RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1193-18T3
A.L.
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
N.L.,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________
Argued telephonically May 4, 2020 –
Decided July 16, 2020
Before Judges Vernoia and Susswein.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Monmouth County,
Docket No. FV-13-0841-03.
Brian J. Neary argued the cause for appellant (Law
Offices of Brian J. Neary, attorneys; Brian J. Neary, of
counsel; Jane M. Personette, on the brief).
John S. Furlong argued the cause for respondent
(Furlong & Krasny, attorneys; John S. Furlong, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant, N.L., 1 appeals from a Family Part order denying his request to
vacate a domestic violence final restraining order (FRO) that was entered against
him in October 2000. 2 His former wife, plaintiff, A.L., opposed the application.
Family Part Judge Angela White Dalton convened a plenary hearing at which
both parties testified. Judge Dalton thereafter denied defendant's application,
finding that the hardships he claimed do not constitute good cause to vacate the
FRO.3 After reviewing the record and the arguments of counsel in light of the
applicable legal principles, we affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in
Judge Dalton's thorough and cogent eighteen-page letter opinion.
1
We use initials to protect the identities of both parties. R. 1:38-3(d)(9).
2
The record shows that midway through the FRO plenary hearing in 2000, N.L.
and A.L. agreed to the entry of mutual restraining orders. Defendant contends
the FRO was improperly entered against him because the trial judge failed to
take a factual basis on the record to support a finding that defendant had
committed a predicate act of domestic violence. We note that defendant has
previously sought to vacate the FRO on that ground. In 2001, the Family Part
addressed and denied his claim that the FRO against him was invalid for lack of
a factual basis. Defendant did not appeal that ruling. In these circumstances,
we decline to revisit his claim that the 2000 FRO was improperly entered.
3
Judge Dalton explained that defendant asserts the FRO has negativel y
impacted his business as a forensic accountant. He seeks to dissolve the FRO
"to avoid a tarnished image associated with his business, and to hand off an
unblemished business reputation to his sons."
A-1193-18T3
2
We presume the parties are familiar with their long history of domestic
violence and bitter divorce litigation. That history is summarized in Judge
Dalton's opinion and need not be repeated in this opinion.
N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(d) provides that a final order under the Prevention of
Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, may be dissolved or modified
"[u]pon good cause shown." Judge Dalton concluded that defendant failed to
meet this standard. In reaching her decision, Judge Dalton relied heavily on
A.L.'s plenary hearing testimony concerning the parties' domestic violence
history, including defendant's repeated threats to kill plaintiff. The judge found
plaintiff had an objective basis to continue to be fearful of defendant in view of
the nature of the prior domestic violence history, defendant's more recent history
with his fiancé, who obtained a temporary restraining order against defendant
when they broke up, 4 and defendant's recent appearance at a club close to
plaintiff's home while she was present.
The gravamen of defendant's argument on appeal is that Judge Dalton
erred in making credibility determinations. We decline to second-guess the
factual findings of the Family Part judge, who had an opportunity to view the
4
Judge Dalton acknowledged in her opinion that the TRO was dismissed.
Defendant testified that a consent order for civil restraints was entered.
A-1193-18T3
3
parties' testimony firsthand. As a general matter, findings by a Family Part
judge are "binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible
evidence." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998) (citing Rova Farms
Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). The Family Part has
special jurisdiction and expertise in these matters. Cesare, 154 N.J. at 413.
Accordingly, an appellate court should not disturb the trial court's factfinding
unless the court is "convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or
inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to
offend the interests of justice." Id. at 412 (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc., 65
N.J. at 484).
Furthermore, Judge Dalton carefully analyzed and made specific findings
with respect to all of the factors enumerated in Carfagno v. Carfagno, 288 N.J.
Super. 424 (Ch. Div. 1995), including defendant's age (sixty-six). Defendant
contends the court failed to apply an objective standard to the factor that
defendant continues to fear defendant. That contention is belied by the record.
Judge Dalton in her written opinion explicitly recognized that "[c]ourts should
focus on objective fear." The judge found that in this instance, "plaintiff
continues to fear the defendant, the fear is that an objective person would feel if
exposed to the prior history in this case."
A-1193-18T3
4
The court determined that plaintiff's fear was objectively reasonable
notwithstanding the passage of time since the parties' last interaction and
notwithstanding that defendant does not live close by. Judge Dalton concluded
her opinion with the observation that, "[t]he children may be grown, and the
parties no longer entangled in bitter litigation, but there remains enough discord
that the plaintiff is entitled to continued protection because it is not outweighed
by defendant's offered reasons."
The trial court's findings are supported by substantial credible evidence.
Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412 (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc., 65 N.J. at 484). We
therefore conclude that defendant has failed to establish good cause to dissolve
the FRO. To the extent that we have not addressed them, defendant's other
arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this opinion. R. 2:11-
3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-1193-18T3
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