State of New York OPINION
Court of Appeals This opinion is uncorrected and subject to revision
before publication in the New York Reports.
No. 31
In the Matter of the Hon. Paul H. Senzer,
a Justice of the Northport Village Court,
Suffolk County.
Paul H. Senzer,
Petitioner;
New York State Commission on Judicial
Conduct,
Respondent.
David H. Besso, for petitioner.
Robert H. Tembeckjian, for respondent.
Per Curiam:
Petitioner, a Justice of the Northport Village Court, Suffolk County, seeks review
of a determination by the State Commission on Judicial Conduct that he committed certain
acts of misconduct warranting his removal from office (see NY Const, art VI, § 22;
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Judiciary Law § 44). Upon our review of the record, we conclude that the sanction of
removal is appropriate and accept the Commission’s determined sanction.
Petitioner has been a Justice of the Northport Village Court in Suffolk County, a
part time position, since 1994. He is an attorney who, during the relevant time period, also
maintained a private law practice. The Commission’s formal written complaint alleged,
among other things, that petitioner repeatedly used degrading and profane language in
communications with his legal clients, whom he represented through his private law
practice. The charge against him is based, in large part, on conduct that occurred during
his representation of two clients in a Family Court matter against their daughter in which
the clients were seeking visitation with their grandchild. Over the course of several
months, petitioner sent a series of emails to his clients providing legal advice in which he
repeatedly insulted other participants in the legal process, including a litigant, opposing
counsel, and the presiding court attorney referee, using vulgar and sexist terms. Among
other things, petitioner used an extremely crude gender-based slur to describe opposing
counsel. Based on the foregoing conduct, the Commission charged petitioner with
violating sections 100.1, 100.2(A) and 100.4(A)(1), (2) and (3) of the Rules Governing
Judicial Conduct (the Rules). These sections of the Rules require judges to uphold the
integrity and independence of the judiciary, avoid the appearance of impropriety and
conduct their extra-judicial activities in a manner that is not incompatible with, nor detracts
from, the dignity of judicial office. After denying petitioner’s motion for summary
determination or dismissal of the complaint, the Commission designated a Referee to report
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Referee sustained the charge with respect to
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the language petitioner used in his email communications with his clients, following a
hearing at which petitioner admitted writing the emails in question.
The Commission thereafter determined that petitioner repeatedly used “profane,
vulgar and sexist terms” in emails to his clients that denigrated participants in the legal
proceeding, concluding that the appropriate sanction was removal from office. Beyond
acknowledging the clear impropriety of petitioner’s language, the Commission reasoned
that removal was appropriate because petitioner used the offensive terms while acting as
an attorney and providing legal advice to his clients, inextricably connecting his
misconduct to the judicial system. The Commission also noted that petitioner’s use of a
gender-based slur was particularly concerning because such words “denigrate a woman’s
worth and abilities and convey an appearance of gender bias.” In this Court, petitioner
does not dispute the Commission’s factual findings and acknowledges that his written
communications violated the Rules. He instead contends that his misconduct, occurring in
“private” communications, does not warrant removal from office, and urges us to reject the
Commission’s sanction.
The purpose of judicial disciplinary proceedings is to impose sanctions where
needed to protect the bench from unfit incumbents (see Matter of Esworthy, 77 NY2d 280,
283 [1991]). We recognize that “[r]emoval is an extreme sanction” that is appropriate
“only in the event of truly egregious circumstances” (Matter of O’Connor [New York State
Commn. on Jud. Conduct], 32 NY3d 121, 127 [2018] [citation omitted]), which we
measure “with due regard to the fact that Judges must be held to a higher standard of
conduct than the public at large” (Matter of Tamsen, 100 NY2d 19, 21 [2003] [citation
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omitted]). In determining the appropriate sanction, we must also consider the effect of the
misconduct “upon public confidence in [the Judge’s] character and judicial temperament”
(id. at 21-22 [citation omitted]). Thus, removal is warranted where a judge exhibits “a
pattern of injudicious behavior . . . which cannot be viewed as acceptable conduct by one
holding judicial office” (O’Connor, 32 NY3d at 127-128 [citation omitted]). Whether a
judge’s behavior warrants removal is a fact-specific inquiry, as judicial disciplinary cases
are necessarily sui generis (see id. at 128).
