NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 8 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 19-50126
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
3:18-cr-04472-BAS-1
v.
RUBEN PALACIOS-HERRERA, MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Cynthia A. Bashant, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 8, 2020**
Pasadena, California
Before: MURGUIA and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges, and STEIN,*** District
Judge.
Ruben Palacios-Herrera appeals his jury conviction for illegal entry into the
United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325. Palacios-Herrera makes two
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Sidney H. Stein, United States District Judge for the
Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.
arguments on appeal. First, he argues that during jury selection, the district court
mishandled his challenge pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
Second, Palacios-Herrera maintains that the district court erred in admitting, over
his objection, his 2015 misdemeanor judgment for illegal entry into the United
States, which the government used to prove felony illegal entry at his trial. We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
1. We review a district court’s application of the three-part Batson
framework de novo. United States v. Alvarez-Ulloa, 784 F.3d 558, 565 (9th Cir.
2015). “First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory
challenge has been exercised on the basis of race. Second, if that showing has been
made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in
question. Third, in light of the parties’ submissions, the trial court must determine
whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.” Id. (quoting Miller–
El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 328–29 (2003)). The district court’s findings are
reviewed “deferentially, for clear error.” United States v. Hernandez-Herrera, 273
F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 2001).
Here, the district court decided that Palacios-Herrera made a prima facie
showing of purposeful discrimination at step one of the Batson analysis. In
response to the prosecutor’s articulated reasons for striking the prospective juror at
step two, the district court did not make an express finding concerning purposeful
2 19-50126
discrimination. However, “[f]aced with an improper application of the Batson
framework, we may decide de novo whether the government’s strikes were
motivated by purposeful discrimination.” Alvarez-Ulloa, 784 F.3d at 565. Here, de
novo review of the record does not support a finding of purposeful discrimination.
Given that there was only one peremptory strike of an Hispanic juror out of a
venire that included at least six Hispanic people; that two Hispanic members of the
venire were actually impaneled; and that a juror’s demeanor can be a permissible,
race-neutral reason for a peremptory challenge, see Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S.
472, 477 (2008), no purposeful discrimination was shown.
2. We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Haines, 918 F.3d 694, 697 (9th Cir. 2019). Here,
however, we need not determine whether the district court erred in admitting into
evidence a certified copy of the judgment of Palacios-Herrera’s 2015 misdemeanor
illegal entry, since any error was harmless. The parties entered a stipulation into
the record that Palacios-Herrera had previously committed the crime of entering
the United States illegally. Furthermore, we have “refuse[d] to hold that a certified
copy of a prior conviction is the only evidence sufficient to prove a prior
conviction.” United States v. Arriaga-Segura, 743 F.2d 1434, 1436 (9th Cir. 1984)
(emphasis added). Here, the jury heard testimony from a border patrol officer
regarding Palacios-Herrera’s prior conviction and the parties’ stipulation before the
3 19-50126
court admitted the certified judgment of his conviction into evidence. Thus, the
jury had enough evidence to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Palacios-
Herrera had committed the prior offense, even without the admitted judgment.
AFFIRMED.
4 19-50126