NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 20 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARVIN WAYNE COFFEY, No. 19-55916
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No.
2:18-cv-03688-DMG-PLA
v.
MESA AIRLINES, INC.; MESA AIR MEMORANDUM*
GROUP, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Dolly M. Gee, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 6, 2020**
Pasadena, California
Before: PAEZ and BADE, Circuit Judges, and MELGREN,*** District Judge.
Appellant Marvin Coffey, an airline pilot, sued his former employer, Mesa
Airlines, Inc. (“Mesa”), and its parent company, Mesa Air Group, Inc.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Eric F. Melgren, United States District Judge for the
District of Kansas, sitting by designation.
(collectively, “Defendants”), for racial and disability discrimination under various
federal and state statutes after he was terminated. The district court dismissed the
case because it determined it could not exercise specific personal jurisdiction over
Defendants.1 The district court also struck a portion of Coffey’s declaration
alleging Defendants contracted with vendors to provide support services at
California airports. Reviewing de novo the court’s personal jurisdiction
determination, Freestream Aircraft (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Aero Law Grp., 905 F.3d
597, 602 (9th Cir. 2018), and for abuse of discretion its evidentiary ruling, Valdivia
v. Schwarzenegger, 599 F.3d 984, 993 (9th Cir. 2010), we affirm.
1. Coffey failed to satisfy the three-prong test to show that Defendants had
“certain minimum contacts” with California to justify the court’s exercise of
specific personal jurisdiction. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316
(1945); Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir.
2004). Coffey did not show Defendants “purposefully direct[ed]” their activities at
California or “purposefully avail[ed]” themselves of its laws and benefits. See
Schwarzenneger, 374 F.3d at 802. Coffey contends Defendants directed their
activities at California because it held employment recruiting events there, but he
readily admits in his declaration that Mesa did not recruit him in California.
1
The district court also determined it lacked general personal jurisdiction over
Defendants, but Coffey expressly waived this issue on appeal.
2
Further, we are not persuaded Defendants “purposefully avail[ed]”
themselves of the “privilege of conducting activities in [California], thereby
invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.” See Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d
at 802. Mere employment of a citizen from the forum state does not satisfy this
factor. Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1212 (9th Cir. 2015). Neither does Mesa’s
offer of free air travel to and from Coffey’s California home to the city in which he
began and ended his work shifts. Id. at 1213. Last, Defendants’ litigation history
in California courts predated Coffey’s employment and was unrelated to Coffey’s
instant action. See Steel v. United States, 813 F.2d 1545, 1549 (9th Cir. 1987)
(explaining minimum contacts are assessed “at the time of the events underlying
the dispute”).
Even if Coffey satisfied the purposeful direction or purposeful availment
test, he falls short on the second prong because he does not show the controversy
relates to or arises out of Defendants’ purported contacts with California. See
Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. The contacts Coffey alleged have no “direct
nexus” to Coffey’s claim that he was discriminated against on the basis of his race
or disability. See In re W. States Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., 715 F.3d
716, 742 (9th Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373
(2015). As the district court reasoned, Coffey would have been terminated
regardless of those contacts.
3
Because Coffey fails to satisfy either of the first two prongs, we need not
address the third prong—reasonableness. Omeluk v. Langsten Slip & Batbyggeri
A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1995).
2. We reject Coffey’s argument that the district court erred in its evidentiary
ruling because he fails to show that the purported error “more probably than not[] .
. . tainted the outcome.” Valdivia, 599 F.3d at 993. The paragraph the court struck
from his declaration—which alleged Defendants contracted with vendors to
provide support services at California airports—does not relate to his termination
or other conduct that gave rise to his cause of action. Thus, that fact is irrelevant to
specific personal jurisdiction as it relates to Coffey’s legal claims.
AFFIRMED.
4