In the Matter of the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: D.W. (Minor Child), and R.W. (Mother) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
May 22 2020, 9:27 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
Don R. Hostetler INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF
Indianapolis, Indiana CHILD SERVICES
David E. Corey
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
CHILD ADVOCATES, INC.
DeDe K. Connor
Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Involuntary May 22, 2020
Termination of the Parent-Child Court of Appeals Case No.
Relationship of: D.W. (Minor 19A-JT-2587
Child), Appeal from the Marion Superior
and Court
The Honorable Marilyn Moores,
R.W. (Mother), Judge
Appellant-Respondent, The Honorable Scott Stowers,
Magistrate
v. Trial Court Cause No.
49D09-1810-JT-1233

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2587 | May 22, 2020 Page 1 of 21
 The Indiana Department of
Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner,

and

Child Advocates, Inc.,
Guardian ad Litem.

Tavitas, Judge.

Case Summary
[1] R.W. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to D.W. (the

“Child”). We affirm.

Issues
[2] Mother raises two issues on appeal, which we restate as follows:

I. Whether the trial court properly concluded that
continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat
to the Child’s wellbeing.

II. Whether the trial court properly concluded that
termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the Child’s
best interests.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2587 | May 22, 2020 Page 2 of 21
 Facts
[3] Mother and D.S. 1 (“Father”) are the biological parents of the Child, who was

born in March 2016. The Child was born with a missing chromosome and has

extensive special needs.

[4] Mother and Father have developmental disabilities and are “low-functioning.”

Mother’s App. Vol. II p. 26. Mother, who also suffers from bipolar disorder,

borderline personality disorder, and borderline intellectual functioning, has

lived in group homes for her entire adult life. Mother requires disability support

services to manage all aspects of her daily living. 2

[5] In August 2016, Mother and Father were arrested in Marion County for a

domestic disturbance in their shared apartment, which was operated by respite

care provider, Safe Journey. The Child was in the home at the time. During a

preliminary inquiry by the Marion County Office of the Department of Child

Services (“DCS”), Mother stated that she heard whispers; saw and heard the

devil; felt sexually attracted to the Child; and experienced suicidal ideations. A

subsequent DCS assessment revealed Mother’s mental health diagnoses, her

spotty record of taking her prescribed medication, and a recent suicide attempt.

1
D.S. is not a party to this action and has consented in writing to the Child’s adoption.
2
Respite care providers “make[ ] sure that [Mother’s] living is sustained, [ ] her bills are being paid [with
Mother’s Social Security disability income], and . . . assist in everyday living skills.” Tr. Vol. II p. 100.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2587 | May 22, 2020 Page 3 of 21
[6] Nicky Bartak, who was employed as a “Qualified Intellectual Disability

Professional” at Safe Journey at the time of the domestic disturbance,

responded to the apartment as the police were arresting Mother and Father and

as DCS was arranging to remove the Child. Tr. Vol. II p. 166. “[B]ecause of

[the Child’s] medical needs, [DCS] did not have a home ready for him to move

to that night.” Id. at 168. Because Bartak “was trained” regarding the Child’s

care and “was the one responsible for training the staff that was working with

[the Child,]” DCS placed the Child in Bartak’s care for the weekend. Id. at

168-69.

[7] On August 15, 2016, DCS filed a petition alleging that the Child was a child in

need of services (“CHINS”). At the initial hearing held that same day, Mother

admitted that the Child was a CHINS due to her lack of parenting skills. DCS

advised the trial court that DCS “still did not have a placement” for the Child,

and the trial court ordered that the Child should remain with Bartak until DCS

found a suitable placement. Id. at 169. Bartak has served as the Child’s foster

parent since his removal from Mother’s and Father’s care.

[8] The trial court adjudicated the Child as a CHINS on December 1, 2016.

Pursuant to the trial court’s dispositional order entered the same day, Mother

was required to participate in home-based case management services; undergo a

sexual abuse assessment; and follow all recommendations. The trial court also

approved a permanency plan for reunification.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2587 | May 22, 2020 Page 4 of 21
[9] In March 2018, after a permanency hearing, the trial court noted in part the

following:

[ ] Parents have been struggling with [domestic violence] and
Mother is [facing] pending criminal charges. [T]his matter has
been open since August of 2016 and no provider is
recommending that the [C]hild be placed in the care of either
parent.

