[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
SEPT 08, 2006
No. 06-10417 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 02-00357-CV-J-32-MMH
TONY A. WILSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
LUCY FARLEY,
FANNIE GREEN,
ANN HENDRICKS,
WILLIAM DAY,
ROGER WILLIAMS et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
TAMMY GAJEWSKI, et al.,
Defendants.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(September 8, 2006)
Before BIRCH, DUBINA and HULL, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Tony A. Wilson appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of appellees, his former employer, the Florida Department of Children and
Families and ten of his former co-workers in their individual and official capacities
(collectively, “DCF”), and denial of his motion for reconsideration as to his race
discrimination and related claims. Because we conclude that (1) Wilson did not
establish a prima facie case of retaliation, (2) Wilson was afforded adequate
opportunity to clear his name regarding the reasons given for his termination, and
(3) the individual defendants did not violate any of Wilson’s constitutional rights
and were entitled to qualified immunity, the district court did not err in granting the
defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Additionally, because the court had
the power to control its docket and Wilson did not allege that he was prejudiced by
any delay, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
ordering the parties to delay their motions for summary judgment. Neither did the
district court abuse its discretion in setting aside the entry of default judgment.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor
of defendants and its denial of Wilson’s motion for reconsideration. Finally,
because appellees’ brief complies with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
2
and Wilson had the opportunity to respond to any factual allegations in his reply
brief, Wilson’s motion to strike is DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
Wilson, an African American male, filed an action alleging retaliation in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e-2, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, and the Florida Civil Rights Act
(“FCRA”), Fla. Stat. § 760.01-760.11 and 509.092. Wilson alleged that he had
become a “Florida Career Service Employee” in June 2001 and that his district
program manager, Lucy Farley, had terminated him in February 2002 for “conduct
unbecoming a public employee, insubordination, and disruptive conduct,” but
actually because he had complained of race discrimination. R3-142 at 2 (emphasis
omitted).
Wilson further alleged that, from September 2001 to November 2001, he had
held “an objectively good faith reasonable belief that” his co-worker, William Day,
was treating him differently from co-workers because of his race. Id. Wilson
claimed that, as a result of his complaints about Day’s conduct, Farley and Roger
Williams retaliated against Wilson by falsely stating that Wilson had failed to
insert the four paragraphs into his case plans 1 and, later, by terminating him.
1
Case plans, which Wilson created as part of his job, consisted of a descriptive list of tasks
that a parent, relative, or guardian had to complete before their child custody rights were reinstated.
3
Wilson also alleged that he had provided Farley with the following information:
(1) a 7 September 2001 complaint, addressed to Fannie Green and Eddie Gibson,
Wilson’s supervisors, about Day’s treating Wilson “differently than the other court
workers, because of his race and using the case plans to harass [him]”;
discriminatory and harassing conduct toward Wilson; (2) a 6 November 2001
complaint, addressed to Gibson and Ann Hendricks, Day’s supervisor, regarding
the same; (3) information that, on 6 November 2001, Wilson had mailed a
complaint to the DCF’s office of civil rights (“OCR”) and the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”); and (4) an email, which Wilson originally
sent to Gibson and Hendricks on 7 November 2001 to inform them that he had sent
a complaint to the DCF/OCR and the EEOC. Id. at 4. Wilson further stated that
his supervisors never investigated either his complaints against Day or the conduct
that they alleged Wilson committed.
In the next two counts of the complaint, Wilson reiterated his retaliatory
discharge claim as against the DCF and also pursuant to the FCRA. The fourth
count, brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleged that the DCF had deprived
Wilson of his due process rights. Wilson explained that he had been deprived of a
meaningful opportunity to be heard regarding the charges against him or for a post-
termination name-clearing hearing. Wilson acknowledged that the DCF provided
4
him with a predetermination letter prior to his termination, but asserted that the
letter was insufficient to safeguard his liberty interest. Wilson also raised due
process claims in the fifth and sixth counts. In the last three counts, Wilson alleged
that the DCF had engaged in pre-hiring retaliation, in violation of 42 U.S.C. §
1981, when it relied on the information regarding Wilson’s termination as grounds
for refusing to hire Wilson for the positions of Protective Investigator, Attorney, or
Child Protective Investigator.
