NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 19-3857
__________
RENE D. EDWARDS,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER GARY M. LANIGAN; SCO FRANCHETTE
(FNU); SGT. BRAINARD, (FNU); SCO WILLIAMS (FNU); SERGEANT JOYNER
(FNU); LIEUTENTANT JOEL TAYLOR; SCO DONNA SCOTT; SCO I. SAMPSON;
WARDEN/ADMINISTRATOR CHRISTOPHER HOLMES, Warden/Administrator,
individually, and in their official capacities
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 13-cv-00214)
District Judge: Honorable Noel L. Hillman
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 1, 2020
Before: AMBRO, GREENAWAY, JR., and PORTER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed September 30, 2020)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Pro se appellant René D. Edwards appeals the denial of four post-judgment
motions. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
In January 2013, Edwards initiated a civil rights lawsuit alleging that New Jersey
State prison officials and administrators violated his constitutional rights regarding an
incident where Edwards was assaulted by his cellmate at South Woods State Prison. The
defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that Edwards had
failed to exhaust the prison’s administrative remedies as required under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). See 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e). By order entered on April
27, 2018, the District Court granted the defendants’ motion, concluding that Edwards had
failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing his complaint.
Edwards appealed the judgment on December 11, 2018, and we dismissed the
appeal as untimely on May 1, 2019. On June 11, 2019, Edwards filed in the closed
District Court proceedings a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) seeking
relief from the District Court’s grant of summary judgment. Edwards also filed a motion
requesting the presiding Judge’s recusal and two motions requesting oral argument and
trial. The District Court denied the motions in a single order, and Edwards timely
appealed.
We have appellate jurisdiction because the order appealed is a “final decision”
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Isidor Paiewonsky Assocs., Inc. v. Sharp Props., Inc., 998
F.2d 145, 149–50 (3d Cir. 1993). We review for abuse of discretion the District Court’s
denial of Edwards’ Rule 60(b) motion, see Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244,
251 (3d Cir. 2008), as well as his other motions, see Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v.
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Securacom Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir. 2000) (denial of recusal motion); Max’s
Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999)
(denial of reconsideration motion). “The district court abuses its discretion if its decision
rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law, or the
improper application of law to fact.” Ragguette v. Premier Wines & Spirits, 691 F.3d
315, 322 (3d Cir. 2012).
The District Court’s denial of Edwards’ Rule 60(b) motion was not an abuse of
discretion. Motions under Rule 60(b) must be made within one year of the entry of
judgment for certain enumerated grounds for relief or, otherwise, “within a reasonable
time.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1). A movant seeking relief under Rule 60(b) must “show
‘extraordinary circumstances’ justifying the reopening of a final judgment.” Gonzalez v.
Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 535 (2005). Edwards’ motion was filed over one year after the
April 27, 2018 judgment, and, despite being made soon after our dismissal of Edwards’
appeal, it was not filed within a reasonable time. See Moolenaar v. Gov’t of V.I., 822
F.2d 1342, 1348 (3d Cir. 1987) (explaining that the plaintiffs’ Rule 60(b) motion was not
made within a reasonable time even though the plaintiffs had brought their motion six
weeks after the district court’s judgment on remand from the Third Circuit because the
motion was filed almost two years after the district court’s initial judgment and “the
reason for the attack upon that judgment was available for attack upon the original
judgment”).
Even if Edwards’ Rule 60(b) motion were to be considered timely, he failed to
provide a meritorious basis for overturning the summary judgment ruling. Edwards’
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claim that the District Court reached the wrong conclusion in determining that he had
failed to exhaust his administrative remedies did not warrant relief under Rule 60(b). See
United States v. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282, 288 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that a Rule 60(b)
motion may not be used as a substitute for an appeal, and legal error, without more, does
not warrant relief under that provision). Additionally, Edwards’ request to reopen the
time to appeal was not properly made under Rule 60(b). See West v. Keve, 721 F.2d 91,
97 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that Rule 60(b) “cannot be used as a means of avoiding
dismissal for want of a timely appeal”); see also Poole v. Family Court of New Castle
Cty., 368 F.3d 263, 266 (3d Cir. 2004).
Even if Edwards’ motion were to be construed as a motion to extend or to reopen
the time to appeal under Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) or 4(a)(6), the
motion was untimely. Edwards stated that he never received notice of the April 27, 2018
judgment.1 He filed his motion on June 11, 2019. Thus, Edwards failed to make the
motion “within 30 days after the prescribed time” to file a notice of appeal had expired,
see Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or “within 180 days after the judgement or order [was]
entered,” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6).
Additionally, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the District Court in
denying Edwards’ recusal motion. Edwards did not allege any facts that would show a
1
We note that Edwards has not supported this claim, and we observe that he must have
received notice of the District Court’s judgment at some point because he appealed the
judgment on December 11, 2018. However, even assuming that Edwards received notice
on December 11, 2018, his motion was untimely filed under both Rule 4(a)(5) and Rule
4(a)(6).
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personal bias on the part of the District Court Judge or that the Judge’s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455. His disagreement with the
Judge’s legal rulings is an insufficient basis for recusal. See Securacomm Consulting,
224 F.3d at 278.
Finally, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Edwards’
motions to hold oral argument and a trial because neither motion made meritorious
arguments or otherwise met the requirements under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
59(e) or 60(b). See Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam)
(describing the grounds for a motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e)); Budget
Blinds, 536 F.3d at 251 (3d Cir. 2008) (describing same under Rule 60(b)); see also In re
Fine Paper Antitrust Litigation, 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1988) (explaining that
“matters of docket control . . . are committed to the sound discretion of the district
court”).
For the above reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
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