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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
BRYANT JOHNSON :
:
Appellant : No. 305 EDA 2019
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 17, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003409-2013
BEFORE: BOWES, J., KING, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED JUNE 30, 2020
Appellant, Bryant Johnson, appeals from the order entered in the
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed his second
petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On
November 3, 2014, Appellant entered negotiated guilty pleas to third-degree
murder, robbery, conspiracy, and other offenses. That same day, the court
imposed the agreed-upon sentence of thirty (30) to seventy (70) years’
imprisonment. Appellant did not pursue a direct appeal.
Appellant timely filed a pro se PCRA petition on October 16, 2015.
Among other things, Appellant claimed the Commonwealth withheld
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1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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exculpatory evidence, thereby causing him to enter an involuntary guilty plea.
The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed a motion to withdraw and “no-
merit” letter on August 26, 2016. On October 19, 2016, the court issued
Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition without a
hearing. Appellant did not respond to the Rule 907 notice, and the PCRA court
dismissed Appellant’s petition and permitted counsel to withdraw on
November 18, 2016.
On April 26, 2017, Appellant submitted a pro se filing styled as an
“application to file nunc pro tunc.” The court treated the filing as a serial PCRA
petition, but it again appointed counsel. Current counsel filed an amended
PCRA petition on Appellant’s behalf on November 30, 2017. The amended
petition re-raised the claims included in the August 2016 “no-merit” letter.
Appellant also raised new arguments, including an allegation that Philadelphia
Police Detective James Pitts “forced or coerced” Appellant into giving a false
confession. (Amended PCRA Petition, filed 11/30/17, at ¶ 10(B)).
Significantly, the amended petition did not specifically invoke any of the
PCRA’s timeliness exceptions. Instead, Appellant baldly asserted “his pro se
petition was timely filed and that this Amended Petition for [PCRA] Relief is
also timely since any new issues that are raised herein are permitted by the
Exceptions section of the [PCRA] statute.” (Id. at ¶ 15).
After a series of continuances, Appellant filed another counseled,
amended PCRA petition on October 30, 2018. Again, Appellant did not
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expressly plead or prove the applicability of any of the PCRA’s timeliness
exceptions. Rather, Appellant continued to develop his claims regarding
Detective Pitts’ interview tactics. Appellant insisted: 1) Detective Pitts coerced
him into providing a false confession; 2) plea counsel was ineffective for failing
to challenge the validity of the confession and subsequent plea; and 3) new
information, in the form of other criminal cases involving misconduct on the
part of Detective Pitts, supported Appellant’s assertions.
On December 13, 2018, the Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss
Appellant’s petition. The next day, the PCRA court provided Rule 907 notice.
Appellant filed a response to the Rule 907 notice on January 3, 2019. In his
response, Appellant requested an evidentiary hearing to explore the
circumstances surrounding his confession. On January 17, 2019, the PCRA
court dismissed Appellant’s petition as untimely filed.
On January 22, 2019, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. That
same day, the PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. Appellant filed his Rule
1925(b) statement on February 13, 2019.
Appellant now raises three issues on appeal:
WHETHER THE CONFESSION OR STATEMENT THAT WAS
RENDERED BY APPELLANT TO DETECTIVE JAMES PITTS
WAS IN VIOLATION OF THE 5TH, 6TH AND 14TH
AMENDMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 9 OF THE PENNSYLVANIA
CONSTITUTION WHICH IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS
CASE SO UNDERMINED THE TRUTH-DETERMINING
PROCESS THAT NO RELIABLE ADJUDICATION OF GUILT OR
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INNOCENCE COULD HAVE TAKEN PLACE WHERE DETECTIVE
JAMES PITTS AND HIS ASSOCIATES COERCED OR
INVOLUNTARILY FORCED [APPELLANT] TO WRONGFULLY
CONFESS TO AND EVENTUALLY PLEAD GUILTY TO THE
CRIMES THAT APPELLANT EVENTUALLY ENDED UP FALSELY
PLEADING GUILTY TO, INCLUDING THE CRIMES OF THIRD
DEGREE MURDER, ROBBERY, CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT
ROBBERY AND USING A MOTOR VEHICLE AS A WEAPON.
