MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any
May 15 2020, 8:59 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Tyler Helmond Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Voyles Vaiana Lukemeyer Baldwin & Attorney General of Indiana
Webb
Indianapolis, Indiana Myriam Serrano
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
William Buckman, May 15, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-2871
v. Appeal from the Vanderburgh
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Robert J. Pigman,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
82D03-1907-F4-4492
Rucker, Senior Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2871 | May 15, 2020 Page 1 of 11
Case Summary
[1] William Buckman appeals his ten-year sentence for causing death when
operating a motor vehicle with a Schedule I or II controlled substance in his
blood. The sole issue Buckman raises is whether his sentence is inappropriate
in light of his character and the nature of the offense. Concluding Buckman has
not carried his burden of persuasion, we affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] At about 8:00 a.m. on Monday February 12, 2019 police officers were
dispatched to First Avenue and Diamond Avenue in Evansville for a report of
an accident with injuries. The accident involved four vehicles all of which
came to rest in the southbound lanes just north of Diamond Avenue. Witnesses
reported that several vehicles in the southbound lane were stopped for a red
light. While they were stopped a silver Ford Escape driven by Buckman was
traveling north on First Avenue when it ran the red light, crossed the center line
into the southbound lane, and struck another vehicle head on. The impact
pushed the vehicle backwards into a second vehicle which in turn collided with
a third vehicle. One witness estimated the speed of the Ford Escape at “about
60 [miles per hour].” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 p. 22.
[3] The first vehicle in the crash was driven by Darla Smith who was transported to
Deaconess Hospital where she was pronounced dead upon arrival. A later
autopsy revealed Smith died as a result of blunt force trauma to the chest. Her
car was pushed into a car driven by Victor Montgomery who was also
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transported to Deaconess Hospital complaining of chest pains. He suffered
broken ribs and internal bleeding. In turn Montgomery’s car was pushed into a
car driven by Sarah May. She too was transported to Deaconess Hospital for
treatment of pain throughout her body. As a result of the collision May
suffered severe whiplash, a severe concussion and Post Traumatic Stress
Disorder. At the time of the collision May was a thirteen-year United States
Army veteran who expected to make a career of the military. However, as a
result of the injuries suffered in the collision May’s doctors recommended the
military to discharge May because she was no longer fit to serve this country.
May’s eighteen-month old son who was a passenger and secured in a car seat
suffered pain in his back and neck. “He has night terrors and wakes up
screaming in the middle of the night.” Tr. Vol. 2 pp. 22-23. According to May,
“[t]his man ended my military career. This man altered my life and my son’s
life.” Id. at 23.
[4] At the scene Buckman admitted to a rescue fire fighter that “he had just smoked
a joint.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 p. 23. Buckman was also transported to
Deaconess Hospital where he was admitted to surgery. A blood test at the
hospital revealed that Buckman tested positive for methamphetamine and THC
– the active ingredient in marijuana. A subsequent diagnostic test showed 25
ng/ml of methamphetamine in Buckman’s blood. A technician explained that
she was concerned about the level of meth in Buckman’s system. According to
the technician the drug “has a crash side effect that is similar to alcohol” and
“estimate[d] Buckman ingested Methamphetamine approximately 48 to 84
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hours before the accident.” Id. at 24. Buckman later advised an investigating
officer that on the Friday before the accident he and a friend “bought $50 of
meth and smoked it that day.” Id. Buckman told the officer that “he used
drugs every weekend.” Id. Police also determined that Buckman’s driver’s
license was suspended and that Buckman did not have auto insurance on his
vehicle.
[5] On July 1, 2019, the State charged Buckman with Count I Causing Death
When Operating a Motor Vehicle with a Schedule I or II Controlled Substance
1
in the Blood, a Level 4 Felony; Count II Operating a Vehicle with a Schedule I
2
or II Controlled Substance or its Metabolite in the Body as a Level 6 Felony,
3
Count III Driving While Suspended a Class A Infraction, and Count IV
4
Operating a Motor Vehicle Without Financial Responsibility a Class A
Infraction. In an open agreement Buckman pleaded guilty as charged.
[6] During a combined change of plea and sentencing hearing held November 22,
2019, several witnesses testified including one of the victims, a family member
of the deceased victim, and members of Buckman’s family. Buckman also
1
Ind. Code § 9-30-5-5(a)(2) (2018).
2
Ind. Code § 9-30-5-1(c) (2018).
