MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jun 16 2020, 11:34 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
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ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Cara Schaefer Wieneke Matthew B. MacKenzie
Brooklyn, Indiana Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Bradley F. Wallace, June 16, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
20A-CR-20
v. Appeal from the Vanderburgh
Circuit Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable David D. Kiely,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
The Honorable Michael J. Cox,
Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
82C01-1902-F6-1404
Riley, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-20 | June 16, 2020 Page 1 of 6
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1] Appellant-Defendant, Bradley Wallace (Wallace), appeals following his
conviction for trespass, a Level 6 felony, Ind. Code § 35-43-2-2(b)(1).
[2] We affirm.
ISSUE
[3] Wallace presents the court with one issue, which we restate as: Whether the
State presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
Wallace trespassed.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4] Prior to April 2018, Wallace’s father, George, allowed Wallace to live in his
home on Kleitz Road in Evansville, Indiana. However, Wallace refused to
follow George’s rules for the home, and George became afraid that Wallace
would hurt him. On April 27, 2018, George contacted the Vanderburgh
County Sheriff’s Office (VCSO) and had a ban put in place prohibiting Wallace
from being on George’s property. The ban went into effect on April 28, 2018,
and VCSO Deputy Mark Johnson (Deputy Johnson) advised Wallace in person
on that day that Wallace was not allowed to come onto George’s property
unless he had George’s permission. Deputy Johnson also informed Wallace
that if he entered the property without George’s permission, he would be
arrested for trespass. Wallace indicated to Deputy Johnson that he understood
the ban.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-20 | June 16, 2020 Page 2 of 6
[5] On February 26, 2019, Wallace came onto George’s property and entered his
garage. George discovered him and told Wallace to be gone by the time he
returned from work. Later in the day George returned from work, but Wallace
was still there. George called the VCSO, and Wallace was arrested.
[6] On February 28, 2019, the State filed an Information, charging Wallace with
Class A misdemeanor trespass which it alleged was elevated to a Level 6 felony
due to a prior trespass conviction in 2018. On August 23, 2019, the trial court
held Wallace’s bifurcated jury trial. George testified on cross-examination that
after the ban had been put in place, Wallace could have returned to retrieve any
property he had at the home and visit, as long as he did not stay. On re-direct
examination, George stated that after the ban was in effect, Wallace had never
returned to the property until February 26, 2019.
[7] In his closing statements, Wallace argued to the jury that he could not be
convicted of trespass because, after the ban was in place, George consented to
him being at the home. The State argued in response that George had never
contacted the VCSO to have the ban formally lifted and George’s oral consent
was irrelevant because the trespass statute did not provide an exception for
consent. The jury found Wallace guilty of Class A misdemeanor trespass, and
Wallace admitted that he had the previous conviction for trespass as alleged in
the enhancement Information. On December 5, 2019, the trial court sentenced
Wallace to two years of imprisonment.
[8] Wallace now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-20 | June 16, 2020 Page 3 of 6
DISCUSSION AND DECISION
[9] Wallace argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.
It is well-established that when we review the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a conviction, we consider only the probative evidence and reasonable
inferences supporting the verdict. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind.
2007). It is not our role as an appellate court to assess witness credibility or to
weigh the evidence. Id. We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable
fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id.
[10] “A person who . . . not having a contractual interest in the property, knowingly
or intentionally enters the real property of another person after having been
denied entry by the other person” commits criminal trespass, a Class A
misdemeanor. I.C. § 35-43-2-2(b)(1). The offense is elevated to a Level 6
felony if the person has a prior conviction for trespass. Id. Here, the evidence
showed that on February 26, 2019, Wallace entered George’s property after
Wallace had been given notice on April 28, 2018, that George had denied him
entry by placing a ban against him and being told that, if he entered the
property, he would be arrested for trespass. We hold this evidence to be
sufficient to sustain Wallace’s conviction. See Blair v. State, 62 N.E.3d 424, 426-
28 (finding sufficient evidence of trespass where Blair entered a home after
being told by its owner to leave).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-20 | June 16, 2020 Page 4 of 6
[11] Wallace acknowledges that he did not have a contractual interest in George’s
property and that he knowingly or intentionally entered on February 26, 2019.
Wallace disputes that he was denied entry to the property for purposes of the
trespass statute because the evidence showed that George consented to his
presence there. In support of this argument, Wallace directs our attention to
George’s testimony during cross-examination which Wallace asserts showed
that “George told Wallace that even after the ban Wallace was permitted to
enter the property to obtain his belongings and to visit the family at the home,
but Wallace was not permitted to stay there.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 5). Thus,
Wallace argues, George rescinded the ban, and “Wallace was only on notice
that he could enter the property if he wished but could not stay for an undefined
amount of time.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 9).
[12] We find this argument to be unpersuasive for at least two reasons. Wallace’s
argument is premised on a mischaracterization of George’s testimony. Our
review of the record leads us to conclude that even though George testified on
cross-examination that he would not have minded if Wallace entered his
property to briefly visit or retrieve his property, there is no evidence that George
ever communicated that to Wallace after the ban was in effect. In addition,
even if we were to assume, without deciding, that George could legally rescind
his denial of entry with such statements, George testified that he told Wallace
on February 26, 2019, to be gone from his property before he returned from
work, which was a subsequent denial of entry. This is the evidence that
supports the jury’s verdict, and it is the only evidence we consider as part of our
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-CR-20 | June 16, 2020 Page 5 of 6
review. See Drane, 867 N.E.2d at 146. Accordingly, we find that sufficient
evidence supported the jury’s verdict.
CONCLUSION
[13] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the State proved beyond a reasonable
doubt that Wallace committed the offense of trespass.
[14] Affirmed.
Mathias, J. and Tavitas, J. concur
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