After Wilson had filed a second amended complaint, he moved the district
court to enter default judgment against the DCF because it had not timely
responded to the summons and second amended complaint. The clerk entered
default judgment. However, upon the motion of the DCF, the district court set
aside the default judgment, finding that defendants had “shown good cause” by
way of demonstrating excusable neglect in that the complaint had not been
properly served upon them. R1-36 at 5; R2-54.
In answer to Wilson’s third amended complaint, the DCF denied Wilson’s
material allegations that it had retaliated against him, but admitted that certain DCF
personnel, including Hendricks, Day, and Farley, had been aware of Wilson’s
racial discrimination complaint made on 6 and 7 November 2001. The DCF also
admitted that Wilson had sent an email on 7 November 2001 in which he stated
5
that he had sent a complaint of disparate treatment to the EEOC, but the DCF
denied that the email indicated that race was the basis for the treatment.
Additionally, the DCF set forth affirmative defenses, including that the individual
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity.
Wilson subsequently moved for summary judgment on the Title VII, 42
U.S.C. § 1983, FCRA, and liberty interest claims. The DCF also moved for
summary judgment, arguing that Wilson had not set forth a prima facie case of
retaliation, the DCF was not on notice of the alleged harassment, and Wilson could
not show causation or pretext. Concerning Wilson’s due process claims, the DCF
argued that Wilson had received due process by way of the predetermination letter
of 18 December 2001, which detailed Wilson’s alleged conduct violations, and the
opportunity to attend the predetermination hearing at which Wilson failed to
appear. The DCF also pointed out that Wilson could have attended a post-
termination hearing through the Public Employees Relations Commission
(“PERC”), but that he failed to do so.
Wilson’s deposition testimony described the hierarchy at the DCF as
follows: Farley supervised Green, who supervised Gibson, who supervised Wilson.
Wilson also stated that Day was a DCF attorney, supervised by Hendricks, who
6
was supervised by Roger Williams.2 Wilson testified that, on 6 November 2001,
he had a discussion with Day concerning Wilson’s belief that Day required Wilson,
and no one else, to add four specific paragraphs 3 to his case plans. Wilson further
alleged that, after this discussion, Day became upset and said “he was tired of my
black ass.” R8-312 (Exhibits Folder - Deposition of Tony Wilson) at 88. Wilson
testified that he did not become angry or raise his voice while he talked with Day.
Wilson also stated that he went to Hendricks’s office on 6 November 2001 to
discuss the problem and to report Day’s conduct, which he considered to be
discriminatory. Id. at 112-14. After his meeting with Hendricks, Wilson sent
letters to the DCF/OCR and to the EEOC. Wilson stated that two employees from
the EEOC contacted him in December 2001 and requested further information.
2
As of 25 April 2005, the date of his deposition, Wilson had completed law school and
passed the Florida Bar exam, but he was not a member of the Florida Bar. R9-335 at 15 n.14.
3
The four paragraphs at issue are:
1. The ____ will provide the names, dates of birth and any other relevant
information on all adults residing in the home of the ____.
2. The ____ will advise the Department of Children and Families of any change
of residence as well as the physical address of such new residence within 72
hours of said change of residence.
3. The ____ will sign an authorization for release of information to the
Department of Children and Families when requested by the counselor so
that relevant information may be obtained to verify compliance with said
case plan, amount [sic] other things.
4. The ____ will not knowing [sic] reside with any person with a history of
domestic and/or physical violence.
R7-303, Exh. 6.
7
Wilson sent the EEOC additional correspondence on 19 November and in
December 2001.
