MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jul 15 2020, 9:26 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Kristin A. Mulholland Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Crown Point, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
J.T. Whitehead
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Lasandra Norman, July 15, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-2751
v. Appeal from the Lake Superior
State of Indiana, Court
Appellee-Plaintiff The Honorable Diane Ross
Boswell, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
45G03-1801-F6-10
May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2751 | July 15, 2020 Page 1 of 8
[1] Lasandra Norman challenges her conviction of Class A misdemeanor operating
a vehicle while intoxicated and endangering a person less than eighteen years of
age. 1 Norman argues the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to support
her conviction. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On December 29, 2017, at 11:39 p.m., Lake Station Police Department Patrol
Officer Troy Allen observed a vehicle swerving and weaving erratically across
lanes on the road during hazardous winter driving conditions. Officer Allen
paced Norman’s vehicle and using his speedometer determined the vehicle’s
speed as sixty miles per hour, even though the speed limit was only thirty-five
miles per hour, and promptly pulled over the vehicle. Norman was the driver
of the car, and her seventeen-year-old daughter, L.N., was sitting in the front
passenger seat. While questioning Norman at the scene, Officer Allen smelled
a “strong odor of alcoholic beverage emitting from her breath,” observed that
she had “red, watery eyes,” and noticed that Norman’s “speech appeared to be
slurred.” (Tr. Vol. II at 52-53.) When questioned, Norman confirmed she had
some champagne earlier that evening while at the beauty salon.
[3] Based on his observations and Norman’s admission to having consumed
alcohol, Officer Allen began to evaluate the extent of Norman’s impairment.
Norman agreed to the first field sobriety test, the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus
1
Ind. Code § 9-30-5-3. Norman was found guilty of a Level 6 felony, but the trial court reduced her
conviction to a Class A misdemeanor pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-50-2-7(c)(1)(A).
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(HGN), which she failed for both eyes. After the HGN test, Officer Allen
administered a portable breathalyzer test which showed that Norman had a
blood alcohol content of “0.184.” (Tr. Vol. II at 73.) Officer Allen did not ask
Norman to perform the walk-and-turn and the one-leg stand field sobriety tests
because of the unsafe weather conditions. Rather, he drove Norman to the
Lake Station Police Department to complete his investigation. While at the
station, Norman refused to complete the final two field sobriety tests or submit
to a chemical test as outlined by the implied consent statute. 2 Officer Allen
placed Norman under arrest for operating a vehicle while intoxicated.
[4] On January 1, 2018, the State charged Norman with Level 6 felony operating a
vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person than eighteen years of age,
Class A misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a
person, 3 and Class C misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated. 4
Norman requested a bench trial and proceeded pro se. The trial court found
Norman guilty on all counts, but vacated the two misdemeanor counts and, in
its discretion pursuant to Indiana Code section 35-50-2-7, entered a judgment of
conviction on the Level 6 felony charge as a Class A misdemeanor. The trial
court then imposed a one-year suspended advisory sentence. The trial court
2
All drivers impliedly consent to submit to chemical testing if there is probable cause to believe the driver
has committed an “operating while intoxicated” offense. Ind. Code §§ 9-30-6-1 & 9-30-6-2.
3
Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2(b).
4
Ind. Code § 9-30-5-2(a).
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granted Norman’s petition to file a belated notice of appeal on October 24,
2019.
Discussion and Decision
[5] When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we
consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the
trial court’s decision. Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). It is
solely the initial fact-finder’s role to evaluate witness credibility and weigh the
evidence to determine whether it is sufficient to support a conviction; thus we
consider conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s
ruling. Jones v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1132, 1139 (Ind. 2003). We will affirm a
conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime
proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
[6] In order to convict Norman, the State had to present evidence to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that Norman “operate[d] a vehicle while intoxicated[,]” Ind.
Code § 9-30-5-2(a), “in a manner that endangers a person under the age of
eighteen.” Ind. Code § 9-30-5-3. Indiana Code section 9-13-2-86 defines
intoxication as being under the influence of alcohol such “that there is an
impaired condition of thought and action and the loss of normal control of a
person’s faculties.” A number of physical factors may indicate impairment,
including: (1) admitted consumption of a significant amount of alcohol; (2)
impaired attention and reflexes; (3) watery or bloodshot eyes; (4) the odor of
alcohol on the breath; (5) unsteady balance; (6) failure of field sobriety tests;
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and (7) slurred speech. Fields v. State, 888 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind. Ct. App.