*****

Mother’s parenting time has been inconsistent due to her mental
health and her inability to take all meds as prescribed.

*****

[Guardian ad litem (“GAL”)] recommends that the plan of
permanency be changed to adoption. GAL states that the child
is medically needy and it would be a stretch that parents would
be able to meet those needs.

Court notes that Mother is pregnant.

[T]he Court now orders that the plan be changed to adoption.

*****

The Court being mindful that in accordance with Ind. Code 31-
34-21-55, the [Child]’s health and safety are the paramount
concerns, finds that DCS has made reasonable efforts to make it
possible for the [Child] to return safely to [his] home, but the
services offered and available have not been effective or
completed such that would allow the return of the [Child]

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2587 | May 22, 2020 Page 5 of 21
 without Court intervention. . . .[I]t is contrary to the health and
welfare of the [Child] to be returned home.

Mother’s App. Vol. II pp. 26, 27.

[10] On June 27, 2018, Mother gave birth to a daughter, R. On October 3, 2018,

DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. On October 17,

2018, and October 26, 2018, Mother was arrested after disputes with support

staff and/or service providers. In each instance, one of the children was

present, as was a support staffer or service provider. Afterwards, the trial court

suspended Mother’s visitation.

[11] The trial court conducted the fact-finding hearing on August 6 and September

5, 2019. On October 2, 2019, the trial court entered findings of fact and

conclusions thereon terminating Mother’s parental rights as follows:

55. There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in the [C]hild’s removal and continued placement
outside of the home will not be remedied by [his] mother.
Despite having nearly three (3) years to put forth an effort,
[Mother] has not demonstrated that her mental health issues
have been treated sufficiently to safely parent the [C]hild.
[Mother] continues to insist that she gave birth to a second child,
[D.], when [the Child] was born. [ ] [Mother] continues to insist
that [D.] was kidnapped and taken out of state by [the Child]’s
current foster mother. She has resided in group homes her entire
adult life, and still cannot have access to sharp knives.

56. Continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to
the [C]hild’s well-being in that it would serve as a barrier for him
obtaining permanency through an adoption when his mother is

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2587 | May 22, 2020 Page 6 of 21
 unable to offer permanency and parent. [Mother] has not seen
the [C]hild in over a year, and [the Child] has extensive special
and medical needs that [Mother] cannot meet. [Mother]
continues to confuse [the Child] with a child that does not exist.

57. Termination of the parent-child relationship is in the [C]hild’s
best interests. Termination would allow him to be adopted into a
stable and permanent home where his needs will be safely met.
[Mother] requires supervision for herself and she is not capable of
addressing [the Child]’s special and medical needs. [The Child]
requires lots of work and patience[;] foster parent provides both.

Mother’s App. Vol. II pp. 18-19. The trial court also found adoption to be a

satisfactory plan for the Child. Mother now appeals.

Analysis
[12] Mother challenges the termination of her parental relationship with the

Child. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects

the traditional rights of parents to establish a home and raise their children. In

re K.T.K. v. Indiana Dept. of Child Services, Dearborn County Office, 989 N.E.2d

1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). “[A] parent’s interest in the upbringing of [his or her]

child is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by

th[e] [c]ourt[s].’” Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S. Ct.

2054 (2000)). We recognize, of course, that parental interests are not absolute

and must be subordinated to the child’s best interests when determining the

proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights. Id. Thus,

“‘[p]arental rights may be terminated when the parents are unable or unwilling

to meet their parental responsibilities by failing to provide for the child’s

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2587 | May 22, 2020 Page 7 of 21
 immediate and long-term needs.’” In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1230 (quoting In

re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied).

[13] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the

evidence or judge witness credibility. In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d 910, 923 (Ind.

2011). We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that are most

favorable to the judgment. Id. We must also give “due regard” to the trial

court’s unique opportunity to judge the credibility of the

witnesses. Id. (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)).

