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Electronically Filed
Supreme Court
SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
16-JUN-2020
08:03 AM
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I
---o0o---
STATE OF HAWAI‘I,
Respondent/Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
KEVIN LORA,
Petitioner/Defendant-Appellant.
SCWC-XX-XXXXXXX
CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
(CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CR. NO. 1CPC-XX-XXXXXXX)
JUNE 16, 2020
McKENNA, POLLACK, AND WILSON, JJ., WITH RECKTENWALD, C.J.,
DISSENTING, WITH WHOM NAKAYAMA, J., JOINS
OPINION OF THE COURT BY POLLACK, J.
The defendant in this case was convicted after a jury
trial that turned on the credibility of the complaining
witness’s testimony. This case raises the issue of whether a
portion of that testimony was properly admitted for the purpose
of bolstering the credibility of the witness’s account of the
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incident. After careful review of the record, we conclude that
the adduced testimony was not relevant to the witness’s
credibility. Further, we find that the circuit court’s
erroneous admission of the witness’s testimony was highly
prejudicial to the defense and not harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. Additionally, we address the circuit court’s
consideration of the defendant’s request to be sentenced as a
young adult in order to review the Intermediate Court of
Appeals’ interpretation of the relevant statute and to provide
guidance in the event the issue arises on remand.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Trial
On May 4, 2017, Kevin Lora was indicted in the Circuit
Court of the First Circuit (circuit court) for one count of
sexual assault in the first degree in violation of Hawaiʻi
Revised Statutes (HRS) § 707-730(1)(a)1 and one count of sexual
assault in the third degree in violation of HRS § 707-
732(1)(f).2 The jury trial began on March 19, 2018.3
1
HRS § 707-730(1)(a) (2014) provides as follows:
(1) A person commits the offense of sexual assault in the
first degree if:
(a) The person knowingly subjects another person to
an act of sexual penetration by strong compulsion[.]
2
HRS § 707-732(1)(f) (2014) provides as follows:
(continued . . .)
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The Complaining Witness (CW) testified that she came
to Hawai‘i for a vacation on May 11, 2016, with her sister and a
friend, Haley Harlow. The group stayed at a hotel in Waikīkī
together for the duration of their trip. On Friday, May 13, the
group “hiked Koko Head” around midday, which made the CW’s legs
and back sore. The next evening, the group had dinner together
and then decided to go to an establishment called “Top of
Waikiki” to enjoy the view. While walking there, the group met
a man named “Rob.” The four proceeded to Top of Waikiki, where
the CW had one glass of wine and one serving of rum. The group
then attempted to enter a nightclub downstairs, the CW
testified, but she and Harlow were unable to get in because they
were not wearing the proper attire. Rob remained at the
nightclub and the three women decided to go to “Playbar,” a
different nightclub they had visited earlier in their trip.
Before they entered Playbar, the CW stated, she and
her sister had “an awkward exchange,” and the CW left the group
and returned to their hotel alone. Once at her hotel room, she
(. . . continued)
(1) A person commits the offense of sexual assault in the
third degree if:
. . . .
(f) The person knowingly, by strong compulsion, has
sexual contact with another person or causes another
person to have sexual contact with the actor.
3
The Honorable Rom A. Trader presided.
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changed into a skirt because of the heat. She received text
messages from Harlow and her sister asking her to return to
Playbar. She also received a text message from Rob, with whom
she had exchanged numbers at Top of Waikiki. Rob asked if she
was staying in for the rest of the evening, and the CW responded
that she was but the other two women were at Playbar. Rob asked
if she would like to go back to Playbar together, and the CW
agreed to do so. The two met up and walked to Playbar together,
where they rejoined Harlow and the CW’s sister. The CW believed
that they arrived at Playbar between 9:30 and 10:00 p.m., but
she was not certain.
Around 11:00 p.m., the CW testified, her sister left
Playbar and returned to the hotel. Harlow and the CW remained
there together until around 1:30 or 2:00 a.m. when Harlow also
returned to the hotel. The CW stated that she remained at
Playbar until around 2:30 a.m. at which time she left to return
to her hotel. She had six servings of alcohol while at Playbar.
She was feeling “a little dizzy” as she left but attributed her
physical condition to the change in environment between the
nightclub and the street. The CW said that she was not feeling
drunk at that time.
Harlow testified that after she left Playbar around
1:30 a.m., she met a man on the street who came up to her and
introduced himself as Dominick. At trial, Harlow identified
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Lora as the man she met that night. She stated that Lora walked
her back to her hotel where they exchanged phone numbers. After
she returned to her hotel room, Harlow testified, the two
conversed for a while through text messages. Harlow asked if
Lora would come back to her hotel and walk with her to the
water, and Lora agreed to do so. The two met up, walked to the
beach, and sat on the sand by the water. They talked for a
while and then started to kiss. Harlow testified that Lora
wanted to go further, but she told him she was not interested in
doing so. Lora said that he respected that, and they continued
talking. Soon after, they were approached by a police officer
who told them the beach was closed. They then returned to
Harlow’s hotel and parted ways near the lobby. Harlow stated
that after returning to her room, she exchanged further text
messages with Lora. Following the text message conversation,
which began at 3:03 a.m. and involved only a few messages,
Harlow fell asleep.
The CW testified that as she was returning to her
hotel from Playbar, she was approached just outside her hotel by
a man who introduced himself as Dominick. The CW identified
Lora at trial as the same man. After briefly engaging in small
talk, Lora asked the CW if she wanted to walk on the beach with
him. The CW stated that she showed Lora her ring and told him
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she was married and not interested.4 According to the CW, Lora
put his left arm around her back so they were standing close
together and reached across and pushed his right thumb into her
arm very hard. He then told the CW that they were going for a
walk on the beach. They began walking toward the beach, the CW
testified, and Lora maintained a tight grip on her arms and
shirt as they walked, which caused the seams of her shirt to
rip. The CW stated that she became fearful and “felt very
frozen.” At some point during the walk, the CW stated, Lora
shifted his grip on her and grasped the side of her neck. As
they neared the beach, the CW testified, she began to physically
struggle against Lora and tried to throw her body weight to the
ground.5 She stayed on her feet, however, and did not fall.
When they arrived at the beach, she stepped off the
two-foot tall seawall onto the shore to try to create distance
between them. Lora removed his pants and shoes and followed her
onto the beach. The CW stated that she was standing with her
back facing the seawall and Lora was in front of her. The CW
said that Lora then grabbed her hand and placed it on his penis
over his underwear. At this point, the CW testified, she raised
4
The CW testified that she was engaged at the time of her trip.
