Zhang v. Barr

18-3854 Zhang v. Barr BIA Hom, IJ A205 036 171 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall 3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of 4 New York, on the 8th day of July, two thousand twenty. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 DENNY CHIN, 8 RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, 9 WILLIAM J. NARDINI, 10 Circuit Judges. 11 _____________________________________ 12 13 LIANSHA ZHANG, 14 Petitioner, 15 16 v. 18-3854 17 NAC 18 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES 19 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 20 Respondent. 21 _____________________________________ 22 23 FOR PETITIONER: H. Danny Kao, Kao & Associates PC 24 Flushing, NY. 25 26 FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant 27 Attorney General; Jessica E. 28 Burns, Senior Litigation Counsel; 29 Rosanne M. Perry, Trial Attorney, 30 Office of Immigration Litigation, 1 United States Department of 2 Justice, Washington, DC. 3 4 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 5 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 6 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 7 is GRANTED. 8 Petitioner Liansha Zhang, a native and citizen of the 9 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a November 29, 10 2018, decision of the BIA affirming an October 20, 2017, 11 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying her 12 application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief 13 under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Liansha 14 Zhang, No. A205 036 171 (B.I.A. Nov. 29, 2018), aff’g No. 15 A205 036 171 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. Oct. 20, 2017). We assume 16 the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and 17 procedural history. 18 Under the circumstances of this case, the Court reviews 19 the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA, i.e., minus the 20 IJ’s finding that the BIA declined to rely on. See Xue Hong 21 Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 22 2005). The applicable standards of review are well 23 established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v. 24 Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018). 2 1 Adverse Credibility Determination 2 “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all 3 relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility 4 determination on . . . the consistency between the applicant’s 5 or witness’s written and oral statements . . . , [and] the 6 internal consistency of each such statement . . . without 7 regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood 8 goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim . . . .” 8 U.S.C. 9 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); see also Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 10 F.3d 162, 163–64 (2d Cir. 2008). The agency erred in finding 11 Zhang not credible as to her claims that Chinese family 12 planning officials forced her to terminate pregnancies in 13 1987 and 1991, and that the police detained and beat her 14 because she complained about being fired from her government 15 job after a workplace injury. 16 The agency erred in finding Zhang’s testimony that she 17 received treatment for her workplace injury at only one 18 hospital inconsistent with her submission of medical 19 certificates from two hospitals. As she testified, the later 20 certificate does not state that she received treatment. 21 Rather, it indicates that it was obtained months after 22 treatment for purposes of certifying that she was disabled 3 1 due to a workplace injury. Further, the agency erred in 2 relying on omissions from Zhang’s asylum application of facts 3 that were “supplementary, not contradictory” to her 4 testimony. Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 79. Accordingly, 5 because each of the agency’s cited bases for its conclusion 6 that Zhang was not credible was either erroneous or 7 insufficient to support such a conclusion when considering 8 the totality of the circumstances, the agency erred in denying 9 relief on that basis. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); 10 Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 82. 11 Burden Finding 12 Although the agency made an alternate burden finding, 13 that finding is also infected with error that requires remand. 14 “The testimony of the applicant may be sufficient to sustain 15 the applicant’s burden without corroboration, but only if the 16 applicant satisfies the trier of fact that the applicant’s 17 testimony is credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific 18 facts sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant is a 19 refugee.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii); see also id. 20 § 1231(b)(3)(C); Wei Sun v. Sessions, 883 F.3d 23, 28 (2d 21 Cir. 2018). “In determining whether the applicant has met 22 the applicant’s burden, the trier of fact may weigh the 4 1 credible testimony along with other evidence of record. 2 Where the trier of fact determines that the applicant should 3 provide evidence that corroborates otherwise credible 4 testimony, such evidence must be provided unless the 5 applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably 6 obtain the evidence.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii); see also 7 id. § 1231(b)(3)(C). The agency’s finding that Zhang failed 8 to adequately corroborate her claims is not supported by the 9 record. 10 The IJ erred in finding that Zhang failed to submit 11 documentary evidence of her pregnancies when she submitted 12 two abortion certificates issued on the dates she claimed to 13 have been forced to terminate those pregnancies. The IJ also 14 found that Zhang submitted evidence that she had obtained 15 three voluntary abortions before her fourth allegedly forced 16 abortion and that she had terminated her last pregnancy only 17 after being diagnosed with uterine cancer; but Zhang only 18 testified and presented evidence of two abortions and she did 19 not allege, much less document, two additional abortions or 20 a cancer diagnosis. Further, the IJ erred in finding that 21 Zhang failed to provide any evidence of her factory employment 22 given that her household registry lists her as a factory 5 1 worker. Although the IJ correctly identified other missing 2 evidence—corroboration that she had an IUD removed before 3 becoming pregnant, affidavits from her ex-husband and her 4 daughter, or evidence that she complained about being 5 terminated from her job—we cannot confidently predict that 6 the agency would reach the same result absent the egregiously 7 erroneous findings regarding the other evidence in the record 8 and the central facts of her claim. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. 9 Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 339 (2d Cir. 2006) (providing 10 that remand is futile when Court “can confidently predict 11 that the agency would reach the same decision absent the 12 errors that were made” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 13 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 14 GRANTED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and 15 stays VACATED. 16 FOR THE COURT: 17 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 18 Clerk of Court 6