19-3732, 19-3820
Meadows v. United Services, Inc.
United States Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit
August Term 2019
Submitted: April 22, 2020
Decided: June 26, 2020
Nos. 19-3732, 19-3820
MICHAEL MATTHEW MEADOWS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
UNITED SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
MICHAEL MATTHEW MEADOWS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DAY KIMBALL HOSPITAL,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Connecticut
Nos. 19-cv-1585, 19-cv-1586, Jeffrey Alker Meyer, Judge.
Before: CALABRESI, WESLEY, AND SULLIVAN, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Meadows, pro se, moves for in forma pauperis
status, for the appointment of counsel, and for a “writ of certiorari” in connection
with his appeals from the sua sponte dismissals of his suits against Defendants-
Appellees United Services, Inc. and Day Kimball Hospital for alleged violations of
his First and Ninth Amendment rights and the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”). The district court (Jeffrey Alker Meyer, J.)
dismissed Meadows’ suits, determining that he could not sue private actors for
violating his constitutional rights and that HIPAA does not provide a private
cause of action. We conclude that Meadows’ appeals lack an arguable basis either
in law or in fact and therefore dismiss the appeals and deny his motions. In
reaching this determination, we hold that there is no private cause of action under
HIPAA, express or implied.
APPEALS DISMISSED. MOTIONS DENIED.
Michael Matthew Meadows, pro se, Putnam,
Connecticut.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-Appellant Michael Meadows, pro se, moves for in forma pauperis
status, for the appointment of counsel, and for a “writ of certiorari” for this Court
to review documents in the district court record in connection with his appeals
from the sua sponte dismissals of his suits against Defendants-Appellees United
Services, Inc. and Day Kimball Hospital (together, “Defendants”). Meadows
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alleged that Defendants violated his First and Ninth Amendment rights and the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) by visiting his
home to conduct a welfare check accompanied by police officers, sharing
information about his mental health status, and “coercing” him to participate in
an outpatient treatment program. The district court (Meyer, J.) dismissed
Meadows’ suits, determining that he could not sue private actors for violating his
constitutional rights and that HIPAA does not provide a private cause of action.
We conclude that Meadows’ appeals lack an arguable basis either in law or in fact
and therefore dismiss the appeals and deny his motions. In reaching this
determination, we hold that there is no private right of action under HIPAA,
express or implied.
I. BACKGROUND
Meadows brought suit against Defendants claiming that they violated his
First and Ninth Amendment rights, those rights established in the Constitution’s
preamble, and HIPAA in two separate but intertwined actions arising from
Defendants’ provision of mental health services to him. Meadows, who had been
receiving outpatient behavioral health treatment at Day Kimball Hospital for over
nine years, alleged that two United Services employees visited his home,
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accompanied by two Putnam Police Department officers, to conduct a wellness
check after Meadows sent “texts of poetry and story telling” to his brother and
sister. Complaint at 6, Meadows v. United Services, Inc., No. 19-cv-1586 (JAM) (D.
Conn. Oct. 8, 2019). He maintains that United Services conducted this assessment
without his permission and without explaining the reasons for it, displayed
“extreme prejudice” toward him, and violated HIPAA by disclosing his protected
health information (“PHI”) to Day Kimball Hospital. Id. at 5. He also alleges that
non-defendant individuals affiliated with Day Kimball Hospital “shared and
acted upon illegally obtained PHI from United Service[s], Inc.” Complaint at 4,
Meadows v. Day Kimball Hosp., No. 19-cv-1585 (JAM) (D. Conn. Oct. 8, 2019).
According to Meadows, the disclosure of his PHI led to a nurse at Day Kimball
Hospital’s outpatient behavioral health program “coercing” his participation in a
day treatment program. Id. at 9. Meadows further claims that Day Kimball
Hospital did not allow him “to have [a] say in [his] medication continuation.” Id.
at 3.
The district court ordered Meadows to show cause why his suits should not
be dismissed, explaining that (1) Defendants appeared to be private actors and
thus that they could not be sued for allegedly violating Meadows’ constitutional
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rights; and (2) there is no private cause of action under HIPAA. Meadows
responded but did not address the district court’s concerns; he instead largely
repeated the allegations in his complaints and attached a brief setting forth his
contentions in greater detail. The district court dismissed the cases, reasoning that
Meadows’ responses failed to address why dismissal was not warranted or
demonstrate how the complaints alleged facts that gave rise to plausible grounds
for relief.
Meadows timely appealed the dismissals and now moves for in forma
pauperis status, for the appointment of counsel, and for a “writ of certiorari” for
this Court to review documents in the district court record.