WHETHER APPELLANT[’S] … 6TH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND HIS
RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 9 OF THE
PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION WERE SUBJECTED TO
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, WHICH IN THE
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS PARTICULAR CASE SO
UNDERMINED THE TRUTH DETERMINING PROCESS THAT
NO RELIABLE ADJUDICATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE
COULD HAVE TAKEN PLACE WHEN HIS TRIAL ATTORNEY
DID NOT CHALLENGE THE COMMONWEALTH WITH A
MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE FALSE CONFESSION THAT
[APPELLANT] SUBMITS WAS COERCED OR INVOLUNTARILY
FORCED FROM HIM BY DETECTIVE JAMES PITTS’
WRONGFUL AND ILLEGAL ACTIVITY AND WHERE
APPELLANT’S TRIAL ATTORNEY FAILED TO FILE A MOTION
TO WITHDRAW APPELLANT’S GUILTY PLEA WHERE IT WAS
NOT KNOWING, VOLUNTARY AND INTELLIGENT AND
WHERE APPELLANT BELIEVED THAT HE HAD NO
ALTERNATIVE BUT TO PLEAD GUILTY BECAUSE OF HIS
PRIOR COERCED CONFESSION.
WHETHER THE UNAVAILABILITY AT THE TIME OF TRIAL OF
AFTER DISCOVERED EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE THAT HAD
SUBSEQUENTLY BECOME AVAILABLE ENTITLED APPELLANT
… TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING OR A NEW TRIAL,
NAMELY—THE WRONGFUL OR COERCIVE ACTIVITY OF
DETECTIVE JAMES PITTS IN FORCING FALSE CONFESSIONS
FROM APPELLANT IN THIS CASE AND THE HISTORY OF
DETECTIVE JAMES PITTS IN HIS HAVING ENGAGED IN
SUCH WRONGFUL OR COERCIVE BEHAVIOR IN THE PAST
WITH OTHER ARRESTEES, A HISTORY THAT [APPELLANT’S]
TRIAL ATTORNEY WAS UNAWARE OF AT THE TIME OF
TRIAL.
(Appellant’s Brief at 4-5).
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As a prefatory matter, the timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional
requisite. Commonwealth v. Hackett, 598 Pa. 350, 956 A.2d 978 (2008),
cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1285, 129 S.Ct. 2772, 174 L.Ed.2d 277 (2009).
Pennsylvania law makes clear that no court has jurisdiction to hear an
untimely PCRA petition. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 575 Pa. 500, 837
A.2d 1157 (2003). The PCRA requires a petition, including a second or
subsequent petition, to be filed within one year of the date the underlying
judgment becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment of sentence
is final “at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in
the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking review.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9545(b)(3).
Generally, to obtain merits review of a PCRA petition filed more than
one year after the judgment of sentence became final, the petitioner must
allege and prove at least one of the three timeliness exceptions:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result
of interference by government officials with the presentation
of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United
States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
provided in this section and has been held by that court to
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apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). “[W]hen a PCRA petition is not filed within
one year of the expiration of direct review, or not eligible for one of the three
limited exceptions, or entitled to one of the exceptions, but not filed within 60
days of the date that the claim could have been first brought, the [PCRA] court
has no power to address the substantive merits of a petitioner’s PCRA claims.”
Commonwealth v. Gamboa-Taylor, 562 Pa. 70, 77, 753 A.2d 780, 783
(2000).2
To meet the “newly discovered facts” timeliness exception set forth in
Section 9545(b)(1)(ii), a petitioner must demonstrate that “he did not know
the facts upon which he based his petition and could not have learned those
facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Brown,
111 A.3d 171, 176 (Pa.Super. 2015). “The focus of the exception is on [the]
newly discovered facts, not on a newly discovered or newly willing source for
previously known facts.” Commonwealth v. Burton, 638 Pa. 687, 704, 158
A.3d 618, 629 (2017) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Instantly, the court sentenced Appellant on November 3, 2014.