Wilson testified that he appealed his termination to PERC, but did not
appear at the PERC hearing because he had “decided to abandon that avenue.” Id.
at 132, 135-37. Wilson believed that Day retaliated against him by leaning over
him and talking loudly, and by sending an email on 9 November 2001 that led to
Wilson’s termination. Wilson also stated that Farley retaliated against him by
moving for his dismissal on 7 November 2001, not reviewing his letter with regard
to the 27 December 2001 predetermination conference, and failing to investigate
the charges against him.
Wilson further testified that, on 6 November 2001, he entered Gibson’s
office without knocking while Gibson was in a meeting with another employee,
and remained there until that meeting had concluded. Wilson and Gibson then
discussed placing the four paragraphs in Wilson’s case plans. Wilson testified that
he was not irate during their conversation, that he did not know whether Gibson
went to speak with Day after their discussion. Wilson did not dispute that a
predetermination meeting was held on 27 December 2001, and that he did not
attend, but rather submitted documents on his own behalf. Wilson asserted that the
8
letters written on 18 December 2001 and 11 February 2002 implicated his liberty
interest.
In her deposition, Farley testified that, in signing the 11 February 2002
dismissal letter, she considered all of the written information that she had from
Wilson. R8-304 (Exhibits Folder), Exh. 1 at 35-36. She further stated that she did
not investigate the charges against Wilson because it was Green’s role, not hers.
Gibson said that Wilson’s job was to put case plans together and to have
those plans reviewed by Gibson, and attorneys Day and Stacy Hill. R7-294
(Exhibits Folder), at TAB: Affidavit of Eddie Gibson, ¶¶ 4-6. Gibson further
indicated that, beginning in the late summer and early fall of 2001, Day
complained that Wilson was not putting necessary information in the case plans.
Gibson therefore drafted four paragraphs containing the necessary information,
which Day and Hill approved, and instructed Wilson to add that language to all of
his case plans. Gibson denied Wilson’s allegation that he had instructed Wilson to
discontinue adding the four paragraphs on 8 October 2001. Id. ¶ 8. Gibson stated
that Wilson complained that the new language was not required by other unit
managers, but explained that, because different attorneys were assigned to the
different units, units often had varied procedures. Gibson also stated that Wilson
alleged that Day “was discriminating against him, though he provided no specific
9
facts of discrimination, other than his general griping about the new task
language.” Id. ¶ 10.
Gibson recounted that, on 4 November 2001, he noticed that several of
Wilson’s case plans did not contain the new language, so he returned those plans to
Wilson and asked him to add the language. He described how, on 6 November
2001, while he was in his office meeting with another employee, Wilson had
entered unannounced and appeared “quite angry.” Id. ¶ 13. Gibson stated that
Wilson “was irate and asked why ‘games’ were being played with the case plans.”
Id. Wilson also told Gibson that he had included the necessary language in an
attachment to his case plans. Id. Gibson took the attachment to Day and Hill, who
found it legally insufficient. Gibson also reported that Wilson returned to Gibson’s
office and demanded to know why the changes were required, refused to
accompany Gibson to the attorneys’ offices to get further clarification, and
“pointed his finger at [Gibson] in a threatening manner.” Id. ¶ 15. Gibson
informed Wilson, on 7 November 2001, that he “did not appreciate the manner in
which” Wilson had treated Gibson. Id. ¶ 16. Thereafter, upon Farley’s request,
Gibson prepared a statement recounting the events of 6 November 2001.
