[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
SEPT 14, 2006
No. 05-16859 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-00297-CR-T-26-MSS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MANUEL DEJESUS BAUTISTA-ENAMORADO,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(September 14, 2006)
Before ANDERSON, BLACK and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Manuel DeJesus Bautista-Enamorado appeals his 135-month sentence for
possession with intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine while aboard a
vessel subject to the United States’s jurisdiction, in violation of 46 App. U.S.C.
§§ 1903(a), (g); 18 U.S.C. § 2; and 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii), and conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute 5 kilograms or more of cocaine while aboard a
vessel subject to the United States’s jurisdiction, in violation of 46 App. U.S.C.
§§ 1903(a), (g), & (j); and 21 U.S.C. § 960(b)(1)(B)(ii). Bautista-Enamorado
argues that he should have received a minor-role reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 3B1.2 and that the district court’s sentence was unreasonable.
I.
We have held that a district court’s determination of a defendant’s role in an
offense is a finding of fact, to be reviewed for clear error. United States v. De
Varon, 175 F.3d 930, 934 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc). The guidelines allow a court
to decrease a defendant’s offense level by two points if the court finds the
defendant was a minor participant. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). A defendant is a minor
participant if he “is less culpable than most other participants, but whose role could
not be described as minimal.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment. (n.5).
The party seeking the downward departure bears the burden of establishing
that the defendant’s role was minor by a preponderance of the evidence. De
Varon, 175 F.3d at 939. In determining whether a mitigating role reduction is
warranted, a district court examines: (1) the defendant’s role against the relevant
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conduct for which he was held accountable, and (2) the defendant’s role in
comparison to the other participants. Id. at 940. The first prong assesses the
defendant’s actual role in comparison to the relevant conduct. Id. The district
court may consider any and all facts probative of the defendant’s role. Id. at 943.
Only if the defendant can establish that he played a minor role in the conduct for
which he has already been held accountable, not just a minor role in any larger
conspiracy, should the district court grant a downward adjustment for a minor role
in the offense. Id. at 944. The second prong compares the defendant’s role to the
roles played by his co-participants. Id. “The conduct of participants in any larger
criminal conspiracy is irrelevant.” Id. Notably, “a defendant is not automatically
entitled to a minor-role adjustment merely because [he] was somewhat less
culpable than the other discernable participants,” especially as it is possible that no
co-conspirator is a minor participant Id.
Bautista-Enamorado pled guilty to possession and conspiracy to possess
more than 5 kilograms of cocaine, and admitted to the more than 2,400 kilograms
of cocaine transported in the offense. Bautista-Enamorado was held accountable at
sentencing for these facts. Based on the close convergence between Bautista-
Enamorado’s conduct and the conduct for which he was held accountable, he has
failed to meet the burden of the first prong. The second prong compares the
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defendant’s role to the roles played by his co-participants. De Varon, 175 F.3d at
944. The district court further found that crew members are fully involved in the
smuggling operation, and are integral to ensuring that the product reaches a
marketplace. Because Bautista-Enamorado was a crew member, like most of the
other co-defendants, he was not less culpable than his co-participants. The district
court did not clearly err in determining that Bautista-Enamorado did not qualify for
a minor-role reduction.
II.
Bautista-Enamorado argues that the district court erred because it did not
adequately consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.
Sentences imposed under an advisory guidelines system are reviewed for
“unreasonableness.” United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259-60 125 S.Ct. 738,
765, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). Following the Booker decision, we have stated that
the district court must first correctly calculate the defendant’s guideline range.
Then, using the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, the court can impose a
more severe or more lenient sentence as long as it is reasonable. United States v.
Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1179 (11th Cir. 2005). The § 3553(a) factors include the
available sentences, the applicable guideline range and policy statements, the
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nature and circumstances of the offense, and the need for the sentence to (1) reflect
the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide just
punishment for the offense, (2) afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct,
(3) protect the public from further crimes of the defendant, and (4) provide the
defendant with needed correctional treatment. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). “[N]othing in
Booker or elsewhere requires the district court to state on the record that it has
explicitly considered each of the § 3553(a) factors or to discuss each of the
§ 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1329 (11th Cir. 2005).
“Review for reasonableness is deferential.” United States v. Talley, 431
F.3d 784, 788 (11th Cir. 2005). “[T]he party who challenges the sentence bears the
burden of establishing that the sentence is unreasonable in the light of both th[e]
record and the factors in section 3553(a).” Id. A sentence within the advisory
guidelines range is not per se reasonable, but is expected to be reasonable. See id.
(“when the district court imposes a sentence within the advisory Guidelines range,
we ordinarily will expect that choice to be a reasonable one.”). We have held that
a district court’s statement that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors alone is
sufficient in post-Booker sentences to indicate it considered the factors, and have
concluded that, in such cases, the defendant’s sentence was reasonable because the
district court accurately calculated the guideline range and the defendant’s sentence
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at the low end of the range reflected the court’s consideration of his evidence in
mitigation. See Scott, 426 F.3d at 1330.
We note that the district court considered the §3553(a) factors, accurately
calculated the guideline range, and sentenced Bautista-Enamorado at the low end
of the guidelines range. The district court explicitly mentioned the §3553(a)
factors, but also stated that it believed the large quantity of cocaine on the boat
justified a guidelines sentence. Further, Bautista-Enamorado’s sentence was at the
low end of the guidelines range, a range that takes into account his offense
conduct, his personal characteristics and history, just punishment, and adequate
deterrence. Therefore, we conclude that Bautista-Enamorado’s sentence was
reasonable. See Talley, 431 F.3d at 788; Scott, 426 F.3d at 1330. The district
court’s judgment is
AFFIRMED.
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