RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-0544-18T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
PIETRO J. PARISI, JR., a/k/a PETE
PARISI, and PIETRO K. PARISI,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________
Submitted May 6, 2020 – Decided June 26, 2020
Before Judges Fuentes and Mayer.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Gloucester County, Accusation No. 10-08-
0636, and Indictment Nos. 08-10-0869 and 09-01-0073.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Anthony J. Vecchio, Designated Counsel, on
the brief).
Christine A. Hoffman, Acting Gloucester County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Jonathan E.W.
Grekstas, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting
Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Pietro J. Parisi, Jr. appeals from an order denying his petition
for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. Defendant
argues he was denied effective assistance of counsel when his attorney failed to
advise him of the potential civil commitment consequences under the New
Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38.
After reviewing the record developed by the parties, we affirm.
Defendant's criminal history dates back to 1996 with convictions related
to the sexual abuse of minors. He has pled guilty on three separate occasions,
all involving sexual abuse of minor girls. He challenged each of these guilty
pleas through motions to withdraw and PCR petitions. All of these challenges
have been rejected by the trial court and upheld on appeal. The third and most
recent PCR petition is the subject of this appeal.
On February 2, 2015, when defendant was about to be discharge from a
term of imprisonment imposed in 2010 for his conviction of second degree
endangering the welfare of a child-distribution of pornography, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-
4b(5)(a), the Attorney General filed a petition for civil commitment under the
SVPA, and the trial court simultaneously granted the State's request for a
Temporary Civil Commitment Order pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24.
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On April 27, 2015, the court held a hearing to determine defendant's
commitment under the SVPA. The State's experts testified that defendant's
"sexual offending history" included: (1) a guilty plea in 1996 to engaging in
sexual activity with a twelve year old girl on three separate occasions; (2) a
guilty plea in 2003 to having sexual intercourse with three minor girls between
the ages of thirteen and fourteen years old, and impregnating one them; and (3)
a guilty plea in 2010 to possession of child pornography after law enforcement
agents found a large file of pornographic images of children on his computer.
The court found the State proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that
defendant had been convicted of a number of predicate acts under the SVPA;
and that he continues to suffer from a psychiatric disorder that makes him a
danger to the community, especially to prepubescent and pubescent girls. The
judge entered a final civil commitment order.
On April 10, 2017, defendant filed a pro se PCR petition challenging his
2010 convictions. On February 2, 2018, an attorney assigned by the Office of
the Public Defender to represent defendant in this matter filed an amended
verified PCR petition. PCR counsel argued the attorney who represented
defendant at the 2010 plea hearing provided him with ineffective assistance
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when the attorney "advised [defendant] could not be civilly committed after his
sentence."
The PCR judge heard oral argument from counsel on April 20, 2018. The
prosecutor characterized defendant's allegations impugning the effectiveness of
the attorney who represented him 2010 were disingenuous. The prosecutor
argued defendant was a shrewd individual who was well-experienced with the
criminal justice system at the time he pled guilty in 2010. The prosecutor noted:
[Defendant] has been on notice [of the potential for
civil commitment] and that's why he said that at the
hearing, [j]udge. He didn't say that because he truly
wouldn't have pled guilty. He said that because he
knew he was going to make this argument. This is a
very savvy defendant who is very smart – I will give
him that – and he set up his PCR at that plea.
The PCR judge found defendant was procedurally barred from seeking
PCR pursuant to Rule 3:22-12 because: (1) he filed this petition more than five
years after the court entered the judgment of conviction; (2) did not present any
basis from which to find excusable neglect; and (3) there is a no basis from
which to find that enforcement of the time bar would result in a fundamental
injustice. The PCR judge attached a memorandum of opinion to his order.
Defendant raises the following arguments on appeal:
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POINT I
THE PCR COURT ERRED IN FINDING
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHERE
COUNSEL MISINFORMED DEFENDANT ABOUT
THE POSSIBILITY OF CIVIL COMMITMENT
RESULTING FROM HIS GUILTY PLEAS.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GRANTING
DEFENDANT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.
POINT III
THE PCR COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
DEFENDANT'S PCR WAS PROCEDURALLY
BARRED UNDER R. 3:22-12.
We review a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the two-
prong test established by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and subsequently adopted by our Supreme
Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). First, defendant must demonstrate
that defense counsel's performance was deficient. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
Second, he must show there exists "a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
different." Id. at 694.
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Here, the PCR judge correctly found defendant's petition was procedurally
barred pursuant to Rule 3:22-12(a). Defendant filed his PCR petition six years
after the trial court's entry of the judgment of conviction. Defendant did not
produce any competent evidence to warrant the relaxation of this procedural
impediment. We affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by Judge Robert
P. Becker, Jr. in his April 20, 2018 memorandum of opinion.
Affirmed.
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