Here, petitioner’s statements were manifestly vulgar and offensive, and his repeated
use of such language in written communications to insult and demean others involved in
the legal process showed a pervasive disrespect for the system, conveyed a perception of
disdain for the legal system, and indicated that he is unable to maintain the high standard
of conduct we demand of judges. Petitioner repeatedly denigrated a litigant, opposing
counsel, and the presiding court attorney referee while acting as an officer of the court
representing clients in an ongoing litigation—a professional function integral to our legal
system. Indeed, his derogatory comments impugned not just the particular referee involved
in this case but all judges, and with it, the judiciary. In this context, petitioner’s conduct
undermined the dignity and integrity of the judicial system. Moreover, his use of an
intensely degrading and “vile” (Matter of Assini, 94 NY2d 26, 29 [1999]) gendered slur to
describe a female attorney, as well as petitioner’s demeaning reference to her as
“eyelashes,” are especially disturbing; it is critical to our judicial system that judges
“conduct themselves in such a way that the public can perceive and continue to rely upon
the impartiality of those who have been chosen to pass judgment on legal matters involving
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their lives, liberty and property” (Matter of Duckman, 92 NY2d 141, 153 [1998] [internal
quotation marks and citation omitted]). Petitioner’s misconduct cannot be explained as an
isolated or spontaneous slip of the tongue, as the statements—repeated multiple times—
were included in deliberative, written communications petitioner made to these clients
relating to their legal representation. Such a pattern of conduct, engaged in over several
months and combined with a prior caution by the Commission for making sarcastic and
disrespectful comments to litigants during a court proceeding, constitutes an unacceptable
and egregious pattern of injudicious behavior that warrants removal.
Under these circumstances, the fact that petitioner’s comments were contained in
emails sent to only two clients, which he believed would not be shared, does not excuse
the wrongfulness of his conduct. There is no question that judges are accountable for their
conduct “at all times,” including in conversations off the bench (Matter of Backal, 87 NY2d
1, 8 [1995] [citations omitted]). Because judges carry the esteemed office with them
wherever they go, they must always consider how members of the public, including clients
or colleagues, will perceive their actions and statements (see Matter of Steinberg, 51 NY2d
74, 81 [1980]). We have long recognized that misconduct, no matter where it occurs,
“subjects the judiciary as a whole to disrespect and impairs the usefulness of the individual
Judge” (Matter of Kuehnel v State Commn. on Jud. Conduct, 49 NY2d 465, 469 [1980]).
Under our standards, petitioner’s conduct warrants removal notwithstanding the fact that
he was not functioning in his judicial capacity at the time that it occurred (see Tamsen, 100
NY2d at 22). Petitioner’s clients with whom he had a professional relationship are
indisputably members of the public despite any personal relationship he had with them.
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Further, petitioner’s derogatory statements directly targeted the legal system and its
participants writ large, and, thus, cannot be divorced from his judicial role, notwithstanding
that petitioner communicated them when off the bench. In sum, we agree with the
Commission that the petitioner’s repeated use of such derogatory language in this context,
in conjunction with his prior caution, warrants removal. A judge’s role is to cultivate
respect for the judicial process and its participants—petitioner did just the opposite.
Accordingly, the determined sanction should be accepted, without costs, and Paul
H. Senzer removed from his office of Justice of the Northport Village Court, Suffolk
County.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Determined sanction accepted, without costs, and Paul H. Senzer removed from the office
of Justice of Northport Village Court, Suffolk County. Opinion Per Curiam. Chief Judge
DiFiore and Judges Rivera, Stein, Fahey, Garcia, Wilson and Feinman concur.
Decided June 23, 2020
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