NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 17 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 18-17217
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 1:17-cv-00187-DAD-EPG
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MELBA FORD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Dale A. Drozd, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 14, 2020**
Before: CANBY, FRIEDLAND, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
Melba Ford appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment for
the United States in its action to reduce to judgment federal income tax
assessments for tax years 1993, 2001, 2002, 2003, and 2005. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Hughes v. United States, 953 F.2d
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
531, 541 (9th Cir. 1992). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because the
government submitted Forms 4340 for the relevant years, and Ford failed to raise a
genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the tax and penalty assessments were
invalid. See Palmer v. IRS, 116 F.3d 1309, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that
the IRS’s deficiency determinations are entitled to the presumption of correctness
unless the taxpayer submits competent evidence that the assessments were
“arbitrary, excessive, or without foundation”); Hughes, 953 F.2d at 535 (absent
contrary evidence, official certificates, such as a Form 4340, constitute proof of
fact that assessments were actually and properly made); Olson v. United States,
760 F.2d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir.1985) (explaining that the IRS may assess frivolous
return penalties when a tax return is premised on a position that is frivolous under
26 U.S.C. § 6702).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Ford’s motion to
vacate or amend the judgment because Ford failed to demonstrate any basis for
such relief. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d
1255, 1262-63 (9th Cir. 1993) (standard of review and grounds for relief under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) or 60(b)).
We reject as without merit Ford’s contention that the district court erred by
failing to take judicial notice of IRS procedural manuals. To the extent the district
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court failed to consider facts that were properly the subject of judicial notice, Ford
was not prejudiced because the facts at issue, taken in the light most favorable to
Ford, would not have defeated summary judgment.
We reject as without merit Ford’s contentions that the district court violated
her due process rights and erred by failing to strike her IRS filings from the record,
failing to appoint counsel sua sponte, and holding her to “exacting evidentiary
standards imposed on attorneys.”
We do not consider Ford’s renewed request for appointment of counsel set
forth in her opening brief. In Docket Entry No. 23, this court denied Ford’s motion
for appointment of counsel and ordered that no motions for reconsideration,
clarification, or modification of the denial shall be filed or entertained. To the
extent Ford seeks reconsideration of the court’s February 25, 2019 or June 26,
2019 orders, we do not consider the requests for reconsideration. See Docket Entry
Nos. 8, 14.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
All other pending motions and requests for relief are denied.
AFFIRMED.
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