FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
JUN 12 2020
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CARL J. CIESLIKOWSKI; CATHY L. No. 19-55679
CIESLIKOWSKI,
D.C. No. 5:17-cv-00562-MRW
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v. MEMORANDUM*
FCA US LLC, a Delaware Limited
Liability Company,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Michael R. Wilner, Magistrate Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 2, 2020**
Pasadena, California
Before: FERNANDEZ and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and AMON,*** District
Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Carol Bagley Amon, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
Plaintiffs Carl J. Cieslikowski and Cathy L. Cieslikowski (the
Cieslikowskis) appeal the judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) entered against
them after a jury returned a verdict in their favor in their action against FCA US
LLC (Chrysler) for defects in their model year 2012 Jeep Grand Cherokee vehicle
(the 2012 Jeep). They argue that the district court erred in determining that the
evidence was inadequate to support the jury’s verdict on their fraudulent
concealment1 claim. We reverse in part, and we vacate and remand in part.
Substantial evidence supported the jury’s verdict. See Johnson v. Paradise
Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 251 F.3d 1222, 1226–27 (9th Cir. 2001); see also EEOC
v. Go Daddy Software, Inc., 581 F.3d 951, 961 (9th Cir. 2009). Viewing the record
in the light most favorable to the Cieslikowskis,2 a reasonable jury could conclude
that Chrysler knew3 of the problematic Totally Integrated Power Module (TIPM) in
the 2012 Jeep when it provided that vehicle to the Cieslikowskis in December
2011. The jury could reasonably determine that it is material to a reasonable
1
See Kaldenbach v. Mut. of Omaha Life Ins. Co., 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d
637, 652 (Ct. App. 2009).
2
See Johnson, 251 F.3d at 1226; see also Go Daddy Software, 581 F.3d
at 961.
3
See RSB Vineyards, LLC v. Orsi, 223 Cal. Rptr. 3d 458, 464–65 (Ct.
App. 2017); OCM Principal Opportunities Fund, L.P. v. CIBC World Mkts. Corp.,
68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 828, 854 (Ct. App. 2007).
2
consumer that a vehicle has a problematic component (i.e., the TIPM) that causes
its engine to stall unexpectedly or fail to start reliably. See Engalla v. Permanente
Med. Grp., Inc., 938 P.2d 903, 919 (Cal. 1997); see also Gutierrez v. Carmax Auto
Superstores Cal., 248 Cal. Rptr. 3d 61, 87 (Ct. App. 2018). There was evidence
suggesting that TIPMs were materially similar across Chrysler’s vehicle models,
that they shared common and obvious defects that caused the vehicle engines to
stall or to fail to start, that Chrysler knew of the problem, and that Chrysler did not
know whether the problem had been solved. In light of the evidence, the jury
could reasonably infer4 that Chrysler committed fraud when it provided the 2012
Jeep to the Cieslikowskis and assured Carl Cieslikowski that the electrical
problems affecting their previous Jeep had been resolved. See Rutledge v. Hewlett-
Packard Co., 190 Cal. Rptr. 3d 411, 422–24 (Ct. App. 2015); see also Kaldenbach,
100 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 652. Thus, the district court erred in entering JMOL on the
merits of the Cieslikowskis’ fraudulent concealment claim, and the compensatory
damages award following therefrom.
As a result of the grant of the JMOL on the merits of the fraudulent
concealment claim, the district court also overturned the punitive damages award
against Chrysler. In light of our conclusion regarding the merits, we also vacate
4
United States v. Navarette-Aguilar, 813 F.3d 785, 793 (9th Cir. 2015).
3
the grant of the JMOL on the punitive damages award and remand for the district
court to decide in the first instance whether substantial evidence supported the
jury’s punitive damages verdict.5 See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273,
291–92, 102 S. Ct. 1781, 1791–92, 72 L. Ed. 2d 66 (1982).
REVERSED in part, and VACATED and REMANDED in part. Costs
shall be taxed to Chrysler.
5
We note that Chrysler also sought relief on the bases that the
Cieslikowskis had sought and obtained a civil penalty, that there was insufficient
evidence that a Chrysler managing agent had ratified the fraud, and that the
punitive damages award was unconstitutionally excessive.
4