5
The CW testified that on May 15, 2016, she was 5’2” and weighed
around 238 pounds. She described Lora as being barely taller than her and
believed that she outweighed him because he was physically smaller than her.
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her voice and began to yell and plead with him. Lora asked her,
“So are you going to go down on me now, or should I force you?”
The CW testified that she was pressed against the seawall, which
was digging into her lower back, and Lora was in front of her.
The CW said that she attempted to move away from him and ended
up lying on her back in the sand on the same level as the
seawall. He held her down by her arms and ripped her shirt in
an attempt to expose her right breast. The CW stated that while
she was struggling Lora’s saliva got on her chest. Lora was
pressing down on her arms on the insides of her biceps, the CW
stated, and he was gripping her so tight that she lost feeling
in her hands. She related that it felt like “he was digging a
knife into my arms”; she was telling him to please stop and that
she did not want to do this. The CW testified that Lora then
pushed up her skirt and penetrated her vagina with his penis.
The CW stated that she struggled at first and then went limp.
During the struggle, the CW testified, she yelled and called out
hoping that someone might hear her. The CW also stated that
Lora headbutted her in the forehead during the struggle. He
eventually stopped, the CW stated, and she believed that he had
ejaculated. After Lora finished, he gathered his clothes and
sprinted away.
The CW testified that she immediately left the beach
and made her way back to the street. She collapsed on the
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ground near a crosswalk and began to cry and call out for help.
A man approached her and asked if she was okay, and she told
him, “No, I’m not okay, I’ve just been raped.” The man helped
her get to a nearby police station, which was in sight of where
she had collapsed on the ground.
The man, Larry Macri, testified that he was working at
a restaurant in Waikīkī at that time. Macri stated that he got
off work sometime after 1:00 a.m. on May 15, 2016. He had
missed the last bus because he got off work late, so he decided
to wait at a bench in that area until 4:15 a.m. when the buses
would start running again. While he was sitting at the bench,
Macri saw the CW, who was about fifty feet away, walk from the
beach toward the crosswalk. The CW was crying and appeared
distraught, so he approached her. Macri testified that the CW’s
clothes appeared to be intact, and she was wearing pants. Macri
helped the CW reach the police station and subsequently gave a
written statement to a police officer around 4:25 in the
morning. Macri stated that from where he was sitting on the
bench, he “absolutely” would have heard any screaming or yelling
coming from the area of the beach that the CW had come from, but
he did not hear screaming or yelling at any time.
Honolulu Police Department (HPD) Officer Jon Kawana
testified that he was working at the Waikīkī substation on May
15, 2016. The CW came into the substation around 3:21 a.m.,
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accompanied by Macri. Officer Kawana took the CW’s statement
and prepared a written report. In the report, Officer Kawana
observed that the CW was wearing a shirt and black and white
pants. HPD Officer Leslie Garner was also working at the
Waikīkī substation at that time. Officer Garner testified that
officers called for an ambulance to treat the CW immediately on-
site based on the statement she gave. The CW refused to be
treated at first, but she ultimately agreed to be taken to the
hospital. Officer Garner stated that she took the CW to the
hospital at 4:21 a.m.
The CW testified that after being taken to the
hospital, she was examined by a male doctor. She identified
several photographs as being accurate depictions of her at that
time. The photographs, which were introduced into evidence,
depicted the CW wearing a long tank-top shirt and black and
white pants. The photographs did not depict any damage to the
CW’s clothes.
The deputy prosecuting attorney (DPA) asked the CW,
“What was it like to get examined by [a] male doctor?” Defense
counsel objected on relevancy grounds, and the objection was
overruled. The CW began to answer, stating as follows: “It was
-- the process of what you go through when you come in like this
is very dehumanizing. Um, you’re -- you’re standing there in
your ripped clothes and --.” Defense counsel objected again
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that the testimony was irrelevant and asked to approach. At the
bench, the DPA argued that what occurred during the exam, her
emotional state, and her ability to relate to the doctor and
give him an accurate medical history were all relevant to the
case. The court overruled the objection. The CW proceeded to
answer the question as follows:
Um, the process of a rape collection kit is very
dehumanizing. Um, after experiencing the trauma that I had
just gone through, I had to stand on a mat and carefully
remove all of the clothing that I had on, and I could see
all the sand falling onto this mat.
And I had to stand naked in exam room lighting, just
completely naked, while someone took pictures of me. I was
given a gown and a sheet, and I waited for the doctor to
arrive.
He explained to me in probably the most compassionate
way that he can that a lot of this will be violating, and
he apologized upfront for the process.
There were, like, a lot of swabs that were taken from
parts of my body where I know that his saliva had been.
There was a vaginal exam, and it’s not the kind like
you go to the doctor and have one done. It’s, like, a very
long time with a man looking at me and taking high def
pictures of my most personal areas. It was horrible.
The DPA then asked the CW how long she was at the hospital. The
CW responded as follows:
I was there until 10:00 the next morning. I had to
receive prophylactic injections in case that the defendant
had diseases.
I took a pregnancy test. I was given oral anti-
virals to make sure that I didn’t contract hepatitis or
HIV, and so for every morning and every night for the next
30 days, I took a pill that made me extremely sick. It’s
better than getting hepatitis, I guess.
The DPA then asked the CW, “When you look back at this night, .
. . is there anything that you wish you did differently?”
Defense counsel again objected on relevancy grounds and the
objection was overruled. The CW answered as follows:
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I have spent two years thinking and pondering of what
could have happened differently that night for me, and when
I first started, my regrets were, I reg[r]et wearing a
skirt. I reg[r]et shaking his hand. I reg[r]et not being
able to feel fear and act on it in a way that would protect
me.
And as I’ve -- as I’ve grown in my progress, in my
healing --
The defense objected for the fourth time on relevancy grounds
and the court sustained the objection.
On cross-examination, the CW acknowledged that during
a police interview with HPD Detective (Det.) David Yamamoto on
Sunday, May 15, she did not mention the glass of wine that she
had at Top of Waikiki when she was asked about how much alcohol
she had consumed that evening. She stated that she had
forgotten about the wine at that time and didn’t realize she had
purchased a glass of wine that night until she reviewed her
credit card statement sometime after she returned home. The CW
also admitted that, when asked about how many drinks she had
that night during the grand jury proceedings, she had not
informed the grand jury about either of the drinks she consumed
at Top of Waikiki that evening.6
Doctor (Dr.) Wayne Lee testified that he conducted the
CW’s sexual assault examination at the hospital on the morning
6
On redirect examination, the DPA asked the CW what her mental
state was like during her interview with Det. Yamamoto. The CW stated that
she was very tired and scared. The DPA asked if she intentionally left
anything out of her statement to Det. Yamamoto, and the CW responded that she
did not. The DPA next asked the CW what the grand jury proceeding was like.