2008). The State is required to establish the defendant was impaired based on
other factors regardless whether the blood alcohol content was above or below
the legal limit. Jellison v. State, 656 N.E.2d 532, 535 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
[7] Norman attempts to persuade us to consider her daughter’s testimony, which
contradicts Officer Allen’s testimony that Norman displayed signs of alcohol-
induced impairment. L.N. testified that she did not smell any alcohol on
Norman nor hear Norman slur her speech and that, due to the condition of the
roads that night, Norman could not have been driving erratically. L.N.
additionally testified that she lived with Norman and that she had never seen
Norman intoxicated before. The trial judge ultimately agreed with the State
that L.N. displayed bias towards Norman’s version of events. It is well-
established that this Court will not reweigh the evidence presented or reassess
the credibility of a witness. Fajardo v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1201, 1208 (Ind. 2007).
Thus, we will not disturb the trial court’s determination that Officer Allen’s
testimony was more credible than L.N.’s testimony and, instead, turn our
attention to whether the State presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate
Norman’s impairment and intoxication.
[8] In A.V. v. State, 918 N.E.2d 642, 643 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), A.V. had been
stopped by a State Trooper for driving fifty-one miles per hour in a thirty-five
mile per hour zone. Upon approaching the vehicle, the Trooper first observed
that A.V. had bloodshot eyes and alcohol-tinged breath and then, during
questioning of A.V. at the scene, confirmed that A.V. had consumed an
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unspecified amount of alcohol earlier that evening. Id. The Trooper
administered only the HGN field sobriety test, because A.V. had a sprained
ankle and could not participate in the other tests. Id. at 644.
[9] Based on the officer’s investigation, the State charged A.V. with Class A
misdemeanor operating while intoxicated and Class C misdemeanor public
intoxication. 5 Id. As part of its case in chief, the State emphasized that A.V.
admitted consuming at least some alcohol that evening, that the Trooper
smelled alcohol on her breath, that her eyes appeared red, and that she failed
the HGN field sobriety test. Id. After a bench trial, the trial court found A.V.
guilty of both counts but entered a conviction on only the operating while
intoxicated count. We upheld A.V.’s conviction as having sufficient support in
the evidence. Id. at 644.
[10] In our present case, the arresting officer testified that Norman had the smell of
alcohol on her breath, had bloodshot watery eyes, produced slurred speech,
failed the only field sobriety test given, displayed erratic and dangerous driving
behavior, and refused to submit to a chemical test or the remaining field
sobriety tests. These facts provide sufficient evidence of intoxication. See id.
[11] Norman also suggests her conviction was improper because the trial court judge
misinterpreted Indiana Code section 9-13-2-86, which defines intoxication. In
support, Norman notes that, during the sentencing hearing, the judge
commented that the statute is “written for people not to drink and drive…and
5
Ind. Code § 35-50-3-4.
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that means not one beer, not one glass of champagne.” (Tr. Vol. II at 162.)
However, immediately prior to that statement, Norman had asked the judge “if
the limit is 0.08 and you blow 0.05, will that still be considered as impaired,” to
which the Judge replied, “well sometimes it is, because of…what you do.” (Id.)
We agree with Norman that the trial judge’s statement during sentencing is not
a correct statement of the law, however we are not persuaded by Norman’s
assertion that, based on that singular statement, the judge misapplied the
statute. When considered against the context in which the statement was said,
the legal understanding of what establishes impairment, and the facts that were
presented at trial regarding Norman’s erratic driving behavior and physical
state, there is sufficient evidence to uphold Norman’s conviction. In a bench
trial, as was held here, we presume the trial court knows and properly applies
the law, see Techna-Fit, Inc. v. Fluid Transfer Products, Inc., 45 N.E.3d 399, 413
(Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (“where a bench trial is held, we presume the trial judge is
aware of and knows the law and considers only evidence properly before [her]
in reaching a decision”), and Norman has not demonstrated we should ignore
that presumption.
Conclusion
[12] We hold the State met its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that
Norman was sufficiently impaired and under the influence of alcohol when she
operated her vehicle. Accordingly, we affirm her conviction of Class A
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misdemeanor operating a vehicle while intoxicated endangering a person under
the age of eighteen.
[13] Affirmed.
Robb, J., and Vaidik, J., concur.
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Lasandra Norman v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Combined Opinion