[14] Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8(c), “The trial court shall enter

findings of fact that support the entry of the conclusions required by subsections

(a) and (b)” when granting a petition to terminate parental rights.2 Here, the

trial court did enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in granting DCS’s

petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. When reviewing findings of fact

and conclusions of law entered in a case involving the termination of parental

rights, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. First, we determine whether

the evidence supports the findings, and second, we determine whether the

findings support the judgment. Id. We will set aside the trial court’s judgment

only if it is clearly erroneous. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous if the

findings do not support the trial court’s conclusions or the conclusions do not

support the judgment. Id.

[15] Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8(a) provides that “if the court finds that the

allegations in a petition described in [Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4] are true,

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2587 | May 22, 2020 Page 8 of 21
the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” Indiana Code Section

31-35-2-4(b)(2) provides that a petition to terminate a parent-child relationship

involving a child in need of services must allege, in part:

(B) That one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least
six (6) months under a dispositional decree.

(ii) The court has entered a finding under IC 31-34-21-5.6
that reasonable efforts for family preservation or
reunification are not required, including a description of
the court’s finding, the date of the finding, and the manner
in which the finding was made.

(iii) The child has been removed from the parent and has
been under the supervision of a local office or probation
department for at least fifteen (15) months of the most
recent twenty-two (22) months, beginning with the date
the child is removed from the home as a result of the child
being alleged to be a child in need of services or a
delinquent child.

(C) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
placement outside the home of the parents will not be
remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-
being of the child.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2587 | May 22, 2020 Page 9 of 21
 (iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services;

(D) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(E) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.

DCS must establish these allegations by clear and convincing evidence. In re

V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016).

[16] Mother argues there is no evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that

continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of

the Child. 3 Mother also argues that there is no evidence that termination of her

parental rights is in the best interests of the Child.

A. Continuation of Relationship Poses Threat to Well-being

[17] First, Mother argues there is no evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion

that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-

being of the Child. Mother argues that DCS presented no evidence that Mother

abused, harmed, or was unable to support, meet the physical needs of, or

provide a suitable home environment for the Child.

3
Mother also argues that there is no evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that the conditions that
led to the Child’s removal would not be remedied. Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the
disjunctive; therefore, we need only decide if the trial court’s findings support one of these two requirements.
See In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2587 | May 22, 2020 Page 10 of 21
[18] When considering whether there is sufficient evidence to support such a

finding, trial courts must “consider a parent’s habitual pattern of conduct to

determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect or

deprivation.” Bester v. Lake Cty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 152

(Ind. 2005). “At the same time, however, a trial court should judge a parent’s

fitness to care for his [or her] child as of the time of the termination proceeding,

taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions.” Id.

[19] “It is well established that ‘a trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly

influenced by a deficient lifestyle such that her physical, mental, and social

growth is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child

relationship.’” In re G.F., 135 N.E.3d 654, 661 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting In

re E.S., 762 N.E.2d 1287, 1290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)); see In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d

798, 811 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“Although there was no specific testimony that

either parent had physically abused [the child], there can be little doubt that the

parties’ serious substance abuse addictions detrimentally affected or greatly

endangered her.”), trans. denied.

[20] The trial court entered the following findings and conclusions thereon:

27. The [C]hild is fed via a G-Tube and could not ingest solid
foods until he was one year old.

28. [Mother] is in denial as to the [C]hild’s medical issues . . . .

29. [Mother] doesn’t believe the [C]hild needs a G-Tube, and has
fed him chicken nuggets and French fries, stating that “if my son

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2587 | May 22, 2020 Page 11 of 21
 wants it, I’m going to give it to him” without regard to his
medical situation.

*****

32. Around November 2017, when [Mother] was pregnant with
R[.], she stopped taking her medication and her behavior got
worse.

33. Also . . . [Mother] began to insist that she had given birth to
another child, D[.], when [the Child] was born.

*****

35. On October 17, 2018, [home based case manager] Ms. Rush
was transporting [Mother and the Child] to a parenting time
session . . . .

36. A dispute arose . . . between [Mother] and staff, and as Ms.
Rush was driving [Mother] back, [Mother] attempted to get out
of Ms. Rush’s vehicle when it was moving.