The CW stated that the questions were much more direct and simple, and she
was not asked to give as many details as she was during the trial.
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of May 15, 2016.7 A sexual assault examination begins with a
historical examination, which involves talking with the patient
and asking them questions about their complaint and why they
came to be examined. During the historical examination, the CW
related that she had consumed five drinks prior to the incident.
Dr. Lee then conducted the physical examination. He found
tenderness on the back of the CW’s head, a faint contusion on
her lower back, bruises on her lower extremities, and
lacerations near her vaginal entrance. He took swabs of areas
where the CW stated that DNA might be found, including from her
breasts. Dr. Lee did not observe any injuries on the CW’s
shoulders, arms, forehead, or neck and did not observe any
bruises, thumb prints, or other contusions. Dr. Lee testified
that if a person’s neck and arms had been tightly gripped, he
would expect to see marks or redness in those areas. Similarly,
he would expect to see some sort of mark on the forehead if a
person was headbutted there. Dr. Lee also testified that the
lacerations on the CW’s genitalia were equally consistent with
consensual sex and non-consensual sex.
7
Dr. Lee testified that he graduated from the University of
Hawaiʻi Manoa in 1970 with a bachelor’s degree in zoology and from the
University of Texas Medical School, San Antonio, in 1974 with a medical
degree. The court found Dr. Lee to be qualified as an expert in the field of
medicine, with further experience in the examination and treatment of
patients who present complaints of alleged sexual assault.
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HPD criminalist Michelle Amorin, an expert in serology
and forensic DNA testing, testified that she compared swabs
collected from the CW’s body during her examination against a
buccal sample collected from Lora. Amorin testified that sperm
cells were recovered from the samples taken from the CW’s
vagina, and she was able to develop a full DNA profile for the
contributor of the sperm. Amorin stated that she compared that
DNA profile to Lora’s profile and excluded him as a source of
the sperm cells that were recovered during the CW’s sexual
assault examination. Amorin also analyzed a sample collected
from the CW’s right breast and stated that it matched Lora’s
profile, with the probability of a false match greater than one
in eight trillion.
HPD Officer Tricenn Rivera testified that he checked
the Waikīkī Hyatt hotel (Hyatt) for surveillance video that
might have shown the CW around the time of the incident based on
her description of her walk with Lora. Officer Rivera stated
that he was able to view security footage of the area for the
relevant time frame, but that the video was not recovered at
that time because the person authorized to release the footage
was not available. Officer Rivera testified to what he saw on
the video:
[Rivera:] At [a] certain time[, I] was able to identify the
complainant and a male walk towards the beach, and after a
few moments, we see the male running northward up the same
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street, and a few minutes later, we see the female emerge
from the beach area onto the sidewalk.
[DPA:] And you say a few moments. When you first see them
walking, when you see them leaving, are you saying it
happens in a few moments?
[Rivera:] It’s actually more than a couple minutes
. . . .
[DPA:] And what could you see about their body positions
during the first portion of the video that you watched?
[Rivera:] So as they’re walking towards the beach on Uluniu
Ave, they’re walking together, they’re abreast toward the
beach, and they’re engaged in conversation.
[DPA:] And when you see the next relevant portion, it’s
only the male wearing similar clothing?
[Rivera:] Correct, and he’s running. He’s actually
sprinting up Uluniu Avenue by himself.
[DPA:] And you also see [the CW] reappear in that
surveillance video?
[Rivera:] Correct. She emerges from the sidewalk area
right here, and she appears to be flag –-
[DPA:] Mm-hm.
[Rivera:] She appears to be flagging down a passerbyer.
The officer identified the CW in the footage, but he could not
positively identify the man she was with. The man’s clothes and
build appeared consistent with the description given to him by
the CW. Officer Rivera testified that, based on the security
footage, the man did not appear to be forcing the CW towards the
beach. At no point did the CW turn around or pull away, and she
did not appear in distress. He stated that it didn’t appear
that “anything was wrong with these two people.”
Det. Yamamoto testified that he was the detective
assigned to investigate the CW’s complaint. He stated that he
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first went to the hospital to meet with the CW before
investigating the scene. He was not personally involved with
securing the scene because it had been secured by patrol
officers before he arrived. Toy Stech, a technician with the
Scientific Investigation Section of the HPD, took photographs
and collected evidence from the scene. Stech used an alternate
light source to look for biological evidence at the scene, but
none was recovered.
Det. Yamamoto testified that during the course of his
investigation, he learned that there was a security video that
was pertinent to the investigation. He initially believed the
video had been retrieved by another officer, but on July 6,
2017, he discovered that the HPD was not in possession of the
video. He contacted the Hyatt at that time but was unable to
retrieve the video. The detective explained that he believed
the video had already been recovered because he recalled being
shown the video by another officer. Det. Yamamoto stated that
he just remembered seeing a video of two people walking and that
it didn’t show anything in particular. There were no
identifying features and he could not tell what the two people
were wearing. He did not recall seeing a man sprinting away
from the scene and stated that if he had, such information would
have been noted in his closing report.
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Det. Yamamoto also testified that he ordered the DNA
testing of the swabs collected from the CW during her
examination. Sometime after the tests were conducted, he
learned that some of the swabs contained semen and that Lora was
excluded as the source. After learning this information, he did
not take any additional investigative steps or attempt to
contact the CW. The detective maintained that although he was
aware of the information, the official report was not completed
before his retirement. He did not know if any other HPD
personnel had taken investigative action based on the results of
the DNA tests.
Mitch Johnson, director of security at the Hyatt,
testified that their security video recordings are kept for
thirty days before being deleted. He stated that he had
responded to requests for security footage from the HPD in the
past and described the procedure that had been established for
many years. The HPD did not request the security video from the
hotel until July 6, 2017.
During closing argument, the DPA stated “Can you
believe [the CW]? Yes. . . . Because [the CW] was candid,
because she was authentic, because she was detailed, and because
she was supported by the evidence.” The DPA pointed to the fact
that “[The CW] told you about the humiliation that she felt when
she endured the sexual assault exam, of being stripped of her
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clothes, being photographed like a specimen, being poked and
prodded by a strange male she had never met before that night.”
