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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
CHRISTIAN WOODSON
Appellant No. 1382 MDA 2019
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 18, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Criminal Division at No: CP-36-CR-0005302-2016
BEFORE: STABILE, J., DUBOW, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED JUNE 16, 2020
Appellant, Christian Woodson, appeals from an order denying relief
under the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541—46. Appellant
argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for
possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance (“PWID”), 35
Pa.C.S.A. § 780-113(a)(30). We affirm.
The following evidence was adduced during Appellant’s trial:
Officer Jared Snader (“Snader”) [of the] LCBP [Lancaster County
Police] testified that on February 26, 2016, he was working
undercover driving in the area of Queen and Conestoga Streets in
Lancaster City targeting street-level drug sales. At the time of the
investigation, this was “the single worst drug area in Lancaster
City, especially for heroin.” Snader told the jury that he had been
an officer for ten years, he was assigned to a special unit designed
to investigate drug-related issues, he received special training for
drug investigations, and he had been involved in over one
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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thousand drug investigations. According to Snader, most
transactions involve a middleman who hangs out in high drug
areas, accepts money from the buyer, and then meets up with a
supplier who provides the drugs. This process isolates the supplier
from dealing directly with people they do not know, while the
middleman gets to keep some of the money or drugs. Without
going through a middleman, it would be very difficult to purchase
drugs.
Regarding this specific transaction, Snader testified that he and
Officer Adam Flurry. (“Flurry”), LCBP, were driving together in a
vehicle when Flurry made contact with an individual later
identified as Santiago-Rivera, at which time Flurry had a
conversation with Santiago-Rivera about purchasing heroin.
Santiago-Rivera got into the undercover vehicle and told Snader
where to drive, while Flurry gave Santiago-Rivera $40 of
previously marked United States currency. Santiago-Rivera asked
to borrow Flurry’s phone, and Snader testified that he heard
buttons being pressed which sounded as if Santiago-Rivera was
sending text messages.
Santiago-Rivera directed Snader to pull over in front of Save-A-
Lot, where Santiago-Rivera began placing phone calls. Snader
testified “[i]t was obvious to me at that point that he was a
middleman. He didn’t have [the heroin] on him. He was
contacting somebody to come and bring the heroin for us.”
Santiago-Rivera called his contact several times, giving his
location over the phone. Santiago-Rivera then directed Snader to
drive to the Andromeda Grocery, where Santiago-Rivera said he
was going to get change. Flurry had given Santiago-Rivera two
$20 bills, and Snader believed Santiago-Rivera wanted change so
he could keep $10 for himself. When Santiago-Rivera exited the
store, he placed several more phone calls with his contact. During
the phone calls, Santiago-Rivera informed his contact that he was
waiting in a van and described the vehicle.
Snader then observed an individual, later identified as [Appellant],
walk towards their location and stop to meet with Santiago-Rivera.
Santiago-Rivera and [Appellant] talked for about 30 seconds,
standing approximately one foot apart. Santiago-Rivera then
reached his left arm towards [Appellant], [Appellant] extended his
arm, and it appeared as if they were exchanging something.
When Santiago-Rivera broke contact with [Appellant], Snader
could see that [Appellant] had money in his hands that he was
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counting as he walked away. It was light out, and from his
training and experience Snader testified this was “absolutely a
hand-to-hand drug transaction.” Santiago-Rivera got back into
the undercover vehicle, at which time Flurry stated the deal was
complete and Santiago-Rivera was dropped off at another
location. [Appellant] was then stopped by another officer under a
ruse so they could verify his identity. After testifying about the
transaction, Snader identified [Appellant] in the courtroom as the
individual who conducted the hand-to-hand transaction with
Santiago-Rivera. In addition to Snader, Officer Flurry testified
about his assignment to the Selective Enforcement Unit, the
extensive training he has received in drug investigations, and his
involvement in over one thousand such investigations[, including
the role of a middleman in those transactions] . ....
Regarding this specific incident, Flurry testified that while he and
Snader were driving in a high drug activity area of the city, Flurry
saw a person later identified as Santiago-Rivera walking in the
street. Flurry had a conversation with Santiago-Rivera about
purchasing heroin, and Santiago-Rivera stated he could assist
Flurry. Santiago-Rivera got into the vehicle, at which time Flurry
gave him $40 of United States currency. Santiago-Rivera asked
for Flurry’s cell-phone, Flurry gave it to him, and Flurry then heard
Santiago-Rivera send text messages. Later, upon reviewing the
text messages, Flurry saw they were written in Spanish to a
person who was not available. At some point, Santiago-Rivera
made a telephone call and cryptically spoke to the other person in
broken English, asking where the person was. Santiago-Rivera
then made a series of additional calls, and it was later determined
by Flurry while inspecting the phone that they were all made to
the same phone number. That number could not be traced.
