In the Matter of the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: R'N.F. and R'S.F. (Minor Children), and A.F. (Mother) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Aug 03 2020, 9:03 am

court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
Daniel Hageman INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF
Indianapolis, Indiana CHILD SERVICES
Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Attorney General of Indiana
Natalie F. Weiss
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:
CHILD ADVOCATES, INC.
Dede Kristine Connor
Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Involuntary August 3, 2020
Termination of the Parent-Child Court of Appeals Case No.
Relationship of: R’N.F. and 20A-JT-266
R’S.F. (Minor Children), Appeal from the Marion Superior
and Court
The Honorable Marilyn Moores,
A.F. (Mother), Judge

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 20A-JT-266 | August 3, 2020 Page 1 of 17
 Appellant-Respondent, The Honorable Scott Stowers,
Magistrate
v. Trial Court Cause No.
49D09-1904-JT-430
The Indiana Department of 49D09-1904-JT-431
Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner,

and

Child Advocates, Inc.,
Guardian ad Litem.

Tavitas, Judge.

Case Summary
[1] A.F. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental rights to her minor

children, R’N.F. and R’S.F. (the “Children”). We affirm.

Issue
[2] The sole issue on appeal is whether sufficient evidence supports the termination

of Mother’s parental rights.

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 Facts
[3] Twins, R’N.F. and R’S.F., were born to Mother and presumptive father, R.S., 1

in March 2017. The Marion County Office of the Department of Child

Services (“DCS”) alleged that R’N.F. was born with “Fetal Alcohol Syndrome

or with [a] Controlled Substance or Legend Drug in [her] Body[.]” Exhibits

Vol. I p. 115. At the time of the Children’s birth, Mother was nineteen years

old and could not legally consume alcohol. DCS filed a petition alleging the

Children were children in need of services (“CHINS”) on November 7, 2017;

however, after a fact-finding hearing, the trial court found the DCS did not

meet its burden of proof and dismissed the CHINS petition.

[4] In March 2018, DCS received allegations that Mother abused drugs and lived

with the Children in an unsanitary and unsuitable home. On March 22, 2018,

family case manager (“FCM”) James Oliver conducted a family assessment and

an inspection of Mother’s home. Mother did not have adequate food or

clothing for the Children; there was trash throughout the home; the home

lacked basic utilities; and the Children’s sleeping area was cluttered with loose

bedding and clothing, which posed a safety hazard for the babies. DCS

removed the twelve-month-old Children that day.

[5] On March 26, 2018, DCS filed a petition alleging that the Children were

CHINS. The trial court conducted a fact-finding hearing and, on June 20,

1
R.S. is not a party to this appeal.

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 2018, adjudicated the Children as CHINS upon the finding that Mother failed

to provide a safe, sanitary, and drug-free home. Following a dispositional

hearing, the trial court entered a dispositional decree on July 18, 2018, wherein

the trial court ordered Mother to participate in “home based therapy, home

based case management; parenting assessment; random drug screens; and a

substance abuse assessment in the event of a positive screen.” Mother’s App.

Vol. II p. 24.

[6] Due to Mother’s youthful age, DCS sought to bolster her parenting education

and to provide her with the resources necessary to meet the Children’s basic

needs. Specifically, DCS referred Mother to home-based case management and

home-based therapy services. Mother’s engagement in services and level of

participation was inconsistent; she rejected instruction; and she had angry

confrontations with multiple service providers. As a result, many providers

discharged Mother for noncompliance and/or personality conflicts. Also,

Mother “did not participate” in random drug screens. 2 Tr. Vol. II p. 19.

[7] Following a March 2019 hearing, the trial court ordered the permanency plan

for the Children to be changed from reunification to adoption and found:

Mother has made no meaningful or sustainable progress toward
reunification. She has been unsuccessfully discharged from all

2
Although DCS substantiated the allegations of Mother’s abuse of alcohol and THC in the 2017 CHINS
action, the record is largely silent regarding whether DCS substantiated the alleged substance abuse claim in
the instant matter. The record includes the trial court’s order on a March 2019 permanency hearing that
provided: “DCS reports that [M]other tested presumptively positive for amphetamines on Monday of this
week.” See Mother’s App. Vol. II p. 37.

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 services ordered by the Court and has been assigned new service
providers. Mother struggles to parent the children during
parenting time and has suggested that twice weekly parenting
time is too much for her. [ ] The [C]hildren are thriving in their
current placement, which is pre-adoptive.