Appellant did not file a notice of appeal, and his judgment of sentence became
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2 As of December 24, 2018, Section 9545(b)(2) now allows any PCRA petition
invoking a timeliness exception to be filed within one year of the date the
claim first could have been presented. See Act 2018, Oct. 24, P.L. 894, No.
146, § 2, effective in 60 days [Dec. 24, 2018]. This amendment applies to
claims arising on or after December 24, 2017. Appellant filed the current
PCRA petition on April 26, 2017, so the amendment does not apply to him.
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final thirty days later, on or about December 3, 2014. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 903(c)(3). Thus, Appellant had until December 3, 2015
to file a PCRA petition. Appellant timely pursued a first PCRA petition on
October 16, 2015, which the court dismissed on November 18, 2016.
Appellant filed the current PCRA petition on April 26, 2017, which was
over one year late and untimely on its face. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).
Appellant now argues he is entitled to PCRA relief, claiming plea counsel was
ineffective for failing to seek suppression of the confession and failing to
challenge the voluntariness of the guilty plea. Appellant also cites multiple
cases where litigants alleged that Detective Pitts used coercive interview
tactics.3 In light of these cases, Appellant insists the PCRA court should have
ordered an evidentiary hearing to gather additional evidence regarding the
circumstances surrounding his confession.
Appellant, however, has failed to plead and prove any exception to the
PCRA timeliness requirements. To the extent Appellant’s arguments can be
interpreted as an attempt to invoke the new-facts exception to the PCRA’s
timeliness requirements, Appellant cannot demonstrate any new facts that
were unknown and could not have been ascertained through the exercise of
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3 Specifically, Appellant cites Commonwealth v. Brown, 134 A.3d 1097
(Pa.Super. 2016), Commonwealth v. White, 215 A.3d 676 (Pa.Super. 2019)
(unpublished memorandum), and Commonwealth v. Thorpe, 91 A.3d 1285
(Pa.Super. 2013) (unpublished memorandum).
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due diligence.4 Appellant participated in an interview with Detective Pitts, he
was aware of the detective’s tactics at that time, and he could have notified
prior counsel to challenge the validity of his confession earlier in the
proceedings. We also note that the judicial decisions from other cases
involving Detective Pitts’ conduct do not amount to newly discovered facts.
See Commonwealth v. Watts, 611 Pa. 80, 23 A.3d 980 (2011) (stating
subsequent decisional law does not qualify as new fact capable of triggering
timeliness exception in PCRA). Moreover, Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims
also fail to qualify as a new fact to excuse an untimely PCRA petition. See
Gamboa-Taylor, supra (defining general class of ineffective assistance of
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4 The substantive claim of after-discovered evidence and the new-facts
exception to the PCRA timeliness requirements are often conflated and
referred to as the same theory of relief. These concepts, however, are not
interchangeable and require different proofs. Under the new-facts exception
to an untimely PCRA petition, a petitioner must establish “the facts upon
which the claim was predicated were unknown and…could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence. If the petitioner alleges and
proves these two components, then the PCRA court has jurisdiction over the
claim under this subsection.” Commonwealth v. Bennett, 593 Pa. 382, 395,
930 A.2d 1264, 1272 (2007) (emphasis in original). Only if a petitioner meets
the statutory jurisdictional requirements by satisfying this exception to the
PCRA time-bar, can he then argue for relief on a substantive after-discovered-
evidence claim, which requires the petitioner to demonstrate: (1) the evidence
has been discovered after trial and it could not have been obtained at or prior
to trial through reasonable diligence; (2) the evidence is not cumulative; (3)
it is not being used solely to impeach credibility; and (4) it would likely compel
a different verdict. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Washington, 592 Pa. 698,
927 A.2d 586 (2007); Commonwealth v. D’Amato, 579 Pa. 490, 856 A.2d
806 (2004). Here, Appellant’s brief includes argument on the substantive
claim of after-discovered evidence without actually analyzing the applicability
of the new-facts exception. (See Appellant’s Brief at 24-25).
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counsel claims that does not serve as exception to PCRA timeliness
requirements). Accordingly, we affirm the order dismissing Appellant’s
current PCRA petition.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/30/2020
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