3
Ind. Code § 9-24-19-1 (2016).
4
Ind. Code § 9-25-8-2 (2016).
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spoke on his own behalf and apologized for his actions. The trial court found
Buckman guilty of Count I. Citing double jeopardy concerns the trial court did
not enter judgment of conviction on Count II. The trial court also found
Buckman guilty of Counts III and IV. In sentencing Buckman the trial court
declared in pertinent part:
On Count I the Court will find that the aggravating
circumstances which are multiple, first being the nature and
circumstances of the offense resulted in injuries and damage
beyond what was suffered by Darla Smith, the other folks whose
property and health were damaged or impaired by your conduct.
The Defendant’s criminal record is an aggravator. You’ve been
given a number of opportunities, Mr. Buckman, to get yourself
straight and for whatever reason you have been unable to do so.
That’s certainly an aggravating circumstance. Several of those
prior records or prior convictions were for substance abuse. On a
number of occasions you have been given opportunities to
correct that through a variety of programs and that’s not worked
out. The mitigators are the fact that he admitted responsibility
right away and basically has from the beginning and pled guilty
but the aggravating circumstances here far outweigh the
mitigating circumstances calling for sentence above the standard
sentence of six years.
Tr. Vol. 2 p. 33. The trial court then sentenced Buckman to ten years
imprisonment in the Indiana Department of Correction. On Counts III and IV,
the trial court assessed a fine of one hundred dollars each and suspended
Buckman’s driver’s license for five years. This appeal followed. Additional
facts are set forth below.
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Discussion
I. Standard of Review
[7] Buckman seeks to reduce the sentence imposed for his conviction on Count I
pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) which provides that this Court “may
revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial
court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the
nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” Specifically, Buckman
seeks to reduce his sentence from ten years to eight years.
[8] We independently examine the nature of Buckman’s offense and his character
under Rule 7(B) with substantial deference to the trial court’s sentence. See
Satterfield v. State, 33 N.E.3d 344, 355 (Ind. 2015). “In conducting our review,
we do not look to see whether defendant’s sentence is appropriate or if another
sentence might be more appropriate; rather, the test is whether the sentence is
‘inappropriate.’” Barker v. State, 994 N.E.2d 306, 315 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013),
trans. denied. As our Supreme Court has declared “[w]hether we regard a
sentence as inappropriate at the end of the day turns on our sense of culpability
of the defendant, the severity of the crime, the damage done to others, and
myriad other factors that come to light in a given case.” Cardwell v. State, 895
N.E.2d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2008). The principal role of appellate review should be
to attempt to leaven the outliers, “not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ result in
each case.” Id. at 1225. The defendant bears the burden of persuading this
Court that his or her sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d
1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006).
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II. Appropriateness of Sentence
[9] Concerning the nature of the offense “the advisory sentence is the starting point
the legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime
committed.” Kunberger v. State, 46 N.E.3d 966, 973 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). The
advisory sentence for Buckman’s Level 4 felony conviction of causing death
when operating a vehicle with a schedule I or II controlled substance in the
blood is six years with a range of between two years and twelve years. See Ind.
Code § 35-50-2-5.5 (2014). Buckman received a sentence of ten years – two
years less than the maximum permissible sentence.
[10] The nature of the offense is found in the details and circumstances of the
commission of the offense and the defendant’s participation. Croy v. State, 953
N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). When determining the appropriateness
of a sentence that deviates from an advisory sentence, we consider “whether
there is anything more or less egregious about the offense committed by the
defendant that makes it different from the ‘typical’ offense accounted for by the
legislature when it set the advisory sentence.” Holloway v. State, 950 N.E.2d
803, 807 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
[11] In this appeal Buckman downplays the nature of his offense. Referring to the
amount of methamphetamine found in his system and evidence that he ingested
the drug days before the accident, Buckman contends “I wasn’t high that day. I
admitted that I got high over the weekend. This happened on Monday. I just
made a bad, bad judgment call. I was trying to beat the light”. Tr. Vol. 2 p. 29.