37. Ms. Rush then stopped the vehicle, and [Mother] got out of
the car, grabbed [the Child], and ran off with the [C]hild. . . . .

*****

39. On October 26, 2018, during a parenting time session with
R[.], [Mother] took R[.] out of her home to a Metro/PCS store at
38th Street and College Avenue. [Mother] was not authorized to
have parenting time with R[.] at this time.

*****

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2587 | May 22, 2020 Page 12 of 21
 42. [At the Metro/PCS store, family case manager] Price
observed as [Mother] balled up her fist and swung at [a police]
officer. The officer blocked the punch, but [Mother] bit the
police officer . . . .

43. [Mother] was charged[ ] and pled guilty to Battery Against a
Public Safety Official (F6) and Battery (MB) for the October 26,
2018 incident.

44. Following the October 17, 2018 and the October 26, 2018
incidents, [Mother]’s parenting time was suspended . . . .

45. While residing at First Call, [Mother] became involved in an
altercation with her then roommate [ ].

46. [ ] [Mother] was arrested and later pled guilty to kidnapping
(F-6) from charges that arose from this incident.

*****

48. While residing at First Care,[ 4] [Mother] is not allowed to
have access to knives due to self harm concerns.

49. [Mother] is also not permitted to have locks on her bedroom
and bathroom doors.

50. As recently as late Spring-early Summer 2019, [Mother] has
been involved in self-harming behaviors . . . .

4
At the time of the fact-finding hearing, Mother resided in a group home operated by First Care.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2587 | May 22, 2020 Page 13 of 21
 51. Due to concerns about statements made by [Mother] . . . , the
FCM recommended, and the Court ordered [Mother] participate
in a sex abuse assessment.

52. [Mother] has not completed the sex abuse assessment . . . .

Mother’s App. Vol. II pp. 17, 18.

[21] At the fact-finding hearing, the trial court heard the following evidence.

Mother testified that: (1) she can raise the Child on her own and has been ready

to do so since the Child was removed from her care; (2) her bipolar disorder

“doesn’t affect [her] at all”, “does not affect [her] ability to take care of kids”;

and “doesn’t affect [her] ability to do anything”; and (3) “[n]othing” happens

when she fails to take her prescribed medications, except that she feels “tired[.]”

Tr Vol. II pp. 53, 65. Mother also testified that, after she left Safe Journey, she

learned that she “had twins” when she gave birth to the Child; staffers “[we]re

switching [the twins] back and forth” during visits; and Bartak was “involved”

with D.’s whereabouts. See id. at 36, 38, 40; DCS’s Ex. 17.

[22] Behavior clinician Sussette Horne of Damar Services testified that she crafted

Mother’s behavior support plans (“BSP”), which targeted Mother’s maladaptive

behaviors. Horne testified that, pursuant to Mother’s most recent BSP: (1) there

should be “no locks on the bedroom or bathroom door”; (2) “[w]hen appearing

withdrawn, or isolated, upset . . . , [Mother] has use[d] her closet and bathroom

as an escape to display severe aggression towards self, self-injurious behavior

such as cutting, stabbing, insertion, and chocking [sic] self” and “should have

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2587 | May 22, 2020 Page 14 of 21
 twenty-four-hour supervision”; and (3) “all sharp objects should be also locked

away” as necessary. Tr. Vol. II pp. 114, 116.

[23] Psychiatrist Jeffrey Kellams (“Dr. Kellams”) testified that he began to treat

Mother in January 2019. 5 Dr. Kellams testified that stressors, including those

related to parenting, can adversely affect patients with bipolar disorder and

borderline personality disorder. On direct examination, Dr. Kellams testified 6:

Q: . . . [W]ere you able to form any opinion on how [Mother]
might be able to deal with a child being introduced . . . or caring
for a young child, a four-year-old?

*****

A: Stress is definitely going to have an impact. Children have
stressors that they bring with them just by the nature of children
being children. And if there are disabilities associated with the
Children that simply impacts the stress further.

