NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 21 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ABDUL GHAFFAR MIRZADA, AKA No. 19-70812
Abdul Mirzada,
Agency No. A072-083-392
Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM*
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted May 14, 2020**
San Francisco, California
Before: WALLACE and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges, and BLOCK,*** District Judge.
Abdul Ghaffar Mirzada (“Mirzada”) petitions for review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order denying his application for deferral of removal
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have jurisdiction under
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Frederic Block, United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
8 U.S.C. § 1252 and review the BIA’s denial of CAT relief for substantial
evidence—upholding its determination unless “compelled to conclude to the
contrary” by the record. Yali Wang v. Sessions, 861 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 2017).
We find the BIA’s denial is supported by substantial evidence and deny Mirzada’s
petition for review.
To be eligible for deferral of removal under CAT, Mirzada must show that it
is “more likely than not” he would be tortured by or with the acquiescence of
Pakistan governmental officials if returned to that country. Azanor v. Ashcroft, 364
F.3d 1013, 1018 (9th Cir. 2004); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a)(1), (7). He
maintains, specifically, that CAT-relief is appropriate as both his renunciation of
Islam and his tattoos—especially a tattoo of the word “Allah” across his chest—
make him a target for “punishment and torture under Pakistan’s blasphemy laws.”
Pet’r Br. at 10, 19. Both the BIA and Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Mirzada’s
application on the basis that he failed to establish non-practicing Muslims and/or
individuals with tattoos were at a particular risk of torture in Pakistan, either directly
at the hands of the government via prosecution under its blasphemy laws, or else
extrajudicially at the instigation or with the acquiescence of public officials. See
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(B) (evidence of risk must be “credible,” “persuasive, and
refer[] to specific facts”).
Nothing in the record compels a contrary conclusion. Mirzada has not
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identified any instance of persons similarly situated to him—tattooed, non-
practicing Muslims—being singled-out for torture in Pakistan. He conceded in
testimony before the IJ that he had not been to Pakistan in decades, lacked personal
knowledge of that country’s current culture, and knew of no instance where someone
with tattoos was tortured in Pakistan for any reason whatsoever. Finally, he does
not dispute the record evidence showing that tattoo parlors are common across major
Pakistan cities; that tattooed individuals show their tattoos on social media and in
public without apparent retribution; and that 3 to 10 million non-Muslims reside in
Pakistan unmolested. See, e.g., Pakistanis Flock to Tattoo Parlours, BBC News
(Feb. 17, 2012); Sparkle Ink Tattoos (Lahore), Ink Grail Tattoos (Islamabad),
Devil’s Art (Karachi), Facebook (Sept. 14, 2018); Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Pakistan 2017 International Religious
Freedom Report (May 29, 2018).
In sum, the record supports the BIA’s determination that Mirzada failed to
establish non-Muslims and/or those with tattoos are at risk of torture in Pakistan.
Because we deny Mirzada’s petition for review, we deny as moot his motion for a
stay of removal pending appeal. The temporary stay of removal remains in effect
until the issuance of the mandate or further order of the court. 9th Cir. G.O. 6.4(c).
PETITION FOR REVIEW and MOTION FOR STAY OF REMOVAL
PENDING APPEAL DENIED.
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