NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2538-18T3
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
GARVENS ALEXANDRE, a/k/a
ALEXANDRE GARVIN,
ALEXANDRE GARVINS, and
ALEXANDRE GARVEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________
Submitted May 13, 2020 – Decided June 8, 2020
Before Judges Gooden Brown and Mawla.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Union County, Indictment No. 17-08-0556.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Michele E. Friedman, Assistant Deputy
Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Lyndsay V. Ruotolo, Acting Union County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Michele C. Buckley, Special
Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor,
of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from his
vehicle without a warrant after a motor vehicle stop, defendant entered a
negotiated guilty plea to unlawful possession of a controlled dangerous
substance, namely alprazolam or Xanax, with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A.
2C:35-5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(13). He was sentenced in accordance
with the plea agreement to three years' probation conditioned upon serving 180
days at the county jail at the end of the probationary term.
Defendant now appeals from the September 6, 2018 memorializing
judgment of conviction, raising the following single point for our consideration:
BECAUSE THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
A DIMMED HEADLIGHT CREATED
REASONABLE SUSPICION SUFFICIENT TO
JUSTIFY STOPPING THE CARAVAN, THIS
MATTER MUST BE REMANDED FOR A NEW
ANALYSIS OF REASONABLE SUSPICION,
ABSENT THE IMPROPER CONSIDERATION OF
THE HEADLIGHT.
After reviewing the record and the applicable legal principles, we find no
merit to defendant's contention because the judge's finding of reasonable
suspicion did not rely exclusively on "a dimmed headlight." Rather, in denying
defendant's suppression motion, Judge Candido Rodriguez, Jr. determined that
defendant's car was "lawfully stopped . . . because of the various motor vehicle
A-2538-18T3
2
violations committed by defendant." We therefore affirm substantially for the
reasons stated in Judge Rodriguez's comprehensive and well-reasoned written
opinion issued on June 20, 2018. We add these comments.
At the suppression hearing, Officer Luciano Porto testified for the State.
Based on his testimony, which the judge found "credible," 1 Judge Rodriguez
made the following key factual findings:
On March 23, 2017, at approximately 9:18 p.m.,
Elizabeth Police Officers Eric Gora and Luciano Porto
were patrolling the high crime area of Walnut Street
and Magnolia Avenue in Elizabeth . . . . While on
patrol, Officer Porto testified that he observed a Dodge
Grand Caravan . . . traveling west on Magnolia Avenue
approaching Walnut Street. The vehicle was traveling
at a high rate of speed over [twenty-five] miles per
hour.[2]
Officer Porto also observed that the passenger
side headlight was partially inoperable, and that neither
the driver[3] nor passenger in the vehicle had a fastened
seatbelt. The police officers positioned their police
vehicle behind the Dodge . . . and the [o]fficers could
see the driver and passenger moving about the cabin.
This caused the Dodge . . . to jerk to the right, almost
1
The officer's testimony was also supported by the body camera footage that
the judge viewed.
2
Porto testified the posted speed limit on Magnolia Avenue was twenty-five
miles per hour.
3
The driver was identified as defendant. "The [o]fficers and [d]efendant[] were
familiar with each other from prior investigations."
A-2538-18T3
3
striking a parked vehicle. At this time, the [o]fficers
activated their overhead lights and siren to conduct a
motor vehicle stop. The Dodge . . . came to a complete
stop in front of 1215 Magnolia Avenue . . . .
Upon approaching the Dodge, Gora detected "a strong smell of marijuana
emanating from the vehicle," and asked defendant, who "was visibly nervous,"
to "step out of the vehicle in order to conduct a search." Initially, defendant
"refused to step out of the vehicle" and "requested that a supervisor be brought
to the scene." When defendant eventually "stepped out [of the vehicle,] an odor
of marijuana emanated from [his] person." As a result,
Gora proceeded to search defendant . . . and located two
unmarked prescription pill bottles in his jacket's
pockets. Recovered from inside the first bottle were
[fifty-seven] Alprazolam pills. Inside the second pill
bottle, the police located . . . a total of [twenty-five]
glassine envelopes containing suspected heroin, . . .
suspected cocaine packaged in [twenty-five] pink tinted
baggies[,] and . . . one knotted plastic bag containing
suspected marijuana. Defendant . . . had $915 in his
possession . . . . A search of the Dodge . . . proved
negative for further contraband. [4]
4
The passenger was also ordered to step out of the vehicle once Gora
determined that he "had an active warrant." As the passenger exited the vehicle,
he "attempted to [discreetly] drop onto the ground a knotted sandwich baggie,
containing various medium sized Ziploc baggies of suspected marijuana," which
was "immediately recovered" by Porto. Following the encounter, defendant was
issued several motor vehicle summonses, including careless driving, N.J.S.A.