5
Dr. Kellams also testified that bipolar disorder affects patients’ “predictability and ability to function on a
day to day basis in terms of holding gainful employment, interpersonal relations in their interaction with
children, employers, parents, next door neighbors”; and borderline personality disorder is:

characterized by having multiple symptoms that appear basically almost from day to day,
it’s unpredictable. They show a lot of mood ability, suicidal ideations, suicidal attempts,
unpredictability in terms of making wise reasonable choices and judgments. At times,
they can appear psychotic and actually have hallucinations and delusions. At other
times, they can think quite clearly and look quite good.

Tr. Vol. II p. 129.

6
The trial court allowed the following testimony over the objections of Mother’s counsel.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2587 | May 22, 2020 Page 15 of 21
 *****

A: I think with the history that we have here of the mood
fluctuation with the bi-polar illness and also the personality
disturbance that occurs with . . . borderline personality disorders,
it’s going to be very difficult for her to, on a consistent basis, be
able to provide solid parenting for a child.

*****

A: Much more so because [the Child has] special needs.

Id. at 129, 130, 131.

[24] Tyrenna Rush, a home-based case worker and supervised visit facilitator for

Family Community Partners, testified that, after two incidents in October 2018,

she developed concerns for the Child’s personal safety. Rush testified that,

during an October 17, 2018, argument in a moving vehicle, Mother “randomly

opened” the car door and “want[ed] to get out of the car”; Rush pulled the car

over to defuse the situation, and Mother “proceeded to get out and . . . took

[the Child] out of the car seat and started to run off with him.” Id. at 142, 143.

Rush testified: “During the incident, [the Child] could have been harmed [or]

could have fell [sic] . . . when [Mother] was running with him.” Id. at 143.

Rush testified that, in the second incident, on October 26, 2018, Mother took R.

out of the house in poor weather conditions at a time when Mother was not

authorized to exercise parenting time. Rush testified that she called the police

after both incidents, and Mother fought with the police after the October 26

incident.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2587 | May 22, 2020 Page 16 of 21
[25] Kiley Walker of First Call Residential Living testified regarding Mother’s self-

harm episodes. Walker testified that Mother once cut her arm with “a nail she

had taken out of her dresser” and then denied staffers entry into her bathroom.

See id. at 164. Rush also testified that, on another occasion, she found Mother

“laying [sic] in front of the [bedroom] door with a sock tied around her neck” so

tightly that Mother “couldn’t get it off.” Id. at 163, 164.

[26] Foster Mother Bartak testified that being the Child’s caregiver requires

attentiveness and patience because the Child’s medical needs are extensive. See

id. at 178 (testifying that the Child initially needed nightly feeding pump

changes and required close monitoring to ensure that the Child did not aspirate

in his sleep). The Child is treated by a team of physicians and therapists and,

for instance, has appointments “once a week [for] an hour-long session each

week” with each of four therapists. 7 Id. at 173. Bartak also testified that the

Child, who is nonverbal and learning sign language, frequently requires

correction for inappropriate behaviors. See id. at 174 (testifying that when the

Child is “trying to tell [Bartak] something [she] do[es]n’t understand, he will

7
The Child’s medical providers include a pediatrician, a developmental pediatrician, and a dietician.
Additionally, the Child sees “a G-tube surgeon that sees him on a regular basis to monitor the G-tube”; “a
neurologist for the seizure activity”; “a pulmonologist for his breathing issues and his sleep issues”; “an eye
doctor for his vision”; “his therapist for OT/PT/Speech developmental”; a “physical therapist [to teach the
child to walk appropriately], a speech therapist[;] an occupational therapist[;]and [is] on the waiting list for a
behaviorist.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 172, 173.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2587 | May 22, 2020 Page 17 of 21
 throw himself to the floor,” “throw things[,]” “hit,” and “kick [Bartak]”

“[be]cause he’s frustrated”).

[27] DCS family case manager Mary Price (“FCM Price”) served as the Child’s

FCM beginning in October 2016. FCM Price testified that Mother: (1) has self-

harmed even while under supervision; (2) has stated “that she wanted to kill

herself and her baby”; (3) has not progressed beyond supervised visits; (4)

“fought” and “kicked” multiple police officers in FCM Price’s presence; (5)

acknowledged a sexual attraction to the Child; and (6) failed to complete a sex

offender assessment despite two referrals. Id. at 192, 206, 215.

