NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 11 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GABRIEL ECKARD, AKA Gabriel Allen No. 19-36010
Eckard,
D.C. No. 2:18-cv-01810-RSM
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. MEMORANDUM*
CHARLES MITCHELL, Classification
Counselor; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Washington
Ricardo S. Martinez, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 2, 2020**
Before: LEAVY, PAEZ, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
Washington state prisoner Gabriel Eckard appeals pro se from the district
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging due process
violations while he was a pretrial detainee. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
§ 1291. We review de novo. Nev. Dep’t of Corr. v. Greene, 648 F.3d 1014, 1018
(9th Cir. 2011). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Eckard failed
to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether his placement in maximum
security housing was not reasonably related to the jail’s legitimate objectives of
maintaining safety and security. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538-39 (1979)
(“Absent a showing of an expressed intent to punish on the part of detention
facility officials . . . if a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is
reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without
more, amount to punishment.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
To the extent that Eckard contends he was retained in maximum security housing
without due process, we reject this contention as unsupported by the record. See
Toussaint v. McCarthy, 801 F.2d 1080, 1100 (9th Cir. 1986) (inmates in
administrative segregation are entitled to due process protections consisting of
periodic review, notice of hearings, and an opportunity to be heard), abrogated in
part on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482-83 (1995).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Eckard’s motion to
amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) because Eckard
failed to demonstrate any basis for relief. See Zimmerman v. City of Oakland, 255
F.3d 734, 740 (9th Cir. 2001) (setting forth standard of review and discussing
2 19-36010
factors for granting a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e)).
AFFIRMED.
3 19-36010
Gabriel Eckard v. Charles Mitchell
Combined Opinion