SECOND DIVISION
MILLER, P. J.,
MERCIER and REESE, JJ.
NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
Please refer to the Supreme Court of Georgia Judicial
Emergency Order of March 14, 2020 for further
information at (https://www.gaappeals.us/rules).
June 1, 2020
In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
A20A0933. MCCALL v. COOPER TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY. ME-031
MERCIER, Judge.
Tyrance McCall sued Cooper Tire & Rubber Company (“Cooper Tire”) and
two other defendants in the State Court of Gwinnett County for injuries he allegedly
sustained in a motor vehicle collision. Cooper Tire moved to dismiss the claims
against it on personal jurisdiction grounds. The trial court granted the motion to
dismiss and denied McCall’s motion for reconsideration, but issued a certificate of
immediate review. We granted McCall’s application for interlocutory appeal, and for
reasons that follow, we reverse.
On appeal, we review a trial court’s order dismissing a claim for lack of
personal jurisdiction de novo, construing all facts “in favor of the party asserting
personal jurisdiction.” Kolb v. Daruda, 350 Ga. App. 642 (829 SE2d 881) (2019). So
viewed, McCall’s complaint alleges that on April 24, 2016, he was a passenger in a
vehicle that was equipped with a rear tire designed, manufactured, and sold by
Cooper Tire. As the vehicle was traveling on a Florida roadway, the tire tread
“suddenly failed and separated from the remainder of the tire.” The driver lost control
of the vehicle, which left the roadway and rolled over until it came to rest in a nearby
wooded area. McCall sustained severe injuries in the crash.
Following the collision, McCall sued Cooper Tire for negligence, strict product
liability, and punitive damages. He also asserted claims against the driver, a Georgia
resident, and the Georgia car dealership that sold the vehicle to the driver. Cooper
Tire answered the complaint, raising numerous defenses, including lack of personal
jurisdiction. It also filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that as a nonesident corporate
defendant with only minimal contacts in Georgia, it is not subject to personal
jurisdiction in this state. An accompanying affidavit from Cooper Tire’s corporate
counsel established that Cooper Tire is incorporated in Delaware and maintains its
principal place of business in Ohio.
McCall responded that Cooper Tire is a resident of Georgia – and thus subject
to personal jurisdiction here – because it is authorized to transact business in the state.
In its reply, Cooper Tire did not dispute that it has been authorized to transact
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business in Georgia at all times relevant to this suit. It argued, however, that such
circumstances do not make it a Georgia resident for jurisdictional purposes. The trial
court agreed and granted Cooper Tire’s motion to dismiss. This appeal followed.
Personal jurisdiction “is the power of a court to render a personal judgment, or
to subject the parties in a particular case to the decisions and rulings made by it in
such a case.” YP, LLC v. Ristich, 341 Ga. App. 381 (1) (801 SE2d 80) (2017) (citation
and punctuation omitted). Georgia residents are, without question, subject to personal
jurisdiction in this state. See Watts v. Allstate Ins. Co., 214 Ga. App. 462, 463 (448
SE2d 55) (1994). In certain circumstances, our courts may also exercise personal
jurisdiction over nonresidents pursuant to Georgia’s long arm statute. See OCGA §
9-10-91 (defining “[g]rounds for exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident”).
We need not consider long arm jurisdiction in this case, however, because binding
precedent establishes that Cooper Tire is a resident corporation subject to suit in
Georgia.
The long arm statute defines a “nonresident” as, inter alia, “a corporation which
is not organized or existing under the laws of this state and is not authorized to do or
transact business in this state at the time a claim or cause of action . . . arises.” OCGA
§ 9-10-90. Construing this definition, our Supreme Court determined in Allstate Ins.
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Co. v. Klein, 262 Ga. 599, 601 (422 SE2d 863) (1992), that a foreign corporation
“authorized to do or transact business in this state at the time a claim arises is a
‘resident’ for purposes of personal jurisdiction over that corporation in an action filed
in the courts of this state.” (citations and punctuation omitted). In other words, a
foreign corporation that is authorized to transact business in Georgia “may sue or be
sued to the same extent as a domestic corporation.” Id.
Seeking to avoid Klein, Cooper Tire argues that our Supreme Court’s
jurisdictional analysis conflicts with and has been implicitly overruled by several
decisions from the United States Supreme Court. It further claims that Klein
misinterpreted the long arm statute and Georgia’s corporate registration requirements.
As we recently noted, however, “[w]hen the Supreme Court [of Georgia] has
addressed an issue in clear terms, this court is not at liberty to decline to follow the
established rule of law.” Ward v. Marriott Intl., 352 Ga. App. 488, 493 (2) (a) (835
SE2d 322) (2019) (citations and punctuation omitted).
We cannot ignore or alter Klein, which explicitly holds that a foreign
corporation authorized to do business in this state is a Georgia resident for
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jurisdictional purposes.1 See Klein, supra; see also Ward, supra at 494 (2) (a)
(“[E]xisting Georgia law leads us to conclude that Marriott[,] [a foreign corporation
registered and authorized to do business in Georgia,] is a resident defendant
corporation for . . . personal jurisdiction purposes.”). Accordingly, because Cooper
Tire is a resident corporation subject to personal jurisdiction in this state, the trial
court erred in granting the motion to dismiss. See Klein, supra; Ward, supra.
Judgment reversed. Miller, P. J., and Reese, J., concur.
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On appeal, Cooper Tire urges us to find that Klein’s analysis violates the Due
Process Clause and the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. When
we originally reviewed this case at the interlocutory application stage, we transferred
the matter to the Georgia Supreme Court because it appeared to fall within that
Court’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction “over all cases involving construction of the
Constitution of the State of Georgia and of the United States and all cases in which
the constitutionality of a law, ordinance, or constitutional provision has been called
into question.” Atlanta Independent School System v. Lane, 266 Ga. 657 (1) (469
SE2d 22) (1996). The Supreme Court rejected the transfer, returning the case to this
Court after concluding that Cooper Tire had not raised a distinct constitutional
challenge in the trial court. It further stated: “[W]here [the Supreme Court of
Georgia’s] prior precedents answer the substantive constitutional question presented
by an appeal, jurisdiction is in the Court of Appeals.” We take this admonition to
mean that, in the Supreme Court’s view, Klein addressed and resolved the issues
raised by Cooper Tire in this appeal. To the extent Cooper Tire challenges that view,
it presents a question for the Supreme Court. See Ward, supra at 493 (2) (a) (“[A]s an
intermediate appellate court, we are bound by Georgia statutes and Supreme Court
of Georgia decisions.”).
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