[28] Former DCS FCM Stephanie Shene testified that, in August 2016, she prepared

a preliminary inquiry report regarding Mother. Over Mother’s objection, the

trial court admitted into evidence the report, which provides, in part, as follows:

[Mother] stated sometimes [ ] things make her mad then she sees
the devil and the devil tells her she is a bad person. [Mother]
stated she also started hearing . . . whispers. [Mother] stated she
has not never [sic] heard these whispers before. FCM asked
[Mother] what the whispers were saying. [Mother] stated it does
not matter what they say because . . . she would never act on or
do what the whispers tell her to do. FCM asked [Mother] if the
whispers are telling her to hurt herself or someone else. [Mother]
stated she did try to hurt herself. [Mother] stated she threw
herself on a moving van. [ ] [Mother] further explained that she
was having sexual feelings towards [the Child]. [ ] [Mother]
stated sometimes when she baths [sic] [the Child] and puts lotion
on him, she starts having those thoughts. [Mother] stated she
knows those are wrong and they are just thoughts. [Mother]
stated those thoughts are part of what caused her to try to kill
herself.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2587 | May 22, 2020 Page 18 of 21
 Id. at 238-39.

[29] Mother’s volatility, resistance to medical guidance, and her failure to undergo a

sex offender assessment pose threats to the Child’s well-being. Moreover, given

the Child’s extensive medical and special needs, coupled with Mother’s low-

functioning status, her need to be supervised herself, and related issues of self-

harm, suicidal ideations, and medication management, the stress inherent in

parenting the Child is beyond Mother’s ability to manage and could threaten

her own well-being. Based on the foregoing, DCS demonstrated by clear and

convincing evidence that a substantial probability of future neglect or

deprivation exists if the parent-child relationship is allowed to

continue. Sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s finding that continuation

of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Child’s wellbeing.

B. Best Interests of the Child

[30] Next, Mother argues that the trial court concluded that termination of her

parental rights is in the best interests of the Child “solely because there is a

better place for the child to live.” Mother’s Br. p. 22. In determining what is in

the best interests of a child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of

the evidence. See In re A.B., 887 N.E.2d 158, 167-68 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). In

doing so, the trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to those of

the child involved. Id. at 168. Termination of a parent-child relationship is

proper where the child’s emotional and physical development is

threatened. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235. A child’s need for permanency is a

“central consideration” in determining the best interests of a child. Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2587 | May 22, 2020 Page 19 of 21
[31] In addition to the testimony above, the trial court also heard the following

testimony at the fact-finding hearing. Guardian ad litem Thomas Heath

testified: “[Mother] has not demonstrated an ability to [ ] care for herself

without significant help, much less a child with special needs.” Tr. Vol. III p. 7.

FCM Nieshia Beverly of DCS testified: “Mother has to be medicated[, and

needs] people to come into her home and take care of her”; “Mother can’t take

care of a special needs child.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 245, 246. FCM Price testified:

. . . [Mother] is violent, she gets arrested, she gets hospitalized.
She does not attend to her mental health the way that she should,
she will . . . refuse to take her medication. . . . I have not seen
her demonstrate the ability to have a physically safe environment
for herself or anyone else.

Id. at 210.

[32] DCS, thus, presented evidence that: (1) Mother cannot meet her own basic

needs or manage her mental health without help; (2) a direct correlation exists

between Mother’s ability to parent, the stability of her mood, and her stress

level; (3) Mother is unwilling to accept the Child’s medical limitations, which

could impair his development; (4) Mother is ill-equipped to simultaneously

manage the Child’s vast medical needs and her own; and (5) Mother has not

undergone an assessment regarding her alleged sexual feelings for the Child.

[33] The record amply supports the trial court’s finding that termination of Mother’s

parental rights is in the Child’s best interests. In re G.F., 135 N.E.3d at 661

(“[A] trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that his

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2587 | May 22, 2020 Page 20 of 21
 or her physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before

terminating the parent-child relationship.”).

Conclusion
[34] Sufficient evidence supports the termination of Mother’s parental rights. We

affirm.

[35] Affirmed.

Riley, J., and Mathias, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-2587 | May 22, 2020 Page 21 of 21