NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 20a0411n.06
Case No. 19-6382
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT FILED
Jul 16, 2020
DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
)
Plaintiff-Appellee,
) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
v.
) THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF
LORENZO DAVIS, ) TENNESSEE
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
BEFORE: GRIFFIN, KETHLEDGE, and THAPAR, Circuit Judges.
THAPAR, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted Lorenzo Davis of multiple crimes for his
involvement in an armed bank robbery and a carjacking. Because the jury had enough evidence
to convict, and the district court made no errors at sentencing, we affirm.
Andre Hollingsworth was walking home in the middle of the night when three men
approached him. One of the men (later identified as Davis) brandished a gun and ordered
Hollingsworth to hand over his money. Davis then searched Hollingsworth and took his phone
and wallet. After the robbers found that the wallet contained a debit card, they threatened to kill
Hollingsworth unless he told them his PIN. Hollingsworth agreed to do so, and Davis took him
(at gunpoint) to a nearby ATM, where Davis used the debit card to withdraw money. After that,
Davis let Hollingsworth go.
The following night, Calvin Marion was driving in the same area when a man waved for
him to stop. When Marion did so, the man (later identified as Davis) approached the car and then
allegedly pulled out a gun and shot Marion in the neck. Davis ordered Marion to exit his vehicle
Case No. 19-6382, United States v. Davis
and walk with him into a nearby field. Once in the field, Davis made Marion turn over his
belongings and strip naked. Davis—while keeping his gun trained on Marion—retreated to
Marion’s car and sped off with it.
After investigating these crimes, law enforcement obtained an indictment charging Davis
with six counts. Count One charged Davis with armed bank robbery (the forced ATM withdrawal).
Count Two charged Davis with using, carrying, and brandishing a firearm during a crime of
violence (the bank robbery). Count Three charged Davis with carjacking with intent to cause death
or serious bodily injury. Count Four charged Davis with using, carrying, brandishing and
discharging a firearm during a crime of violence (the carjacking). And Counts Five and Six
charged Davis with being a felon in possession of a firearm.
Davis went to trial, and a jury convicted Davis for the first two counts (related to the bank
robbery) along with the felon-in-possession counts. But on Count Three, the jury found Davis not
guilty of carjacking with intent to cause serious bodily injury (though it did convict him of a lesser
included offense). And on Count Four, the firearm charge linked to the carjacking, the jury
acquitted Davis entirely.
At sentencing, the probation officer recommended multiple sentencing enhancements
because Davis discharged a firearm during the carjacking and caused serious injury to Marion.
Davis objected, pointing out that the jury had acquitted him of discharging (or even using) a
firearm during the carjacking. But the district court overruled his objections and applied the
enhancements. The court sentenced Davis to 376 months in prison.
On appeal, Davis makes two arguments. He first argues that the jury had insufficient
evidence to convict him on any of the charges. Next, he argues that the district court erred by
relying on acquitted conduct to enhance his sentence. Both arguments lack merit.
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Case No. 19-6382, United States v. Davis
Sufficiency of the Evidence. Davis asks us to vacate his convictions because (he argues)
there was not enough evidence to find him guilty. Although Davis challenges five separate
convictions, his argument is uniform. He claims that this is a case of mistaken identity—whoever
robbed Hollingsworth or stole Marion’s car, it wasn’t him.
Our review of the jury verdict is deferential. That’s because juries—not judges—“decide
what conclusions should be drawn from evidence admitted at trial.” Coleman v. Johnson, 566
U.S. 650, 651 (2012) (per curiam) (cleaned up); see also United States v. Tolliver, 949 F.3d 244,
247 (6th Cir. 2020) (per curiam) (discussing the importance of giving juries “due deference”).
Thus, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and draw all reasonable
inferences in the government’s favor. Then we ask whether any rational jury could have
convicted Davis. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Here, that means the convictions
stand if any rational jury could have found that Davis (rather than someone else) committed the
charged crimes.
The jury had ample evidence to conclude that Davis was in fact the perpetrator. Consider
the different charges:
• Bank Robbery (Count 1) & Brandishing a Firearm (Count 2). Although
Hollingsworth couldn’t identify the perpetrator, the two other men involved in the
robbery testified that it was Davis who had forced Hollingsworth to withdraw
money at gunpoint. What’s more, when officers eventually recovered
Hollingsworth’s phone, they found that someone had logged into Davis’s social
media accounts with it—corroborating that Davis was the robber.
• Carjacking (Count 3). Marion identified Davis as the carjacker while testifying
that the carjacking was so traumatic that he would “never forget” the face of his
attacker. R. 64, pg. ID 483. Two other witnesses confirmed this identification.
• Felon in Possession (Counts 5 & 6). Multiple witnesses also testified that Davis
possessed a firearm during both the robbery and the carjacking.
This testimony gave the jury more than enough evidence tying Davis to the charged crimes.
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Case No. 19-6382, United States v. Davis
Faced with this evidence, Davis does his best to show that it is biased or incredible.
He offers several reasons why the jury shouldn’t have believed Marion’s testimony and that of
Davis’s confederates. But those arguments go to witness credibility. And we may not “consider
the credibility of witnesses” when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence. United States v.
Ward, 957 F.3d 691, 696 (6th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). Davis made these credibility arguments to
the jury, but the jury chose to convict Davis anyway. We cannot second-guess that decision.
Acquitted Conduct. Davis next argues that the district court erred by relying on acquitted
conduct to increase his guideline range. But, as Davis admits, this challenge is a nonstarter. That’s
because our circuit permits district courts to use acquitted conduct when sentencing a defendant.
United States v. White, 551 F.3d 381, 382 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc). This panel cannot overrule
that authority. See Brumbach v. United States, 929 F.3d 791, 795 (6th Cir. 2019).
We affirm.
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