NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 13 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 19-10202
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 1:18-cr-00090-HG-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CHASE WILLIAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
Helen W. Gillmor, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 7, 2020**
Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: OWENS, FRIEDLAND, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
Chase Williams appeals from the district court’s judgment following his
conditional guilty plea to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams
or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), 846.
Williams contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
evidence seized from a parcel mailed via the U.S. Postal Service. We review de
novo the denial of a motion to suppress, and for clear error any underlying factual
findings. United States v. Johnson, 875 F.3d 1265, 1273 (9th Cir. 2017). As the
parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We affirm.
We assume that Williams had standing to challenge the search and seizure of
the parcel, and conclude that the district court properly denied on the merits
Williams’ motion to suppress. See United States v. Huggins, 299 F.3d 1039, 1050
n.15 (9th Cir. 2002).
“Postal inspectors may detain a package to conduct an investigation if they
have a reasonable and articulable suspicion that it contains contraband or evidence
of illegal activity.” United States v. Hernandez, 313 F.3d 1206, 1210 (9th Cir.
2002) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “To determine whether
reasonable suspicion exists, reviewing courts must look at the totality of the
circumstances of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a particularized
and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” Id. (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). “Reasonable suspicion may exist even if each factor,
standing alone, is susceptible to an innocent explanation.” Id.
Here, looking at the totality of the circumstances, the postal inspector had
reasonable suspicion to detain the parcel until a drug sniffing dog was available
based on a number of factors, including: (1) a database search failed to reveal that
2
the named sender was associated with the return address or that the named
recipient was associated with the delivery address; (2) the parcel was shipped by
Priority Mail Express; (3) the mailing label was handwritten; (4) the parcel’s origin
and destination locations were areas from which and to which narcotics have been
shipped in recent years; (5) the parcel was heavily taped; (6) the parcel’s postage
was paid in cash; (7) the telephone number listed for the sender was not a working
phone number; and (8) handling the parcel indicated there was a densely packaged
item inside the outer box. See id. at 1211 (holding, based on similar factors, that
“looking at the totality of the circumstances, . . . [the postal inspector] had a
reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify his detention of the package so that a drug
dog could smell it”).
Because the search and seizure of the parcel did not violate the Fourth
Amendment, Williams’ argument that it tainted the subsequent search of his
residence also fails.
AFFIRMED.
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