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[12] We first observe there is no evidence in the record before us explaining what
level of drugs in a person’s system is necessary before it has an impact on the
person’s judgment. In any event Buckman’s implication that the THC and
methamphetamine in his system did not contribute to the collision is of no
moment. For a charge of operating a vehicle with a controlled substance in the
body causing death or serious bodily injury, of importance is not the causal link
between the person’s use of a controlled substance and death or injury. See
Keckler v. Meridian Sec. Inc. Co., 967 N.E.2d 18, 24 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans.
denied. Instead, of import is whether the “[person’s] ‘driving conduct’ was a
substantial cause of the death or injury.” Id. (citing Abney v. State, 766 N.E.2d
1175, 1178 (Ind. 2002)).
[13] The record is clear that “high” or not, Buckman should not have been driving a
vehicle at all. He did not have a valid driver’s license and had no automobile
insurance. This conduct alone endangered the community as a whole. Further,
Buckman acknowledges that “he could have been suffering some crash effect
from the [methamphetamine].” Appellant’s Br. p. 9. Then, “trying to beat the
light” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 29, Buckman drove through an intersection – at a speed
estimated by one witness as about 60 miles per hour – and crossed the center
line.
[14] The resulting collision not only caused the death of one person, but it also
resulted in injury to at least three other people. The existence of multiple
victims of a crime is an appropriate justification for increasing the sentence for
that crime. French v. State, 839 N.E.2d 196, 197 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans.
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denied. We conclude that the recklessness of Buckman’s actions and the long-
lasting harmful impact it had on others justify the trial court’s imposition of an
enhanced sentence in light of the nature of the offense.
[15] The “character of the offender” standard in Appellate Rule 7(B) refers to the
general sentencing considerations and the relevant aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. Williams v. State, 782 N.E.2d 1039, 1051 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003),
trans. denied. “A defendant’s life and conduct are illustrative of his or her
character.” Morris v. State, 114 N.E.3d 531, 539 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018). When
considering the character of the offender one relevant consideration is the
defendant’s criminal history. Rutherford v. State, 866 N.E.2d 867, 874 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2007). “The significance of a criminal history . . . varies based on the
gravity, nature and number of prior offenses in relation to the current offense.”
Id. And we have held that “[e]ven a minor criminal record reflects poorly on a
defendant’s character.” Reis v. State, 88 N.E.3d 1099, 1105 (Ind. Ct. App.
2017).
[16] The record shows that Buckman has a lengthy criminal record which includes
six felony convictions and numerous misdemeanor convictions, twelve of
which are substance abuse related including the use of methamphetamine. See
Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 pp. 45-48. Contending that he has struggled with
substance abuse throughout his life, Buckman points to testimony offered by
family members at the sentencing hearing that his “substance abuse was the
result of childhood trauma, that he has struggled with substance abuse, and that
he has helped counsel others in maintaining sobriety.” Appellant’s Br. p. 9.
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Buckman suggests that his character should be viewed in a more favorable light
than “a casual user or offender” who has not suffered the challenges “on and off
with sobriety and unsuccessfully went through treatment.” Id. at 10.
[17] Although we have recognized that a history of substance abuse may be a
mitigating circumstance, Field v. State, 843 N.E.2d 1008, 1012 (Ind. Ct. App.
2006, trans. denied, we have also held that when a defendant is aware of a
substance abuse problem but has not taken appropriate steps to treat it, the trial
court does not abuse its discretion by declining to consider it as a mitigating
circumstance. Bryant v. State, 802 N.E.2d 486, 501 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) trans.
denied. Further, “a history of substance abuse is sometimes found by trial courts
to be an aggravator, not a mitigator.” Iddings v. State, 772 N.E.2d 1006, 1018
(Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied.
[18] Here the trial court addressed Buckman’s substance abuse issues. The court
noted that Buckman has “been given a number of opportunities . . . to get
[himself] straight,” but has not taken advantage of those opportunities and that
“[o]n a number of occasions [Buckman has] been given opportunities to correct
that through a variety of programs and that’s not worked out.” Tr. Vol. 2 p. 33.
[19] Buckman’s lengthy criminal history demonstrates that he has shown little
regard for the law and has not been rehabilitated, despite the opportunities to
do so. This conduct reflects poorly on Buckman’s character. See Mefford v.
State, 983 N.E.2d 232, 237-38 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (finding defendant’s
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“extensive and prolonged history of alcohol and drug use despite prior
treatment does not reflect positively on his character.”) trans. denied.
Conclusion
[20] Buckman has failed to persuade this Court that his sentence is inappropriate in
light of the nature of the offense and his character. We therefore affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
[21] Affirmed.
Vaidik, J., and Crone, J., concur.
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