Mother’s App. Vol. II pp. 37-38.

[8] On April 11, 2019, DCS filed petitions to terminate Mother’s parental rights.

The trial court conducted evidentiary hearings on the petitions for termination

of parental rights on November 7, 2019, November 21, 2019, and December 4,

2019. On December 26, 2019, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental

rights, pursuant to an order containing findings of fact and conclusions thereon.

The order provided in part:

72. There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that
resulted in the [C]hildren’s removal and continued placement
outside of the home will not be remedied by [M]other. [Mother]
has made no significant progress towards reunification. She has
been unsuccessfully discharged from services despite multiple
referrals. She has been inconsistent with parenting time with the
[C]hildren, and is overwhelmed with even one session per week.
[]

73. Continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to
the [C]hildren’s well-being in that it would serve as a barrier for
them obtaining permanency through an adoption when their
parents are unable and unwilling to offer permanency and parent.
The [C]hildren are thriving in their pre-adoptive placement.

74. Termination of the parent-child relationship is in the
[C]hildren’s best interests. Termination would allow them to be

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 adopted into a safe and stable environment where their needs will
be safely met.

75. There exists a satisfactory plan for the future care and
treatment of the [C]hildren, that being adoption.

76. The [C]hildren have been placed in foster care for twenty (20)
months where they are bonded and doing well. This is a pre-
adoptive placement.

Id. at 26. Mother now appeals.

Analysis
[9] Mother appeals from the termination of her parental rights. The Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the traditional rights of

parents to establish a home and raise their children. In re K.T.K. v. Indiana Dept.

of Child Services, Dearborn County Office, 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). “[A]

parent’s interest in the upbringing of [his or her] child is ‘perhaps the oldest of

the fundamental liberty interests recognized by th[e] [c]ourt[s].’” Id. (quoting

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000)). We recognize, of

course, that parental interests are not absolute and must be subordinated to the

child’s best interests when determining the proper disposition of a petition to

terminate parental rights. Id. Thus, “‘[p]arental rights may be terminated when

the parents are unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities by

failing to provide for the child’s immediate and long-term needs.’” In re K.T.K.,

989 N.E.2d at 1230 (quoting In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App.

2004), trans. denied).

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[10] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the

evidence or judge witness credibility. In re. I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (Ind.

Ct. App. 2010). We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that

are most favorable to the judgment. Id. We must also give “due regard” to the

trial court’s unique opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id.

(quoting Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)).

[11] Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8(c), “The trial court shall enter

findings of fact that support the entry of the conclusions required by subsections

(a) and (b).” Here, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions

thereon in granting DCS’s petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights. When

reviewing findings of fact and conclusions thereon entered in a case involving a

termination of parental rights, we apply a two-tiered standard of review. First,

we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second, we

determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. We will set aside the

trial court’s judgment only if it is clearly erroneous. Id. A judgment is clearly

erroneous if the findings do not support the trial court’s conclusions or the

conclusions do not support the judgment. Id.

[12] Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8(a) provides that “if the court finds that the

allegations in a petition described in [Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4] are true,

the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” Indiana Code Section

31-35-2-4(b)(2) provides that a petition to terminate a parent-child relationship

involving a child in need of services must allege, in part:

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 (A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
placement outside the home of the parents will not be
remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-
being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been
adjudicated a child in need of services;

(B) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(C) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.

DCS must establish these allegations by clear and convincing evidence. In re

V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016).

I. Threat to the Well-being of the Children

[13] Mother argues that “DCS did not present clear and convincing evidence that

continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of

the [C]hildren” because “Mother and Children [a]re bonded and no one voiced

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 a concern for the [C]hildren’s safety.” 3 Mother’s Br. p. 9. When considering

whether there is sufficient evidence to support such a finding, trial courts must

“consider a parent’s habitual pattern of conduct to determine whether there is a

substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation.” Bester v. Lake Cty. Office

of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 152 (Ind. 2005). “At the same time,

however, a trial court should judge a parent’s fitness to care for his [or her] child

as of the time of the termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence

of changed conditions.” Id.

[14] “It is well established that ‘a trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly

influenced by a deficient lifestyle such that her physical, mental, and social

growth is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child

relationship.’” In re G.F., 135 N.E.3d 654, 661 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting In

re E.S., 762 N.E.2d 1287, 1290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)).