Thereafter, Santiago-Rivera met with an individual on the
sidewalk, but Flurry could not see what occurred because they
were out of his field of vision.
When Santiago-Rivera returned to the car, he handed Flurry the
heroin. Flurry later gave the packets of suspected heroin to Officer
Jason Hagy (“Hagy”). Officer Hagy, LCBP, also a member of the
Selective Enforcement Unit, detailed his training and experience
in drug investigations. On February 26, 2016, Hagy was the
primary surveillance officer in charge of this investigation,
traveling in a separate vehicle. During the surveillance, Hagy
witnessed Santiago-Rivera meet up with another individual that
Santiago-Rivera obviously knew. Hagy saw Santiago-Rivera
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retrieve something with his left hand and stick it in his left jacket
pocket, while the other person was manipulating what appeared
to be paper currency. This interaction was indicative of a drug
transaction. Hagy identified [Appellant] in court as the person
who came into contact with Santiago-Rivera.
Trial Court Opinion, 11/21/2017, at 5-9 (record citations and footnotes
omitted). The Commonwealth introduced video footage showing the hand-to-
hand exchange between Santiago-Rivera and Appellant. Another police officer
apprehended Appellant as he walked away from the transaction with Santiago-
Rivera. The packets that Santiago-Rivera received from Appellant and handed
to Flurry tested positive for heroin.
Appellant was charged with delivery of heroin, criminal conspiracy to
deliver heroin to an undercover officer, and criminal use of a communication
facility. On April 13, 2017, the jury found Appellant guilty of delivery of heroin
and criminal conspiracy to deliver heroin, but not guilty of criminal use of a
communication facility. On July 12, 2017, the court imposed consecutive
sentences of 27-60 months’ imprisonment on each count. On July 21, 2017,
Appellant filed a motion for judgment of acquittal, motion for new trial, and
motion to reconsider sentence. On July 28, 2017, Appellant filed a
supplemental motion to modify sentence. On September 1, 2017, the court
denied all post-sentence motions. Appellant timely appealed to the Superior
Court, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his conspiracy
conviction. On June 20, 2018, this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence.
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Commonwealth v. Woodson, 2018 WL 3045876 (Pa. Super., June 20,
2018).
On February 28, 2019, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition raising
multiple claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The PCRA court appointed
counsel, who filed a Turner/Finley1 no merit letter and a motion to withdraw.
The no merit letter addressed the claims raised in Appellant’s PCRA petition
and five more claims raised by Appellant during their correspondence and
conversations, including a contention that the evidence was insufficient to
sustain his convictions. On June 4, 2019, the PCRA court filed a Pa.R.Crim.P.
907 notice of intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a hearing.
Appellant filed a lengthy pro se response in opposition to the Rule 907 notice.
On July 18, 2019, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition and granted
PCRA counsel leave to withdraw.
On August 15, 2019, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to this
Court. On August 20, 2019, the PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a
Pa.R.A.P. 1925 statement within twenty-one days. On September 6, 2019,
Appellant submitted a Rule 1925(b) statement to prison authorities. On
October 1, 2019, the PCRA court filed an opinion recommending quashal of
this appeal due to untimely service of Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement.
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1Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth v.
Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
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We decline to quash this appeal because Appellant submitted the Rule 1925(b)
statement to prison authorities on September 6, 2019, within twenty-one days
of the PCRA court’s order. Pa.R.A.P. 121(a) (“a pro se filing submitted by a
prisoner incarcerated in a correctional facility is deemed filed as of the date it
is delivered to the prison authorities for purposes of mailing or placed in the
institutional mailbox”).
We will not reprint the questions raised in Appellant’s pro se brief due
to their prolix and repetitive nature. The bulk of Appellant’s brief is an
argument that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for
PWID and conspiracy. Appellant makes several procedural objections in the
final pages of his brief. He has abandoned multiple other issues that he raised
before the PCRA court.
Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence of conspiracy
fails because it was previously litigated. The PCRA provides that an issue is
previously litigated where “the highest appellate court in which the petitioner
could have had review as a matter of right has ruled on the merits of the
issue.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(a)(2); see also Commonwealth v. Stansbury,
219 A.3d 157, 161 (Pa. 2019) (PCRA court properly dismissed petitioner’s
assertion that Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence at attempted
murder trial to establish his identity as shooter, since this assertion was
previously litigated on direct appeal). In this case, a panel of this Court—the
highest court in which Appellant could have had review as a matter of right—
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held in Appellant’s direct appeal that the evidence was sufficient to sustain his
conspiracy conviction. Woodson, 2018 WL at 3045876, **3-5. Therefore,
no relief is due on this issue.
Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying his
PWID conviction fails for two reasons. First, a claim of insufficient evidence is
not cognizable under the PCRA. The PCRA only provides relief for the following
types of claims:
(1) A violation of the Constitution of this Commonwealth or the
Constitution or laws of the United States which, in the
circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-
determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or
innocence could have taken place.
(2) Ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances
of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining
process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could
have taken place.
(3) A plea of guilty unlawfully induced where the circumstances
make it likely that the inducement caused the petitioner to plead
guilty and the petitioner is innocent.
(4) The improper obstruction by government officials of the
petitioner’s right of appeal where a meritorious appealable issue
existed and was properly preserved in the trial court.
(5) The unavailability at the time of trial of exculpatory evidence
that has subsequently become available and would have changed
the outcome of the trial if it had been introduced.
(6) The imposition of a sentence greater than the lawful
maximum.
(7) A proceeding in a tribunal without jurisdiction.
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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2). Appellant’s claim of insufficient evidence does not
fit within any of these categories. It does not allege a constitutional violation,
ineffective assistance of counsel, an unlawful guilty plea, obstruction by
governmental officials of his right of appeal, newly discovered exculpatory
evidence, an unlawful sentence, or the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction.
Even if this claim were cognizable under the PCRA, it is devoid of merit.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must determine whether
the evidence admitted at trial and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom,
viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner,
were sufficient to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. Commonwealth v. Diamond, 83 A.3d 119, 126 (Pa. 2013). “[T]he
facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude
every possibility of innocence.” Commonwealth v. Colon-Plaza, 136 A.3d
521, 525–26 (Pa. Super. 2016). It is within the province of the fact-finder to
determine the weight to accord to each witness’s testimony and to believe all,
part or none of the evidence. Commonwealth v. Tejada, 107 A.3d 788,
792–93 (Pa. Super. 2015). The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
proving every element of the crime by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Commonwealth v. Crosley, 180 A.3d 761, 767 (Pa. Super.
2018). As an appellate court, we may not re-weigh the evidence and
substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Commonwealth v.
Rogal, 120 A.3d 994, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2015).
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To sustain a conviction for PWID, the Commonwealth must prove both
the possession of the controlled substance and the intent to deliver the
controlled substance. Commonwealth v. Roberts, 133 A.3d 759, 767 (Pa.
Super. 2016). The jury may infer intent to deliver from an examination of the
facts and circumstances surrounding the case. Commonwealth v. Griffin,
804 A.2d 1, 15 (Pa. Super. 2002). The evidence satisfies all elements of this
offense. Viewed collectively and in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, the testimony of Lancaster police officers and video footage
of the incident demonstrate that Officer Flurry had a conversation with
Santiago-Rivera about purchasing heroin and gave Santiago-Rivera money for
cash for the purchase. Santiago-Rivera met with Appellant on the sidewalk
and made a hand-to-hand exchange. Santiago-Rivera then handed packets
of heroin to Officer Flurry. This evidence demonstrates that Appellant
possessed the packets of heroin and intended them to be delivered to Officer
Flurry.
Appellant complains at some length about perceived discrepancies in the
evidence or evidence that he deems inadmissible. In so doing, he attempts
to recast the evidence in the light most favorable to himself. Our mandate,
however, is to view all evidence of record in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth. Under this standard, we readily conclude that there was
sufficient evidence to support his PWID conviction.
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At the end of his brief, Appellant raises a series of procedural objections,
for example, a claim that there was no docket entry verifying the entry of
appearance by any attorney on his behalf and no document verifying that he
received copies of the criminal complaint or notice to appear for his
preliminary hearing. Such claims are not cognizable under any category of
the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2). Indeed, under the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the time for raising these objections lapsed long before
trial. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 109 (defendant shall not be discharged due to defect
in procedure unless (1) he raises objection before conclusion of preliminary
hearing and (2) defect is prejudicial to his rights).
Lastly, Appellant objects that he did not consent to appointment of
counsel on his behalf during PCRA proceedings. Once again, this claim is not
cognizable under Section 9543(a)(2). Moreover, throughout PCRA
proceedings below and in this Court, Appellant has had full and fair opportunity
to file pro se petitions, responses and briefs expressing his position, and he
has repeatedly exercised this right. The appointment of PCRA counsel caused
him no prejudice.
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Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/16/2020
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