The DPA continued:
Now, [the CW] was also believable because she was
consistent. [The CW] was completely candid in the way that
she testified to everything, the things that made her look
bad, the things that were embarrassing to her, all of her
regrets, and the days and weeks and months of wishing that
she did things differently, that’s the self-blame. That’s
the self-blame that you saw right in front of you these
past few days.
Near the end of argument, the DPA stated that the
evidence in the case “is [the CW], the rest of it is just there
to support or not support. And [the CW]’s testimony, as the
jury instructions tell you, by itself can prove guilt.”
Defense counsel argued during closing argument that
the CW’s account was not credible. Numerous inconsistencies
between the CW’s account and the evidence adduced at trial
undermined the credibility of the CW’s assault allegation,
counsel argued. These included the inconsistencies between what
the CW stated she was wearing and what Macri and Officer Kawana
observed, the lack of evidence that her clothing was ripped or
damaged, the inconsistency between her description of how Lora
forced her down the street and what Officer Rivera and Det.
Yamamoto observed on the surveillance video, and the
inconsistency between the marks Dr. Lee observed during his
examination of the CW and the marks that he stated he would
expect to see based on the CW’s account. Counsel also noted the
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inconsistency between the number of drinks the CW reported
consuming to Dr. Lee and her testimony at trial.
The DPA argued on rebuttal that even though “people
aren’t going to get why [she] didn’t run,” the CW “still went
through all of this.” The DPA continued, stating that:
[The CW] still went through that sexual assault exam. She
still endured having to take medication for weeks. She
still endured having to fly to Hawaii twice, take time out
of her life to sit there, relive her assault and be
attacked for every decision that she made and every action
she did or didn’t do. She went through all of that with
absolutely nothing to gain.
B. Sentencing
The jury found Lora guilty on both counts. Lora
requested, and the State opposed, that he be sentenced as a
young adult defendant pursuant to HRS § 706-667.8 At the
8
HRS § 706-667 (2014) provides in relevant part as follows:
(1) Defined. A young adult defendant is a person convicted
of a crime who, at the time of the offense, is less than
twenty-two years of age and who has not been previously
convicted of a felony as an adult or adjudicated as a
juvenile for an offense that would have constituted a
felony had the young adult defendant been an adult.
. . . .
(3) Special Term. A young adult defendant convicted of a
felony, in lieu of any other sentence of imprisonment
authorized by this chapter, may be sentenced to a special
indeterminate term of imprisonment if the court is of the
opinion that such special term is adequate for the young
adult defendant’s correction and rehabilitation and will
not jeopardize the protection of the public. When ordering
a special indeterminate term of imprisonment, the court
shall impose the maximum length of imprisonment, which
shall be eight years for a class A felony, five years for a
class B felony, and four years for a class C felony. The
minimum length of imprisonment shall be set by the Hawaii
paroling authority in accordance with section 706-669.
During this special indeterminate term, the young adult
(continued . . .)
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sentencing hearing, Lora presented statements from family
members and himself to argue that he fit HRS § 706-667’s age
requirement, was in the military, had no prior arrests or
convictions, and had the love and support of the community. The
circuit court stated that it was “a terribly sad day for all
concerned.” The court noted that the CW’s life had been
“forever changed by what happened that night” and that this was
“a violent, horrific act.” The court recognized that Lora
“vehemently disagree[d]” with the jury’s verdict and it was
clear to the court that Lora had the love and support of many in
the community. The court further noted that Lora had served in
the military, engaged in community service, and was married and
expecting his first child. However, the court stated, Lora had
taken advantage of the CW and expected to get away with it
because he was “bigger, badder, stronger.” “You’re a Marine,”
the court stated. “You take care of business, and [the CW] was
no match for you.” The court then stated as follows:
[O]ne of th[e] options that [defense counsel] is asking the
Court to consider is that of youthful offender. I think
you technically meet the requirements.
But I divide the world into basically two camps. I
sentence people every single week. That’s probably the
most important decision that judges make. And I separate
the world in two: Those people that are violent, and those
people that aren’t.
(. . . continued)
shall be incarcerated separately from career criminals,
when practicable.
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And in this particular instance, while [defense
counsel] has done his best and everybody who cares about
you has tried to have the Court focus in on your good
qualities –- and you have them. But when people are
watching, it is easy to do the right thing. But when you
don’t think people are watching, people do things that no
one would expect them to do. And in this particular case,
that is exactly what the Court thinks you did. It may not
typify how you’ve lived the rest of your life.
But in an instant, you chose to get out there, trying
to meet some girls, trying to get some action, or whatever
you want to call it, and you preyed upon this woman. And
you treated her like a piece of garbage, and you left her
there on the beach to try to pull together the pieces. And
unfortunately, that has blown back on you.
So, Mr. Lora, I give you tremendous credit for being
here today. I worry. I don’t know sometimes when I have
people released on status whether they’re going to show up,
especially when they’re looking at a sentence like this.
But it’s to your credit. All right.
But now’s the time where the consequences have to be
imposed. And for you, Mr. Lora, I am going to deny the
request for youthful offender sentencing, not that you
don’t meet the age and other requirements, but I don’t
believe that a special term is appropriate in your
situation.
(Emphases added.)
Lora was sentenced to an indeterminate term of twenty
years of imprisonment on the sexual assault in the first degree
offense and five years of imprisonment on the sexual assault in
the third degree offense with the sentences to run concurrently.
The Judgment of Conviction and Sentence (circuit court judgment)
was entered on June 12, 2018.
II. ICA PROCEEDINGS
Lora appealed from the judgment to the Intermediate
Court of Appeals (ICA), arguing that the circuit court committed
five separate errors that required either resentencing or a new
trial. First, Lora argued that the court abused its discretion
by “refusing to sentence Lora as a youthful offender.” Second,
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Lora maintained that the court erred in overruling defense
counsel’s relevancy objections to the CW’s testimony about her
examination by Dr. Lee and what she wished she had done
differently, and additionally that the court’s failure to
exclude the evidence under Hawai‘i Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule
403 was plainly erroneous.9 Third, Lora argued that the circuit
court committed plain error by permitting testimony about the
contents of the security video that had not been recovered.
Fourth, Lora maintained that the State committed prosecutorial
misconduct in its opening statement, closing argument, and
rebuttal argument. Finally, Lora contended that the cumulative
effect of these errors required a new trial.
In a summary disposition order entered on August 30,
2019, the ICA affirmed the circuit court judgment.10 The ICA
determined that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion
in sentencing Lora. The ICA stated that the circuit court’s
“division of offenses into ‘two camps’ based on the use of
violence reflects the circuit court’s consideration of the
‘protection of the public,’ as required in HRS § 706-667(3).”