[15] At the evidentiary hearing, DCS presented extensive witness testimony. Eileen

Stinson of Dockside Services testified that she provided parenting aide services

and supervised Mother’s parenting time. Stinson testified that she offered to

supervise three supervised visits each week; however, Mother subsequently

3
Mother also argues that there is no evidence to support the trial court’s conclusion that the conditions that
led to the Children’s removal would not be remedied. Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in
the disjunctive; thus, we need only decide if the trial court’s findings support one of these two requirements.
See In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d 204, 209 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). Accordingly, we do not reach Mother’s claim that
the trial court’s conclusion that the conditions that led to the Children’s removal would not be remedied is
clearly erroneous.

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 complained that two weekly visits were too burdensome and only participated

in one supervised visit each week. According to Stinson, Mother missed

multiple parenting sessions and, when Mother attended sessions, Mother often

was not receptive to instruction. See Tr. Vol. II p. 69 (testifying that

“sometimes [Mother] was open to” instruction but that “[s]ometimes she

basically told me to mind my own business and not tell her how to raise her

Children”). Stinson testified further that Mother’s level of participation briefly

improved, but Mother failed to maintain her progress. Stinson also testified

that Mother skipped or cancelled multiple supervised visits. Mother also

prioritized her social life and often claimed she was too busy to meet Stinson.

Additionally, Stinson testified that Mother developed an acrimonious

relationship with Stinson, and Stinson planned to discharge Mother.

[16] Kevin Flowers of Dockside Services and Cummins Behavioral Health services

testified that he provided home-based therapy and supervised visitation services

to Mother. Mother failed to regularly attend supervised visits and missed

multiple therapy appointments; Mother was unable to achieve the goal of

increased parenting time; and Mother rejected Flowers’ guidance. Flowers

testified that Mother “was frustrated about the process” and verbally clashed

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 with Flowers. Id. at 106, 108 (“Mom was kind of up and down, was not really

consistent with the parenting time”). 4

[17] Home-based therapy provider Ebony Shorts of Dockside Services testified that,

after Mother completed an initial mental health assessment, “it took a while [to

identify therapy goals] because [Mother] was inconsistent with therapy. And [ ]

once we tried to develop goals, she started to become extremely non-compliant

and then we moved toward discharge, so goals were never actually established .

. . .” Id. at 90-91. Shorts testified that Mother required “coping skills[ ] and

emotional regulation”; “had a hard time maintaining appropriate or healthy

relationships with others”; rejected guidance; and was rude to service providers.

At the fact-finding hearing, Shorts was asked to describe Mother’s behavior:

Q: [ ] Could you [ ] describe the behavior you witnessed?

A: Yes. Yelling, argumentative, very combative during [child
and family team meetings], making inappropriate comments, . . .
and then, once redirected, just totally shutting down when
someone said something that she didn’t agree with.

Mother’s App. Vol. II p. 25; Tr. Vol. II p. 91. Shorts also testified that Mother’s

attendance and level of engagement fluctuated:

4
Flowers testified that he discharged Mother for lack of engagement and because Mother demanded a new
service provider.

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 The first three to four [therapy sessions], I believe . . . [Mother]
was good, she completed the mental health assessment, very
talkative, engaged. It wasn’t until later on . . . that she started to
be very combative, and then just didn’t attend anything. But
towards the beginning, . . . she was fine and then it took a turn
for the worst [sic].

Tr. Vol. II p. 93. Shorts discharged Mother for inconsistency, confrontational

behavior, and Mother’s refusal to engage in therapy.

[18] William Opoku of New Hope testified that, as Mother’s home-based therapy

provider, he helped with Mother’s decision-making, sobriety, stability,

cultivation of healthy relationships, and parenting education. Opoku testified

that, although Mother demonstrated progress regarding anger management

issues, he believed that Mother required a psychological evaluation to address

the root of her anger.

[19] Felix McGee of New Hope Indiana succeeded Opoku as Mother’s home-based

therapy provider. McGee testified that Mother made “very surface level”

strides regarding her anger management, but additional work still needed to be

done. Id. at 45. According to McGee, Mother’s level of engagement was

inconsistent, and issues remained regarding Mother’s “instability[,]” “lack of

consistency[,] just taking responsibility, and just kind of identifying the

patterns.” Id. at 46. McGee testified regarding the disparity between Mother’s

stated goals and her actions. See id. (testifying that Mother sought additional

visitation hours but cancelled or cut visits short; Mother sought reunification

but skipped appointments with service providers; Mother required stable

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 housing, but “jump[ed] around [between homes and jobs, which] affect[ed]

[Mother’s] budgeting”). McGee testified further that Mother fluctuated

between being engaged in services and “[j]ust kind of disappearing [with] no

communication at all.” Id. at 48.

