19-2204-cv
Borrani v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT'S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A
SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION "SUMMARY ORDER"). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED
BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in
the City of New York, on the 7th day of July, two thousand twenty.
PRESENT: DENNY CHIN,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
STEVEN J. MENASHI,
Circuit Judges.
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GRACE BORRANI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
-v- 19-2204-cv
NATIONSTAR MORTGAGE LLC, DBA MR.
COOPER,
Defendant-Appellee. ∗
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∗
The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to amend the official caption to
conform to the above.
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Grace Borrani, pro se, Yonkers, New York.
FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: CHARLES H. JEANFREAU (Brian P. Scibetta,
on the brief), McCalla Raymer Leibert Pierce,
LLC, Iselin, New Jersey.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (Karas, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
In 2013, plaintiff-appellant Grace Borrani defaulted on a mortgage and
was placed in state court foreclosure proceedings by the holder of her mortgage note,
defendant-appellee Nationstar Mortgage LLC ("Nationstar"). In response, Borrani
argued that Nationstar did not possess a valid mortgage note and that Nationstar and
its counsel, Shapiro, DiCaro & Barak, LLP ("SDB"), had violated numerous federal and
state laws. Nationstar moved for summary judgment. The state court granted the
motion and entered a judgment of foreclosure in December 2016.
Before Nationstar could hold the foreclosure sale, Borrani, proceeding pro
se, filed the instant action against Nationstar and SDB. She alleged that Nationstar and
SDB violated various federal and state laws by fraudulently foreclosing on her
property. The district court dismissed the complaint, reasoning that it lacked
jurisdiction over Borrani's claims challenging the legitimacy of the foreclosure
judgment, pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, and that Borrani's remaining claims
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were barred by res judicata. 1 We assume the parties' familiarity with the underlying
facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. 2
"We review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo, accepting as true all
factual claims in the complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's
favor." Fink v. Time Warner Cable, 714 F.3d 739, 740-41 (2d Cir. 2013). We also review de
novo a district court's application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and res judicata. See
Hoblock v. Albany Cty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 83 (2d Cir. 2005) (Rooker-Feldman
doctrine); Brown Media Corp. v. K&L Gates, LLP, 854 F.3d 150, 157 (2d Cir. 2017) (res
judicata).
I. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine establishes the principle that federal courts
lack jurisdiction over "cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused
by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced
and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp.
1 The district court declined to address Borrani's claims against SDB because SDB was not
properly served and was never a party to the lawsuit. For this reason, we decline to consider
the claims raised against SDB.
2 Although final judgment has not been entered below, "the deadline imposed by the
district court for amendment has passed," Festa v. Local 3 Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 905 F.2d 35,
37 (2d Cir. 1990), Borrani has failed to effectuate service on SDB, and she has instead filed a
separate complaint against Nationstar, see Borrani v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, No. 7:20-cv-1444
(S.D.N.Y., filed Feb. 19, 2020). On these facts, we will treat Borrani's appeal as an appeal from a
final judgment. See Slayton v. Am. Express Co., 460 F.3d 215, 224 n.7 (2d Cir. 2006).
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v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); see also Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home
Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 426 (2d Cir. 2014).
The district court properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction, pursuant
to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, over Borrani's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1961; wire fraud, fraud and deceit, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1343 and 1503; and emotional distress claims (claims 1-5 and 9). All of these claims
are based on injuries caused by the state court's judgment of foreclosure against Borrani
and invite the federal court to review that judgment. The state-court judgment of
foreclosure was rendered before Borrani began federal proceedings because she filed
her federal complaint on December 1, 2017, more than thirty days after the December 5,
2016, judgment of foreclosure and sale was entered. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5513
(establishing thirty-day deadline for appeal); see also Federacion de Maestros de P.R. v.
Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de P.R., 410 F.3d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 2005) ("[I]f a lower state
court issues a judgment and the losing party allows for the time for appeal to expire,
then the state proceedings have ended."); Hoblock v. Albany Cty. Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d
77, 89 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Federacion, 410 F.3d at 25). Accordingly, the district court
properly applied the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to these claims.
II. Res Judicata
The district court also properly concluded that the remaining claims
against Nationstar were barred by res judicata. In New York, "the doctrine of res
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judicata gives binding effect to the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction and
prevents the parties to an action, and those in privity with them, from subsequently
relitigating any questions that were necessarily decided therein." Watts v. Swiss Bank
Corp., 27 N.Y.2d 270, 277 (1970) (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). "[I]f
claims arise out of the same factual grouping they are deemed to be part of the same
cause of action and the later claim will be barred without regard to whether it is based
upon different legal theories or seeks different or additional relief." Davidson v.
Capuano, 792 F.2d 275, 278 (2d Cir. 1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Res judicata barred Borrani's remaining claims against Nationstar. Both
Nationstar and Borrani were parties to the state court action, and the grant of summary
judgment was a final judgment on the merits. Further, Borrani's remaining Fair Debt
Collection Procedures Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692; Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act ("RESPA"), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617; Truth-in-Lending Act ("TILA"), 15
U.S.C. § 1601 and Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. §§ 226, 1026; and unjust enrichment claims
arose from the same factual grouping that supported her defenses in the state
foreclosure case. Here, Borrani asserted either identical claims, e.g., that Nationstar had
violated TILA and Regulation Z, or claims that were based on the same facts, e.g., that
Nationstar had failed to comply with federal and state regulations regarding its
collection of mortgage payments and was not the real owner of her mortgage note.
Because Borrani had an opportunity to raise these issues in the state foreclosure action
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and that case was decided on the merits, her substantially identical claims here are
barred by res judicata.
* * *
We have considered the Borrani's remaining arguments and conclude they
are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O'Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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