II. DISCUSSION
We review de novo “a district court’s sua sponte dismissal of a complaint for
failure to state a claim.” Sykes v. Bank of Am., 723 F.3d 399, 403 (2d Cir. 2013). “It
is well established that the submissions of a pro se litigant must be construed
liberally and interpreted to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.”
Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks and emphasis omitted). “Nonetheless, a pro se complaint must
state a plausible claim for relief.” Hogan v. Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 515 (2d Cir. 2013).
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We have inherent authority to dismiss an appeal “where it lacks an arguable basis
either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
A. Meadows Fails to Plausibly Allege that Defendants
Engaged in State Action
Although Meadows, proceeding pro se, does not mention the authority
under which he seeks damages from Defendants, the Court construes his
constitutional claims to be made under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Because the United
States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private parties, a litigant
claiming that his constitutional rights have been violated must first establish that
the challenged conduct constitutes state action.” Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193,
206 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A plaintiff pressing a claim
of [a] violation of his constitutional rights under § 1983 is thus required to show
state action.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “State action requires
both . . . the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State . . . and” the
involvement of “a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” Flagg v.
Yonkers Sav. & Loan Ass’n, FA, 396 F.3d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation
marks and brackets omitted).
Meadows’ § 1983 claims fail because he does not plausibly allege that
Defendants engaged in state action. Put simply, none of the conduct that
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Meadows pleads is “fairly attributable to the state.” Fabrikant, 691 F.3d at 207
(internal quotation marks omitted). First, though Meadows does assert that two
police officers accompanied the United Services employees who came to his home
to conduct a welfare check, the mere fact that a private actor received police
assistance is not sufficient to transform that private actor’s conduct into state
action for § 1983 purposes. See Ginsberg v. Healey Car & Truck Leasing, Inc., 189 F.3d
268, 272 (2d Cir. 1999) (explaining that a legitimate request for assistance does not
render a private actor “jointly engaged” in law enforcement conduct). Second,
while Meadows claims that Defendants coerced him into participating in an
outpatient treatment program, he pleads no facts that would establish that
Defendants’ conduct amounted to state action. See McGugan v. Aldana-Bernier, 752
F.3d 224, 229–31 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that a private hospital’s involuntary
commitment of a patient was not state action, even though the hospital received
state funding and was subject to extensive state regulation).
Accordingly, because Meadows cannot raise a non-frivolous argument on
appeal that Defendants violated his constitutional rights under § 1983, we dismiss
Meadows’ appeals of the district court’s sua sponte dismissals of those claims.
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B. There Is No Private Cause of Action Under HIPAA
Meadows alleges that Defendants violated HIPAA by sharing his PHI.
Whether Meadows may assert these claims depends on whether there is a private
cause of action under HIPAA. Although we have not addressed this issue in a
precedential decision, see Bond v. Conn. Bd. of Nursing, 622 F. App’x 43, 44 n.2 (2d
Cir. 2015), all other circuits to have considered the question have held that there is
no private cause of action under HIPAA, express or implied, see Faber v. Ciox
Health, LLC, 944 F.3d 593, 596–97 (6th Cir. 2019); Stewart v. Parkview Hosp., 940 F.3d
1013, 1015 (7th Cir. 2019); Dodd v. Jones, 623 F.3d 563, 569 (8th Cir. 2010); Wilkerson
v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d 1256, 1267 n.4 (10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Streich, 560 F.3d
926, 935 (9th Cir. 2009); Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 570–71 (5th Cir. 2006). We
agree.
HIPAA prohibits the disclosure of medical records without a patient’s
consent. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-1 to 1320d-7. But the statute does not expressly
create a private cause of action for individuals to enforce this prohibition. Instead,
HIPAA provides for penalties to be imposed by the Secretary of the Department
of Health and Human Services. Id. § 1320d-5(a)(1). Nor does the statute imply a
private cause of action. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1855–56 (2017). By
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delegating enforcement authority to the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services, the statute clearly reflects that Congress did not intend for
HIPAA to create a private remedy. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-3, § 1320d-5; Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 290 (2001) (“The express provision of one method of
enforcing a substantive rule suggests that Congress intended to preclude others.”).
Accordingly, because HIPAA confers no private cause of action, express or
implied, we must dismiss Meadows’ claims.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we DISMISS Meadows’ appeals because they lack
an arguable basis either in law or in fact, and DENY his motions to proceed in
forma pauperis, for the appointment of counsel, and for a “writ of certiorari.”
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