In addition to the depositions and affidavits, the parties submitted various
documentary exhibits in support of their summary judgment motions, of which the
10
following are relevant to this appeal: (1) the 18 December 2001 predetermination
letter that identified the charges against Wilson, and informed him that the DCF
was considering his dismissal and that he could request a conference to rebut the
charges, R7-294 (Exhibits Folder), Exh. 1; (2) Wilson’s 11 February 2002
dismissal letter, which indicated that a predetermination conference had been held
on 27 December 2001 and that, because Wilson did not attend, Farley had made a
decision about his dismissal “based on the information outlined in [her] December
18, 2001 letter to [Wilson] and the written documentation [Wilson had]
submitted,” id. Exh. 2; (3) an email, dated 7 November 2001 and written by
Wilson, which stated: “[o]n November 6, 2001, I forwarded a complaint against
Mr. Day for [d]isparate [t]reatment [d]iscrimination to the [OCF/DCF] and the
EEOC” id. Exh. 7; (4) a letter, dated 6 November 2001, from Wilson to the
DCF/OCR in which Wilson stated that Day had discriminated against him by
requiring him, and not requiring any other DCF employee, to add language to his
case plans, id. Exh. 44 at 1, and the DCF/OCR response, stating that it was “unable
to determine the basis of [Wilson’s] alleged discrimination or delineate the details
of [Wilson’s] alleged personal harm,” id. at 3; (5) a 12 December 2001 letter from
the EEOC to Wilson, instructing him that if he believed his discrimination was
based on a protected factor, he could file a charge, id. Exh. 47; (6) a 15 February
11
2002 letter from Wilson to the EEOC, alleging discrimination based on Wilson’s
sex and race, id. Exh. 48; and (7) Wilson’s charge of discrimination on an EEOC
form dated 1 April 2002, id. Exh. 49.
The court found that Wilson had failed to satisfy the first prong for a prima
facie case of retaliation because he had not produced evidence that he had engaged
in a statutorily protected activity. More specifically, the court explained that
Wilson had failed to demonstrate that he had an objectively reasonable belief that
the DCF had discriminated against him, adding that Day’s requirement that Wilson
add the four paragraphs to his case plans was “hardly the stuff of racial
discrimination or hostile work environment.” R9-335 at 21. Further, in accepting
as true Wilson’s claim that Day made a racially derogatory remark to him, the
court found that the single remark was not “a basis for bringing a charge of
discrimination.” Id. at 21-22. Finally, the court found that “Wilson’s
unsubstantiated assertions of alleged differential treatment based on race, without
supportive evidence, [were] insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact
that his charge of discrimination based upon race was objectively reasonable.” Id.
at 22. The court additionally concluded that, even if Wilson had established a
prima facie case of retaliation, he had not presented sufficient evidence to create a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the DCF’s legitimate,
12
nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Wilson – insubordination, disruptive
conduct, and conduct unbecoming a public employee – was pretextual. The district
court granted the DCF’s motion for summary judgment as to these claims.
In determining that the DCF did not deny Wilson procedural due process,
the court found that, even assuming arguendo that the predetermination process
was procedurally inadequate, Wilson had an adequate post-termination remedy in
that he could have continued his appeal before the PERC, rather than abandoning
the claim. With regard to Wilson’s substantive due process liberty interest claim,
the court found that the DCF was entitled to summary judgment because Wilson
had the opportunity to clear his name either through the predetermination hearing,
which he chose not to attend, or the PERC appeal process. The court also found,
concerning the DCF’s claim of qualified immunity for the individual defendants,
that a qualified immunity inquiry was not necessary because Wilson had not
established a violation of any constitutional right associated with his termination.4
After the court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the DCF, Wilson moved
for reconsideration. The court denied the motion.
4
The district court also granted the DCF’s motion for summary judgment as to Wilson’s
retaliatory discharge claim under the FCRA, his § 1981 retaliatory discharge claim, and his § 1981
retaliatory failure to hire claim. Wilson does not raise those issues on appeal and we do not address
them.
13
On appeal, Wilson argues that (1) he did establish a prima facie case of
retaliation; (2) he was not afforded adequate due process before or after his
termination; (3) the individual defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity;
(4) the district court erred in ordering the parties to refrain from filing their
summary judgment motions until discovery was complete; and (5) the district court
abused its discretion in setting aside the default judgment entered against certain of
the defendants. We address each issue in turn.
II. DISCUSSION
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing
all facts “in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Pipkins v. City of
Temple Terrace, Fla., 267 F.3d 1197, 1199 (11th Cir. 2001). “Summary judgment
is only proper if there are no genuine disputed issues of material fact, and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Frederick v.
Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 246 F.3d 1305, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001); see also Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c).
A. Prima Facie Case of Retaliation
Wilson argues on appeal that the district court erred in concluding that he
failed to present a prima facie case of retaliation because he had engaged in
protected activity by way of informal complaints to his superiors alleging racial
14
discrimination that he had suffered. Title VII prevents an employer from
retaliating against an employee who “has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). A claim brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981 is analyzed under the same framework as a Title VII claim because both
statutes have the same requirements of proof. See Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs.,
Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11th Cir. 1998). To establish a prima facie case of
retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must show: “(1) []he participated in an
activity protected by Title VII; (2) []he suffered an adverse employment action;
and (3) there is a causal connection between the participation in the protected
activity and the adverse employment decision.” Gupta v. Florida Bd. of Regents,
212 F.3d 571, 587 (11th Cir. 2000).
We have held that “Title VII protects not just individuals who have filed
formal [EEOC] complaints, but also those who informally voice complaints to their
superiors.” Shannon v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 292 F.3d 712, 716 n.2 (11th
Cir. 2002) (quotations omitted). To demonstrate participation in a protected
activity for purposes of a prima facie case, however, “a plaintiff must show that
[]he had a good faith, reasonable belief that the employer was engaged in unlawful
15
employment practices.” Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th
Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted). Accordingly, a plaintiff must demonstrate both his
subjective belief that his employer was engaged in unlawful employment practices
and that his “belief was objectively reasonable in light of the facts and record
presented.” Id. at 1312.
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Wilson, and based on the
record, it is clear that Wilson at least made the DCF aware of his belief that Day
had discriminated against him, even if the record is unclear as to when Wilson filed
a formal complaint with the DCF/OCF or EEOC. Therefore, the record supports
Wilson’s allegation that he complained of discrimination, but the issue remains as
to whether those complaints constitute “protected activity” under Title VII. See
Gupta, 212 F.3d at 587. In making that determination, we must ascertain whether
Wilson’s subjective belief that he had been discriminated against was objectively
reasonable. See Weeks, 291 F.3d at 1311-12.
The discriminatory conduct Wilson alleged was (1) Day’s requirement that
Wilson insert four additional paragraphs into his case plans, and (2) Day’s remark
that he was tired of Wilson’s “black ass.” See R8-312 (Exhibits Folder -
Deposition of Tony Wilson) at 112-14. Wilson maintained that the requirement
that he had certain paragraphs to his case plans was discriminatory because Day
16
did not require any other employees to insert the language, but Wilson offered no
evidence in support of this allegation. Further, Day’s single derogatory remark
was insufficient to serve as a basis for a discrimination charge where Day was
merely Wilson’s co-worker, rather than his supervisor, and, thus, Day’s conduct
could not be attributed to the DCF. See Little v. United Techs., Carrier Transicold
Div., 103 F.3d 956, 959-60 (11th Cir. 1997) (concluding that a co-worker’s single
racially offensive remark was not attributable to the employer, and, thus, the
plaintiff’s opposition to it did not constitute opposition to an unlawful employment
practice under Title VII). Accordingly, we conclude that Wilson’s informal
complaints that his co-worker William Day’s conduct constituted racial
discrimination were not objectively reasonable. Accordingly, they do not
constitute participation in a protected activity. Thus, the district court did not err in
finding that Wilson failed to satisfy the first prong of a prima facie case for
retaliation.5
5
Wilson also argues that the district court erred in finding that his dismissal was for just
cause, as required under Fla. Stat. § 110.227(1), (2), (5), but makes no explicit argument on appeal
regarding the district court’s findings that the DCF presented a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for Wilson’s dismissal, and that Wilson failed to establish that the reason was pretext. Once a Title
VII plaintiff establishes his prima facie case, the employer has the burden to produce a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Sullivan v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 170 F.3d 1056,
1059 (11th Cir. 1999). We have held that this burden is “exceedingly light” and that the employer
“need not persuade the court that its proffered reasons are legitimate; the defendant’s burden is
merely one of production, not proof.” Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, __ U.S. __, 126 S.Ct. 478 (2005) (quotation omitted). If the employer satisfies its burden,
thus rebutting the presumption of retaliation, the plaintiff must then demonstrate that the employer’s
17
B. Due Process
Wilson first argues that the district court erred in not analyzing his due
process claim regarding DCF’s placement of allegedly stigmatizing documents in
his personnel file under the Equal Protection Clause. However, because Wilson
did not present an equal protection argument before the district court, we will not
consider that argument on appeal. See Thaeter v. Palm Beach County Sheriff’s
Office, 449 F.3d 1342, 1351 n.6 (11th Cir. 2006) (refusing to analyze an issue
raised for the first time on appeal).