9
HRE Rule 403 (2016) provides as follows: “Although relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.”
10
The ICA’s summary disposition order can be found at State v.
Lora, No. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX, 2019 WL 4132682 (App. Aug. 30, 2019) (SDO).
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With respect to the CW’s testimony about the
examination, the ICA concluded that it was “relevant evidence
for the jury to consider in assessing” her credibility,
providing potential explanations for her inconsistent testimony
and “undermin[ing] defense counsel’s portrayal of [the] CW as a
liar.” The ICA exercised plain error review to consider whether
the evidence should have been excluded under HRE Rule 403 and
concluded that the circuit court did not err in permitting the
CW’s testimony. The ICA determined that the CW’s testimony
about her “regrets” was irrelevant, which the State had
essentially conceded. But the ICA concluded that the admission
of the testimony was inconsequential because the “CW’s
statements regarding her regrets were brief” and “neither the
State nor defense counsel emphasized it or further referred to
it in closing arguments.” Accordingly, the ICA concluded that
the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The ICA further determined that the testimony about
the security video was not erroneously admitted, and while the
DPA made argumentative remarks during opening statement, there
was no misconduct during closing argument or rebuttal and the
improper argument was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The
ICA also concluded that although the introduction of the
irrelevant evidence about the CW’s regrets was erroneous and
there was some improper argument during the State’s opening
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statement, these errors were insubstantial, and thus there was
no need to consider their cumulative effect.
Lora timely sought certiorari review of the ICA’s
Judgment on Appeal, contending that the ICA erred in its rulings
on the points of error raised in his appeal.
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Relevance
“We apply the right/wrong standard in reviewing
challenges to a court’s relevancy decision[.]” State v. Kony,
138 Hawai‘i 1, 8, 375 P.3d 1239, 1246 (2016).
B. Sentencing
“[A] sentencing judge generally has broad discretion
in imposing a sentence. The applicable standard of review for
sentencing or resentencing matters is whether the court
committed plain and manifest abuse of discretion in its
decision.” State v. Kahapea, 111 Hawaiʻi 267, 278, 141 P.3d
440, 451 (2006) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). A
court abuses its discretion if it has clearly exceeded the
bounds of reason or disregarded rules or principles of law or
practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant.
Amfac, Inc. v. Waikiki Beachcomber Inv. Co., 74 Haw. 85, 114,
839 P.2d 10, 26 (1992) (citing State v. Akina, 73 Haw. 75, 78,
828 P.2d 269, 271 (1992)).
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IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Admission of the CW’s Challenged Testimony Was Not
Harmless Error.
1. The Challenged Testimony Was Not Relevant to the CW’s
Credibility.
Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence. HRE Rule 401 (2016). In this
case the State argued, and the ICA concluded, that the CW’s
response to the question “What was it like to be examined by a
male doctor?” was relevant to her credibility. The ICA
emphasized that defense counsel elicited testimony as to how
many drinks the CW reported consuming that evening to Dr. Lee
and that counsel noted in closing argument the inconsistency
between the amount the CW stated to Dr. Lee, police, the grand
jury, and her testimony at trial. In conclusion, the ICA held
that the CW’s “emotional state during the post-assault
examination provided a possible explanation for the
inconsistencies and was thus relevant . . . to support CW’s
credibility.”
It appears the ICA assumed that the testimony
regarding the physical examination was probative of the CW’s
emotional state at the time she reported the number of drinks
that she consumed to Dr. Lee, and thus it was relevant to the
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credibility of her statements to Dr. Lee. Preliminarily, we
note that the CW reported the number of drinks she consumed that
evening to Dr. Lee during the historical examination, which
occurred before she underwent the physical examination. Thus,
any emotional disturbance caused by the physical examination
could not have affected the credibility of statements the CW
made during the historical examination. The nature of the CW’s
physical examination and the effect that undergoing it had on
her emotional state was therefore irrelevant to the credibility
of statements that the CW made during the historical
examination.
Significantly, the challenged testimony also does not
describe the CW’s emotional state during the historical
examination. The question was framed as an inquiry about the
physical examination: “What was it like to get examined by [a]
male doctor?” Accordingly, the question prompted the CW to
extensively describe the process she went through when
undergoing the physical examination.11 Similarly, the follow-up
11
The CW’s response, as stated, was as follows:
Um, the process of a rape collection kit is very
dehumanizing. Um, after experiencing the trauma that I had
just gone through, I had to stand on a mat and carefully
remove all of the clothing that I had on, and I could see
all the sand falling onto this mat.
And I had to stand naked in exam room lighting, just
completely naked, while someone took pictures of me. I was
given a gown and a sheet, and I waited for the doctor to
arrive.
(continued . . .)
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question by the DPA again went solely to the physical
examination: “And how long were you there?” The CW’s response
described not only the length of time the CW was at the
hospital, but also the injections and medication given while she
was there and her reactions to medication over the following
month.12 The emotional effect of the physical examination was
therefore irrelevant because it could not have affected the
veracity of statements that were made prior to the physical
examination. Since the challenged testimony was not probative
of the CW’s emotional state during the historical examination,
it had no bearing on her credibility at the time that the
statements in question were made to Dr. Lee and cannot be
relevant on that basis. Thus, the detailed testimony about the
(. . . continued)
He explained to me in probably the most compassionate
way that he can that a lot of this will be violating, and
he apologized upfront for the process.
There were, like, a lot of swabs that were taken from
parts of my body where I know that his saliva had been.
There was a vaginal exam, and it’s not the kind like
you go to the doctor and have one done. It’s, like, a very
long time with a man looking at me and taking high def
pictures of my most personal areas. It was horrible.
12
As stated above, the CW’s full response was as follows:
I was there until 10:00 the next morning. I had to
receive prophylactic injections in case that the defendant
had diseases.
I took a pregnancy test. I was given oral anti-
virals to make sure that I didn’t contract hepatitis or
HIV, and so for every morning and every night for the next
30 days, I took a pill that made me extremely sick. It’s
better than getting hepatitis, I guess.
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physical examination was improperly admitted by the court.13
Accordingly, the circuit court and the ICA erred in concluding
that this testimony was relevant to the credibility of
statements the CW made during the historical examination.
Contrary to the State’s contention that the challenged
testimony was relevant to the credibility of the CW’s statements
to Dr. Lee, the dissenting opinion (dissent) argues that the
challenged testimony was probative of the CW’s mental state
during her interview with Det. Yamamoto the following evening.