39:4-97, failure to maintain headlamps, N.J.S.A. 39:3-66, and failure to wear a
seatbelt, N.J.S.A. 39:3-76.2f.
A-2538-18T3
4
Judge Rodriguez determined that as a result of their "personal
observations," the "officers lawfully stopped defendant's vehicle" based on their
objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion that the driver committed a
motor vehicle violation. See State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 33-34 (2016) ("Under
both the Fourth Amendment and Article I, Paragraph 7 [of the New Jersey
Constitution], ordinarily, a police officer must have a reasonable and articulable
suspicion that the driver of a vehicle . . . is committing a motor-vehicle violation
. . . to justify a stop." (citing State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470 (1999))).
In support, Judge Rodriguez pointed to the fact that defendant was
"traveling at a high rate of speed, the passenger's headlight was partially
inoperable, neither the driver [n]or the passenger had a fastened seatbelt, and
[d]efendant['s] . . . car jerked to the right, almost striking a parked vehicle." See
State v. Pitcher, 379 N.J. Super. 308, 315 (App. Div. 2005) ("In evaluating the
sufficiency of the basis for a stop . . . , courts consider the totality of the
information available to the officer at the time of the conduct."); State v. Arthur,
149 N.J. 1, 7-8 (1997) ("[T]he officer 'must be able to point to specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant [the] intrusion.'" (second alteration in original) (quoting
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1969))).
A-2538-18T3
5
Further, the judge found that "the officers lawfully detained defendants"
to investigate based on the fact that "[t]he motor vehicle stop occurred in a high
crime area," defendant "bec[a]me visibly nervous . . . during the traffic stop,"
and Officer Gora "almost immediately detect[ed] an odor of raw marijuana
emanating from the vehicle." See State v. Dickey, 152 N.J. 468, 479-80 (1998)
("If, during the course of the stop or as a result of the reasonable inquiries
initiated by the officer, the circumstances 'give rise to suspicions unrelated to
the traffic offense, an officer may broaden [the] inquiry and satisfy those
suspicions.'" (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 58 F.3d
356, 357-58 (8th Cir. 1995))).
According to the judge, "not only did the officers validly stop the vehicle
after witnessing [d]efendant . . . commit various traffic infractions, but once the
vehicle was stopped the [o]fficers acquired probable cause based on plain
smell." See State v. Walker, 213 N.J. 281, 290 (2013) ("New Jersey courts have
recognized that the smell of marijuana itself constitutes probable cause 'that a
criminal offense ha[s] been committed and that additional contraband might be
present.'" (quoting State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 515-16 (2003) (alteration in
original))). The judge concluded that "[g]iven the totality of the circumstances,"
the stop, search and seizure were constitutionally permissible.
A-2538-18T3
6
On appeal, defendant only challenges the motor vehicle stop. He argues
that because Porto's testimony that "[defendant] violated the headlight statutes"
was deficient, the judge's "reasonable-suspicion calculus was erroneous, and the
matter must be remanded for a proper determination of whether reasonable
suspicion existed absent the flawed inclusion of the partially-illuminated
headlight." Specifically, according to defendant, there was no testimony that
the light from the headlight failed to project a distance of 500 feet as required
under N.J.S.A. 39:3-48(b).5 However, even without Porto's testimony regarding
the headlight violation, there remains ample reasonable suspicion that defendant
committed a motor vehicle infraction to justify the stop from the other violations
observed by the officers and found by the judge.
We conclude there was sufficient credible evidence in the record to
support Judge Rodriguez's factual findings. See State v. Boone, 232 N.J. 417,
425-26 (2017) ("An appellate court reviewing a motion to suppress evidence in
5
Even if there was a mistake on the part of Porto, based on our decision, we
need not address whether the officer's reasonable suspicion that defendant
violated the headlight statute constituted a "mistake-of-fact" or "a mistake of
law." State v. Sutherland, 231 N.J. 429, 439 (2018). If the former, "the State
need prove only that the police lawfully stopped the car, not that it could convict
the driver of the motor-vehicle offense." State v. Williamson, 138 N.J. 302, 304
(1994). See also State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470 (1999) (noting that the
State is not required to prove that the motor vehicle violation occurred in order
to meet the standard of reasonable suspicion).
A-2538-18T3
7
a criminal case must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's
decision, provided that those findings are 'supported by sufficient credible
evidence in the record.'" (quoting State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 40 (2016))). We
also agree with the judge's legal conclusions, which we review de novo. See
State v. Brown, 456 N.J. Super. 352, 358-59 (App. Div. 2018) ("We owe no
deference, however, to conclusions of law made by trial courts in deciding
suppression motions, which we instead review de novo." (citing State v. Watts,
223 N.J. 503, 516 (2015))). Defendant's contrary arguments do not warrant
further discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
A-2538-18T3
8