Wilson also argues that the DCF violated a “liberty interest” in failing to
give him an opportunity to clear his name as to the charges upon which his
termination was based.6 “[A]lthough damage to reputation, standing alone, does
reason is a pretext for retaliatory conduct. Sullivan, 170 F.3d at 1059. “To show that the employer’s
reasons were pretextual, the plaintiff must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities,
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for
its action that a reasonable factfinder could find them unworthy of credence.” Cooper, 390 F.3d at
725 (quotation omitted).
As discussed, Wilson has not established a prima facie case of retaliation because he did not
demonstrate that he had engaged in a statutorily protected activity. Even if he had, his claim still
fails because the DCF asserted a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Wilson – rude
and improper behavior in the workplace – and Wilson did not offer evidence sufficiently supporting
his contention that this reason was pretextual. Rather, he has offered little more than conclusory
allegations that he did not engage in the improper behavior for which the DCF terminated him, and
he has failed to point to any “weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or
contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons” that would create a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the DCF’s reason was pretextual. See id. (quotations omitted).
Accordingly, even if Wilson had established a prima facie case at the outset, we conclude that the
district court did not err in finding that he failed to satisfy his burden as to pretext for retaliation.
6
As to any other procedural due process claims, Wilson has, by his own statement,
abandoned them on appeal. See Appellant’s Br. at 6.
18
not provide a basis for an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983[,] when reputational
damage is sustained in connection with a termination of employment, it may give
rise to a procedural due process claim for deprivation of liberty which is actionable
under section 1983.” Cotton v. Jackson, 216 F.3d 1328, 1330 (11th Cir. 2000) (per
curiam). “To recover, a plaintiff must satisfy a six-factor test and show that (1) a
false statement, (2) of a stigmatizing nature, (3) attending a governmental
employee’s discharge, (4)[was] made public, (5) by the governmental employer,
(6) without a meaningful opportunity for an employee name clearing hearing.” Id.
(quotations omitted). Such a hearing may “be held either before or after the
termination or publication.” Id. “If adequate state remedies were available but the
plaintiff failed to take advantage of them, the plaintiff cannot rely on that failure to
claim that the state deprived him of procedural due process.” Id. at 1331.
Here, Wilson had more than one opportunity to clear his name. First,
Wilson could have attended the DCF’s predetermination hearing, but instead he
chose to submit a written response to the DCF’s charges against him. Second,
Wilson could have followed through with the appeal that he initiated through
Florida’s PERC process. Instead, he chose to “abandon that avenue.” R8-312
(Exhibits Folder - Deposition of Tony Wilson) at 132, 135-37. Given these
opportunities to clear his name, both before and after his termination, the district
19
court correctly concluded that the DCF had not deprived Wilson of a liberty
interest without due process of law.
C. Qualified Immunity
Wilson argues that the district court erred in finding that the individual
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. He specifically asserts that the
individual defendants were not acting within the scope of their authority in failing
to investigate the charges against him and in carrying out his termination. He
further maintains that the individual defendants violated his clearly established
constitutional rights.