Dissent at 2-3. This position, which the State has never taken
during the proceedings of this case, is not supported by the
CW’s own testimony that explained why certain statements made to
Det. Yamamoto were inconsistent with her testimony at trial.
Additionally, the record does not indicate that the CW ever
referred to the physical examination during the interview or
indicated that its effects impacted her ability to appropriately
13
It is noted that during the redirect examination of the CW, the
DPA specifically asked what her state of mind was during her interview with
Det. Yamamoto so that she could explain to the jury why she may have had
difficulty with the precise details in her statement. The reasons given by
the CW did not relate to the physical examination. The DPA also specifically
elicited testimony from the CW explaining why her testimony to the grand jury
did not contain all the details that she testified to at trial. The DPA did
not elicit similar testimony with respect to the CW’s mental state during the
historical examination. Even assuming the CW was in an emotional state from
the incident during the historical examination, this condition would not
provide a basis for admitting evidence of her emotional reactions to the
physical examination that subsequently occurred.
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respond to the detective’s questions. The dissent’s contention
is consequentially unsupported by the record.
The dissent also makes the argument that because the
defense maintained that the CW was not truthful in her account
of the incident, the State was permitted to elicit the detailed
testimony regarding the physical examination. Dissent at 3-4.
The ICA similarly concluded that the challenged testimony
“provided relevant evidence for the jury to infer possible
reasons for a person to voluntarily undergo the examination.”
However, the CW’s reasons for undergoing the examination were
irrelevant to the issues in the case. The nature of the
physical examination, its length, the manner in which it was
conducted, and medication taken afterwards were likewise not
relevant to the CW’s account of the incident. The ICA’s and
dissent’s analyses indicate that whenever there is a physical
examination of a complainant following an allegation of a sexual
assault, the complainant is permitted to provide a detailed
explanation of the examination and any subsequent treatment
received if the complainant’s version of the events is impeached
by evidence or is challenged in opening statement or closing
argument. Thus, although the testimony regarding the physical
examination was not otherwise relevant to the issues at trial,
the ICA and the dissent would hold that it was admissible to
prove why the complainant underwent the examination or as a
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means to bolster the general credibility of the complainant’s
allegation. We do not agree that these reasons are proper bases
for the admission of the testimony regarding the physical
examination in this case. We reject an approach that would
permit the admissibility of the impacts of an alleged offense on
a complaining witness in order to bolster the witness’s
credibility after it has been impeached or attacked.14
Additionally, the DPA was erroneously permitted to
introduce other irrelevant testimony. The DPA asked the CW,
“When you look back at this night, . . . is there anything that
you wish you did differently?” Defense counsel objected on
relevancy grounds and was again overruled.15 The State has
14
The dissent cites cases from other jurisdictions to support its
contention that the CW in this case could testify to the details of the
medical examination to bolster her credibility after it had been challenged
by the defense. Dissent at 4. Numerous cases have held otherwise, and the
general rule is to the contrary. See Kimberly J. Winbush, Admissibility of
Victim Impact Evidence in Noncapital State Proceedings, 8 A.L.R. 7th Art. 6
(2016) (stating that impact evidence is “generally considered irrelevant if
offered during the guilt phase of a trial unless relevant to a proper
purpose, such as to impeach a victim’s credibility or establish an element of
the crime at issue”).
In any event, this court has never held that the complainant or
another witness may testify about the impact of an alleged offense merely to
bolster the credibility of a complainant whose credibility has been
impeached, nor do we endorse this proposition.
15
The CW testified as follows:
I have spent two years thinking and pondering of what could
have happened differently that night for me, and when I
first started, my regrets were, I reg[r]et wearing a skirt.
I reg[r]et shaking his hand. I reg[r]et not being able to
feel fear and act on it in a way that would protect me.
And as I’ve -- as I’ve grown in my progress, in my healing
--
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implicitly conceded on appeal that this testimony was
irrelevant, and there is no dispute that the testimony was
improperly admitted into evidence. Thus, although the ICA
correctly determined that it was error to admit the CW’s
testimony about what she wished she had done differently, the
ICA erred in holding that the CW’s testimony about the physical
examination was properly admitted.16
2. The Errors Were Not Harmless Beyond a Reasonable Doubt.
Once it has been determined that testimony was
erroneously admitted into evidence, the appellate court must
consider whether the erroneous admission was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. McCrory, 104 Hawai‘i 203, 210, 87
P.3d 275, 282 (2004) (quoting State v. Gano, 92 Hawai‘i 161,
176, 988 P.2d 1153, 1168 (1999)). Errors must be considered in
light of the entire proceedings, and if there is a reasonable
possibility that an error might have contributed to the
conviction, then it is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Id.
In this case, the CW was erroneously permitted to
testify about what it was like to undergo the physical
examination and about what she wished she had done differently.
16
The ICA also considered whether the challenged testimony should
have been excluded under HRE Rule 403 and concluded that its admission did
not constitute plain error. While it is unnecessary to address this issue,
we do not agree with the ICA’s analysis.
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This court considered the prejudicial effect of similarly
irrelevant testimony in State v. Uyesugi, 100 Hawai‘i 442, 60
P.3d 843 (2002).
In Uyesugi, the defendant was charged for the shooting
deaths of several individuals. Id. at 446, 60 P.3d at 847. The
prosecution adduced testimony about the victims’ backgrounds
from family members. Id. at 448, 60 P.3d at 849. On appeal,
this court stated that the admission of the evidence was likely
prejudicial to defendant but did not constitute plain error.
Id. at 460-461, 60 P.3d at 861-862. We noted that defense
counsel objected to only a single question involving the
evidence and there was no reference to the testimony by the
prosecutor during closing argument. Id. Additionally, the
overwhelming evidence of guilt led the Uyesugi court to conclude
that while the admission of the testimony from family members
may have been error, it did not affect the defendant’s
substantial rights and therefore did not rise to the level of
plain error. Id. at 462, 60 P.3d at 863.
In contrast, defense counsel in this case immediately
objected to the first improper question as being irrelevant and
was overruled. Counsel objected again during the course of the
CW’s answer and requested a bench conference. The objection was
again overruled, and the CW was permitted to provide an
extensive answer that detailed the process of the physical
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examination. The subsequent question, wherein the DPA asked the
CW if there was “anything that you wish you did differently?”
was also immediately objected to and overruled. Subsequently,
the DPA referred to the improperly admitted testimony about the
physical examination and the CW’s regrets during closing and
rebuttal arguments and specifically asserted that it bolstered
the credibility of the CW’s sexual assault allegation.17 The
DPA’s use of this evidence as a means to bolster the overall
credibility of the CW’s allegation was clearly improper and
highly prejudicial to the defense.
