NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2640-18T3
APRIL SIRLEAF,
Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
and FIRST FINANCIAL
FEDERAL CREDIT UNION,
Respondents.
_________________________
Argued telephonically June 15, 2020 –
Decided June 30, 2020
Before Judges Fisher and Fasciale.
On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of
Labor, Docket No. 166,050.
Sarah Shaver Hymowitz argued the cause for appellant
(Legal Services of New Jersey, attorneys; Sarah Shaver
Hymowitz and Melville D. Miller, on the briefs).
Rimma Razhba, Deputy Attorney General, argued the
cause for respondent Board of Review (Gurbir S.
Grewal, Attorney General, attorney; Donna Sue Arons,
Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Rimma
Razhba, on the brief).
Respondent First Financial Federal Credit Union has
not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM
April Sirleaf left her job of three and one-half years as an assistant branch
manager at First Financial Federal Credit Union to care for her child with
medical issues. She appeals from the Board of Review's final agency decision,
which disqualified her from receiving unemployment benefits under N.J.S.A.
43:21-5(a) because she left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to
her work. We affirm.
Our "capacity to review administrative agency decisions is limited."
Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). We will not disturb an
agency's ruling unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Ibid. We
defer to a Board's factual findings if they are supported by sufficient credible
evidence. Ibid. The employee must establish her right to collect unemployment
benefits. Id. at 218.
Under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), an employee who "left work voluntarily
without good cause attributable to such work" is disqualified for unemployment
compensation benefits. The threshold question is whether an applicant
A-2640-18T3
2
voluntarily left work. Lord v. Bd. of Review, 425 N.J. Super. 187, 190-91 (App.
Div. 2012). If so, the applicant bears the burden to prove she did so with good
cause attributable to the work. Brady, 152 N.J. at 218. An employee has left
work "voluntarily" within the statute's meaning when "the decision whether to
go or to stay lay at the time with the worker alone." Campbell Soup Co. v. Bd.
of Review, 13 N.J. 431, 435 (1953); see also Utley v. Bd. of Review, 194 N.J.
534, 544 (2008).
On appeal, Sirleaf argues:
[POINT I]
MS. SIRLEAF IS ENTITLED TO BENEFITS
BECAUSE SHE WAS TERMINATED FROM THE
JOB THROUGH NO FAULT OF HER OWN[.]
[POINT II]
MS. SIRLEAF IS ENTITLED TO BENEFITS UNDER
THE "OFFER OF NEW WORK" STATUTE AND
REGULATION[.]
[POINT III]
THE [BOARD'S] FACTUAL FINDINGS WERE
INACCURATE, INSUFFICIENT, AND LED TO AN
UNJUST DISQUALIFICATION FROM BENEFITS.
A-2640-18T3
3
We considered Sirleaf's contentions and conclude they are without sufficient
merit to warrant an extended discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
We add the following brief remarks.
Sirleaf testified that her child was diagnosed with a medical condition
while she was on leave as to her newborn. She notified her employer and
explained that she exhausted her family medical leave. Sirleaf's employer said
it would hold her position open for a specific duration, which she did not
consider as an option. She acknowledged that her employer gave her two other
options⸻return full time, or if that was not an option, then accept a part-time
position. Sirleaf declined all options. Moreover, Sirleaf had no further
communication with her employer, who did not terminate her.
Guided by our standard of review, we conclude that the Board's factual
findings are supported by credible evidence, and its decision comports with the
law and is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.
Affirmed.
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