NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 14 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ARTHUR LOPEZ, No. 19-55162
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 8:17-cv-01470-DOC-JDE
v.
MEMORANDUM*
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 6, 2020**
Before: BERZON, N.R. SMITH, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.
Arthur Lopez appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in
his action alleging premises liability claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 2671 et seq. (“FTCA”). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
We review de novo. Marlys Bear Med. v. U.S. ex rel. Sec’y of Dep’t of Interior,
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
241 F.3d 1208, 1213 (9th Cir. 2001). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment on Lopez’s FTCA
claims because Lopez failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether the walkway outside the Ronald Reagan Federal Building and Courthouse
was a dangerous condition. See Conrad v. United States, 447 F.3d 760, 767 (9th
Cir. 2006) (“In assessing the United States’ liability under the FTCA, we are
required to apply the law of the state in which the alleged tort occurred.”); Taylor v
Trimble, 13 Cal. App. 5th 934, 944 (2017) (premise liability only arises under
California law if there is a showing plaintiff’s injuries were caused by a
“dangerous condition” on the property).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lopez’s motion for
appointment of counsel because Lopez did not present “exceptional circumstances”
warranting the appointment of counsel. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970
(9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth standard of review and “exceptional circumstances”
standard for appointment of counsel).
To the extent that Lopez challenges the district court’s order denying his
reconsideration motion, we lack jurisdiction over that decision because Lopez did
not file an amended notice of appeal. See Fed. R. App. 4(a)(4)(B)(ii).
We reject as meritless Lopez’s contention that the district court’s dismissal
of his case deprived him of his constitutional rights.
2 19-55162
We do not consider facts or documents that were not raised before the
district court. See United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990).
All pending motions and requests are denied.
AFFIRMED.
3 19-55162