NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 19 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
REYNA DE LOS ANGELES PALACIOS- No. 17-73043
PALACIOS, et al.,
Petitioners, Agency No. A202-123-889
A202-123-890
v.
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM*
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 15, 2020**
San Francisco, California
Before: FRIEDLAND and BENNETT, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF,*** District
Judge.
Petitioner Reyna de Los Angeles Palacios-Palacios (“Palacios-Palacios”)
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
and her minor son, natives and citizens of El Salvador, seek review of the decision
of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying asylum, withholding from
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 We have
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and review both the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”)
and the BIA’s decisions “[w]here, as here, the BIA cites Burbano and also
provides its own review of the evidence and law.” Ali v. Holder, 637 F.3d 1025,
1028 (9th Cir. 2011).
1. We review denials of asylum and withholding of removal for substantial
evidence, and to reverse we “must determine that the evidence not only supports a
contrary conclusion, but compels it.” Silva-Pereira v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 1176, 1184
(9th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s
conclusion that Palacios-Palacios is not eligible for asylum.
First, while Palacios-Palacios received several death threats and these types
of threats alone can constitute persecution, the evidence here does not compel a
finding that Palacios-Palacios suffered past persecution. See Duran-Rodriguez v.
Barr, 918 F.3d 1025, 1028-29 (9th Cir. 2019) (noting that “cases with threats
alone, particularly anonymous or vague ones, rarely constitute persecution”).
Second, Palacios-Palacios argues she is eligible for asylum because she has
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Palacios-Palacios’s minor son has a derivative asylum claim through Palacios-
Palacios; his claim rises or falls with hers. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3).
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a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of her membership in the
particular social group: “Salvadoran women who are single mothers with children,
who own a small business in rural El Salvador, and whose partners are residing in
the United States.” We review de novo whether a particular social group exists and
for substantial evidence that “a specific society recognizes a social group.” Conde
Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1242 (9th Cir. 2020). Palacios-Palacios “must
show that the proposed social group is ‘(1) composed of members who share a
common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially
distinct within the society in question.’” Id. (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. &
N. Dec. 227, 237 (2014)). Based on the record, substantial evidence supports the
BIA’s finding that Salvadoran society does not recognize Palacios-Palacios’s
proposed social group. Palacios-Palacios has not provided any evidence that
Salvadoran society generally recognizes, as a distinct social group, small business
owners who are women. See Conde Quevedo, 947 F.3d at 1242-43. Thus, the BIA
did not err in concluding that Palacios-Palacios failed to establish membership in a
cognizable particular social group.
Because Palacios-Palacios failed to show “membership in a particular social
group” and has not based her asylum claim on any other protected ground, her
asylum claim fails. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). Similarly, Palacios-Palacios is not
eligible for withholding from removal because withholding applicants, like those
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seeking asylum, must prove a nexus between persecution and a protected ground,
which she has failed to do. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3).
2. We review denial of CAT relief for substantial evidence. Silva-Pereira, 827
F.3d at 1184. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Palacios-
Palacios is not eligible for CAT relief. She has not shown a clear probability of
torture if removed to El Salvador by either government officials or private actors
with government acquiescence. Police refusal to investigate the death threats and
extortion Palacios-Palacios reported does not “compel the conclusion that the
police acquiesced in the attack” and thus does not support the claim of future
acquiescence in future attacks. See Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1034
(9th Cir. 2014).
3. “We review an IJ’s decision to deny a request for continuance for abuse of
discretion” and apply a non-exhaustive four-factor test to determine whether the IJ
abused its discretion. See Cui v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1289, 1290, 1292 (9th Cir.
2008) (noting the factors are “(1) the importance of the evidence, (2) the
unreasonableness of the immigrant’s conduct, (3) the inconvenience to the court,
and (4) the number of continuances previously granted”). The IJ did not abuse its
discretion because three of the four factors favor the government.
The first factor favors Palacios-Palacios. She sought a continuance to find an
expert to support her proposed social group, and the BIA denied her claim for
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asylum based on its finding that Palacios-Palacios’s proposed social group was not
cognizable. The potential evidence offered by the expert could have been
important. The second factor favors the government. Palacios-Palacios has not
explained why she could not find the expert prior to the hearing. Her claim rested
on her proposed social group, she was represented by counsel the entire time, and
she had approximately two years before the hearing to locate an expert. The third
factor likewise favors the government: the inconvenience to the court was more
than minor. Palacios-Palacios requested the continuance at the end of the merits
hearing, after the IJ was ready to rule. The IJ would have had to reschedule the
rehearing for a later date and devote additional resources to the case. Cf. id. at 1295
(finding no inconvenience to the court because the time was already reserved for a
merits hearing). The fourth factor also favors the government because Palacios-
Palacios was previously granted several continuances to help her prepare her case.
Cf. id. (finding this factor favored petitioner because “the delays were a result of
the government’s requests and the IJ’s busy calendar”).
The petition for review is DENIED.
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