The CW’s testimony about the details of the
“dehumanizing” and “horrible” nature of the physical examination
she underwent, “taking high def pictures of [her] most personal
areas,” the injections and medication she was given, and her
reactions to the medication over the following month very likely
created sympathy for the CW and negative feelings against Lora.
See HRE Rule 403 cmt. (stating that evidence may be prejudicial
17
The DPA recounted the following testimony during closing
argument: “[The CW] told you about the humiliation that she felt when she
endured the sexual assault exam, of being stripped of her clothes, being
photographed like a specimen, being poked and prodded by a strange male she
had never met before that night.” The DPA relied on the other erroneously
admitted testimony as well, arguing that “[the CW] was completely candid in
the way that she testified to everything, the things that made her look bad,
the things that were embarrassing to her, all of her regrets, and the days
and weeks and months of wishing that she did things differently, that’s the
self-blame.” During rebuttal argument, the DPA again relied on the CW’s
testimony about the physical examination, arguing as follows: “[The CW] still
went through that sexual assault exam. She still endured having to take
medication for weeks.”
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if it engenders juror prejudice, hostility, or sympathy). The
CW’s testimony about what she wished she had done differently
was similarly inclined to provoke sympathy for the CW and
hostility toward Lora.
It is clear that the erroneously admitted testimony
was presented in such a way as to cause the jury to believe it
was appropriate for their consideration when determining Lora’s
guilt. Uyesugi, 100 Hawai‘i at 461-62, 60 P.3d at 862-63. The
admission of this testimony, the manner in which it was
presented by the DPA, and the reliance upon it during closing
argument all demonstrate that this error was highly prejudicial.
See id.
Turning to the record as a whole, this is distinctly
not a case where there is a “wealth of overwhelming and
compelling evidence tending to show the defendant guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt.” State v. Rivera, 62 Haw. 120, 128, 612
P.2d 526, 532 (1980). As the DPA stated in closing argument,
the evidence of Lora’s guilt “is the CW,” all the other evidence
merely supported or undermined her testimony. The jury’s
verdict rested on it accepting the CW’s account as true, and the
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erroneously admitted testimony was specifically used to bolster
the credibility of her account.18
In cases when a defendant’s conviction turns on a
jury’s determination as to credibility, the potential for
prejudice is “particularly evident” where the error concerned
the credibility of the testimony of the witness on which the
case turned; in such circumstances we have held that the error
is not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v.
Underwood, 142 Hawai‘i 317, 329, 418 P.3d 658, 670 (2018) (“When
a conviction is largely dependent on a jury’s determination as
to the credibility of a complainant’s testimony, we have held
that the evidence of the offense is not so ‘overwhelming’ that
it renders the prosecutor’s improper statements harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt.”); see also State v. Pacheco, 96 Hawai‘i 83,
97, 26 P.3d 572, 586 (2001) (holding that the prosecutor’s
improper attack on the defendant’s credibility during closing
argument was not harmless when guilt turned on the credibility
18
The dissent acknowledges that the CW’s testimony was central to
the State’s case, but it contends that the corroborating evidence
demonstrates the admission of the challenged testimony was harmless. Dissent
at 5-7. However, several portions of the CW’s account of the incident were
not corroborated by other evidence in the record. For example, the CW’s
description at trial of Lora’s use of physical force was inconsistent with
Dr. Lee’s expert opinion that visible marks would have been left on her body
from many of the actions she attributed to Lora, which the doctor stated that
he did not observe and would have expected to see during the physical
examination. The CW’s description of the forceful manner in which she and
Lora walked from her hotel to the beach was inconsistent with the testimonies
of Officer Rivera and Det. Yamamoto as to what the security footage showed.
There were also additional inconsistencies regarding the clothing worn during
the incident and the description of the CW’s shirt being ripped.
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of the defendant’s testimony); State v. Pitts, 146 Hawai‘i 120,
133, 456 P.3d 484, 497 (2019) (holding that error was not
harmless when evidence of defendant’s guilt was not
overwhelming). Additionally, even the presence of some
corroborating evidence will not militate against a finding of
harmful error when the case essentially turns on credibility.
Underwood, 142 Hawai‘i at 328–29, 418 P.3d at 669–70 (“Although
testimony from other witnesses and physical evidence indicated
the surrounding circumstances were generally consistent with
CW’s account of events, only the statements of CW herself
directly described the actual acts constituting the two
offenses.”).
Based on the foregoing reasons and our review of the
record as a whole, we are not left with a firm conviction that
there is no reasonable possibility the errors might have
contributed to Lora’s conviction. Thus, the admission of the
challenged testimony was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt,
and the conviction must be vacated.19 State v. Nofoa, 135
Hawai‘i 220, 229, 349 P.3d 327, 336 (2015).
19
In light of our ruling as to the challenged testimony, we need
not consider whether the alleged misconduct by the DPA during opening
statement, closing argument, and rebuttal closing argument may have also
contributed to Lora’s conviction. Additionally, we also do not decide
whether the officers’ testimonies about what they saw on the security video
recording was erroneously admitted or whether the cumulative effect of the
errors in this case would require that Lora be granted a new trial.
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B. The Circuit Court Erred by Effectively Excluding All
Defendants Convicted of Offenses Involving Violence from
Sentencing Under HRS § 706-667.
HRS § 706-667(1) defines a young adult defendant as a
person convicted of a crime who, at the time of the offense, is
less than twenty-two years of age. Additionally, the defendant
must not have been previously convicted of a felony as an adult
or adjudicated as a juvenile for an offense that would have
constituted a felony had the defendant been an adult. HRS
§ 706-667(1). Defendants that meet this definition may be
sentenced to a special indeterminate term of imprisonment if the
sentencing court “is of the opinion that such special term is
adequate for the young adult defendant’s correction and
rehabilitation and will not jeopardize the protection of the
public.” HRS § 706-667(3). By its plain language, the statute
is applicable to any offense except the offenses of murder and
attempted murder. HRS § 706-667[(4)] (“This section shall not
apply to the offenses of murder or attempted murder.”); see also
Int’l Sav. & Loan Ass’n, Ltd. v. Wiig, 82 Hawaii 197, 201, 921
P.2d 117, 121 (1996) (noting that the inclusion of a specific
matter in a statute implies the exclusion of another when the
contrast between the matter expressed and the one not mentioned
leads to an inference that the latter was not intended to be
included within the statute). It is also well settled that
“[u]nder the rule of lenity, [a penal] statute must be strictly
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construed against the government and in favor of the accused.”