To establish entitlement to qualified immunity, a public official must first
demonstrate that he was “acting within the scope of his discretionary authority
when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred.” Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340,
1346 (11th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted). The burden then shifts to the plaintiff
to demonstrate that qualified immunity is inappropriate. Id. In deciding whether
the plaintiff has satisfied his burden, a reviewing court must first determine
whether “[t]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, . . .
the facts alleged show the [public official’s] conduct violated a constitutional
right?” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2156 (2001).
20
Here, the individual defendants, Wilson’s co-workers and supervisors, either
complained about what they believed was inappropriate behavior by Wilson in the
workplace, or initiated and completed the DCF’s termination procedure against
Wilson. Thus, it is clear that the individual defendants were acting within the
scope of their discretionary duties in connection with Wilson’s dismissal. Thus,
we proceed to the issue of whether the individual defendants violated any of
Wilson’s constitutional rights. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201, 121 S.Ct. at 2156. As
discussed above, neither the DCF nor the individual defendants violated any
constitutional right. Accordingly, the district court did not err in finding that the
individual defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. See id. (“If no
constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established,
there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity”).
D. Order to Refrain from Filing
Wilson complains that, in the course of the proceedings below, the district
court ordered the parties to refrain from filing a motion for summary judgment
until the expiration of the discovery process. A district court retains the inherent
authority to manage its own docket. See Four Seasons Hotels and Resorts, B.V. v.
Consorcio Barr S.A., 377 F.3d 1164, 1172 n.7 (11th Cir. 2004). Accordingly, we
will review the district court’s order for an abuse of discretion. See Young v. City
21
of Palm Bay, Fla., 358 F.3d 859, 863-64 (11th Cir. 2004) (reviewing various
district court decisions made in the course of managing its docket for an abuse of
discretion).
Here, in the face of the district court’s discretion in managing his own
docket, Wilson has not alleged on appeal that he was prejudiced by the delay in
filing his motion for summary judgment, or that the district court did not apply the
order equally to both parties. Without a demonstration of prejudice, there exist no
grounds upon which Wilson’s case should be remanded to the district court.
E. Setting Aside Default Judgment
Finally, Wilson argues that the district court abused its discretion in setting
aside the default judgment that had been entered against the DCF for failing to file
a timely answer to Wilson’s summons. We review a district court’s decision
regarding a motion to set aside the entry of a default judgment for an abuse of
discretion. See Gibbs v. Air Canada, 810 F.2d 1529, 1537 (11th Cir. 1987).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c) provides that, for good cause shown, a
district court may set aside an entry of default. Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(c).
In granting the DCF’s motion to set aside the clerk’s entry of default
judgment, the district court found that the DCF had shown good cause for failing
timely to respond to Wilson’s complaint – namely, that Wilson had not properly
22
served the complaint upon the DCF. Wilson does not argue on appeal that the
district court’s finding that the DCF was not properly served was incorrect.
Moreover, Wilson’s allegation that the district court utilized the inappropriate
standard in setting aside the judgment is without merit because the district court
clearly used the “good cause” standard, which Wilson admits is the proper
standard. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in setting aside the default judgment.
III. CONCLUSION
Wilson appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
the appellees and the denial of his motion for reconsideration. Because Wilson
failed to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, because he was afforded
numerous opportunities to clear his name as to the reasons given for his
termination, and because the individual defendants did not violate any of Wilson’s
constitutional rights and were entitled to qualified immunity as to his claims
against them, the district court did not err in granting the defendants’ motion for
summary judgment. Additionally, we discern no abuse of discretion in the district
court’s management of its docket by ordering the parties to delay their motions for
summary judgment, or in its setting aside the entry of default judgment based on
Wilson’s improper service of the complaint. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the
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district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants and its denial of
Wilson’s motion for reconsideration.
Finally, because appellees’ brief complies with the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure and Wilson had the opportunity to respond to any factual
allegations in his reply brief, Wilson’s motion to strike is DENIED.
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