State v. Woodfall, 120 Hawaii 387, 396, 206 P.3d 841, 850
(2009) (first alteration in original); State v. Kalani, 108
Hawaii 279, 288, 118 P.3d 1222, 1231 (2005) (quoting State v.
Shimabukuro, 100 Hawaii 324, 327, 60 P.3d 274, 277 (2002)).
Lora met HRS § 706-667(1)’s definition of a young
adult defendant and was not convicted of murder or attempted
murder. Accordingly, as the circuit court stated, he was
eligible to be sentenced to a special term under HRS § 706-
667(3). The circuit court decided that it would not sentence
Lora under HRS § 706-667 and stated its reasons for doing so on
the record, a course we have long “urged and strongly
recommended” that sentencing courts take. State v. Lau, 73 Haw.
259, 263, 831 P.2d 523, 525 (1992) (noting that although the
sentencing court is not obligated to state its reasons for
imposing sentence, it is firmly recommended that it do so,
particularly when sentencing a young adult defendant).
Specifically, the court stated that it “divide[s] the world into
basically two camps[:] . . . . [t]hose people that are violent,
and those people that aren’t.” The court thereafter concluded
that it did not believe a special term was appropriate in Lora’s
case and denied his request to be sentenced as a young adult
defendant. In its review of this decision, the ICA stated that
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the “circuit court’s division of offenses into ‘two camps’ based
on the use of violence reflects the circuit court’s
consideration of the ‘protection of the public’ as required in
HRS § 706-667(3).”
However, it is clear from HRS § 706-667’s plain
language that the statute is applicable to any offense except
murder and attempted murder. HRS § 706-667(2)-[(4)]. The
statute does not distinguish between violent and non-violent
offenses and, other than the limitation imposed by HRS § 706-
667[(4)], the nature of the offense does not restrict the
application of the statute. The relevant considerations set
forth in HRS § 706-667(3) are whether a special term will be
adequate for the young adult defendant’s correction and
rehabilitation and whether a special term would jeopardize the
protection of the public. Categorically excluding defendants
convicted of a crime involving violence from being sentenced as
a young adult would be contrary to the express provisions of the
statute and is inconsistent with this court’s policy of
interpreting such statutes as being inclusive of a more
favorable sentencing alternative in the absence of contrary
language.20 See State v. Casugay-Badiang, 130 Hawaii 21, 33,
20
Although the ICA concluded that the circuit court’s categorical
division of offenses simply reflected the court’s consideration of the
“protection of the public,” the court’s categorical approach precludes an
individualized assessment of the risk posed to the protection of the public
(continued . . .)
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305 P.3d 437, 449 (2013) (“Therefore, it appears that the
legislature did not intend to exclude [young adult sentencing
under] HRS § 706–667 as a sentencing alternative to [the offense
of methamphetamine trafficking in the second degree].”); State
v. Medeiros, 146 Hawaii 1, 3, 454 P.3d 1069, 1071 (2019)
(“[T]he legislature intended for the benefits of [a deferred
plea under] HRS Chapter 853 to be broadly available to
defendants, except where clearly articulated, deliberate
exceptions apply.”); State v. Sakamoto, 101 Hawaii 409, 414, 70
P.3d 635, 640 (2003) (holding that the court did not exceed its
legal authority in granting the defendant’s motion for a
deferred no contest plea when the statute did not expressly
exclude offenses involving “substantial bodily injury”).
In this case, it appears the circuit court denied
Lora’s request for sentencing as a young adult by relying on the
nature of the offense as a determinative factor. But
categorically excluding defendants convicted of offenses
involving violence would exclude numerous offenses that are not
excepted from the statute, such as sexual assault offenses
involving forcible compulsion, robbery involving force, and
assaults resulting in substantial or serious bodily injury. The
(. . . continued)
from sentencing a particular defendant to a special term, which is what is
required by HRS § 706-667(3).
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categorical approach the court used in this case is contrary to
the plain language of the statute, which excludes only murder
and attempted murder. Therefore, by deciding whether to
sentence Lora as a young adult defendant based on whether or not
the offense involved violence, the court disregarded a principle
of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party
litigant. See State v. Klie, 116 Hawaii 519, 525–26, 174 P.3d
358, 364–65 (2007) (holding that the district court disregarded
rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial
detriment of the defendant by denying defendant’s motion for a
deferred acceptance of no contest based on erroneous statutory
interpretation).
We need not decide, however, whether the circuit court
abused its discretion in not sentencing Lora as a young adult
defendant because the errors we have already discussed require
that the conviction be vacated. See supra Part IV.A. We
consider the issue only because we find it necessary to correct
the ICA’s interpretation of HRS § 706-667 and to provide
guidance if the issue should arise again on remand.21 See Omori
21
The dissent maintains that the circuit court did not rely on the
violent nature of the offense in concluding that Lora would not be sentenced
as a young adult under HRS § 706-667 because the court made other statements
related to the circumstances of the case at the sentencing hearing. Dissent
at 8-9. The court’s recitation of other matters that were germane to this
case at the sentencing hearing does not alter the fact that, in considering
whether to sentence Lora as young adult, the court explained that it divided
the world into camps: those who are violent, and those who are not. Further,
(continued . . .)
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v. Jowa Hawaii Co., 91 Hawaii 146, 981 P.2d 703 (1999)
(certiorari granted for the sole purpose of clarifying the ICA’s
interpretation of a statute); see also Sentinel Ins. Co. v.
First Ins. Co. of Hawaii, 76 Hawaii 277, 297, 875 P.2d 894, 914
(1994) (“We now address issues that we anticipate will arise on
remand[.]”).
V. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the ICA’s October 2, 2019 Judgment on
Appeal and the circuit court’s June 12, 2018 Judgment of
Conviction and Sentence are vacated, and this case is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Kevin A. Lora, pro se, on the /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
application, Emmanuel V. Tipon on
the brief /s/ Richard W. Pollack
for petitioner
/s/ Michael D. Wilson
Stephen K. Tsushima
for respondent
(. . . continued)
the court’s statements that did not relate to the violent nature of the
alleged crime concerned mitigating factors such as Lora’s military service
and family ties. The reference to such factors underscores that the court’s
determination as to the applicability of HRS § 706-667 turned on its
categorization of the offense. The ICA’s express approval of a “division of
offenses into ‘two camps’ based on the use of violence” is plainly
inconsistent with HRS § 706-667. (Emphasis added.)
41
State v. Lora.
Combined Opinion