[20] Home-based parent aide Helena Wilson of New Hope provided case

management services to Mother. 5 Wilson testified that Mother asked for

assistance regarding a supervised visit and a medical or psychological

appointment. In each instance, Mother failed to follow through with Wilson’s

efforts to assist her, which resulted in a cancelled supervised visit and a missed

appointment. Wilson testified that Mother failed to achieve extended-duration

supervised visits because Mother wavered between being engaged and cutting

appointments short and “was just inconsistent across the board . . . .” Id. at 80.

Regarding Mother’s employment, Wilson testified, “[Mother]’s had about six

places of employment. She gets the jobs . . . , just due to [her attitude,

scheduling, or the wage rate,] she doesn’t keep them very long”. Id. at 79, 80.

Wilson testified she intended to refer Mother to a new provider due to “tension

and conflict” in their relationship and Mother’s lack of consistent participation.

Id. at 87.

5
Wilson worked with Mother and supervised Mother’s visitation both before and after the Children were
removed from Mother’s care. Wilson instructed Mother on how to maintain a clean home, referred Mother
to food and clothing pantry resources, and assisted with Mother’s finances and bills.

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[21] FCM Chantal Borg testified that, during her tenure as Mother’s FCM, Mother

required multiple “re-referrals[,]” which generally occur when a service

provider has discharged a parent upon unsuccessful completion of services. 6 Id.

at 12. Borg testified that, at the end of her tenure as FCM, Mother had not

successfully completed home-based case management, had not achieved her

referral goals, and had not taken advantage of services.

[22] After a thorough review of the record, we cannot agree with Mother’s

contention that the trial court terminated her parental rights solely because it

deemed the Children’s pre-adoptive placement to be a better home for the

Children. To the contrary, DCS proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that

Mother lacks the ability to consistently parent the Children and provide a stable

home.

[23] At the time of the evidentiary termination hearing, the Children, who were

twelve months old at the time of removal, had been out of Mother’s care for

twenty months. Although Mother made some positive strides during that time,

she failed to demonstrate the consistency inherent in parenting twins. Various

service providers testified that, despite multiple referrals, Mother was unwilling

or unable to achieve consistency in the critical areas of home-based therapy and

case management. The goals of those services—consistency, adherence to a

routine, receptiveness to help and instruction, planning, and organization—

6
FCM Borg referred Mother to three different service providers for supervised visitation because Mother
could not get along with her providers.

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 were critical to such a young parent’s full-time parenting of twins. Mother,

however, no-called, no-showed to appointments and visits; requested the

reduction of her parenting time; rejected her service providers’ guidance; and

often refused outright to participate in services.

[24] Based on the foregoing, the trial court’s finding that there is a reasonable

probability that continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to

the well-being of the Children is supported by clear and convincing evidence.

A substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation exists if Mother’s

parent-child relationship with the Children is allowed to continue.

II. Best Interests of the Children

[25] Mother also argues that there is no evidence that termination of her parental

rights is in the best interests of the Children. When we consider the best

interests of a child, we look at the totality of the circumstances. In re A.W., 62

N.E.3d 1267, 1275 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). The trial court “need not wait until a

child is irreversibly harmed before terminating the parent-child relationship.”

S.E. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 15 N.E.3d 37, 47 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans.

denied. Although not dispositive, permanency and stability are key

considerations in determining the best interests of a child. In re G.Y., 904

N.E.2d 1257, 1265 (Ind. 2009). “A parent’s historical inability to provide a

suitable environment along with the parent’s current inability to do the same

support[ ] a finding that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of

the child[ ].” In re A.P., 981 N.E.2d 75, 82 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citation

omitted).
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[26] In addition to the testimony above, FCM Borg testified that she did not support

giving Mother additional time to complete services because of Mother’s lack of

engagement; “unpredictab[ility]”; mental instability; and evolving housing and

employment situations. Tr. Vol. II pp. 21-22, 26. Also, FCM Smith testified:

“I don’t know that [Mother] is able to provide [the Children] with stability.

Nothing that she’s done since . . . has shown me that[,]” and “[the] Children

need stability.” Id. at 126. Additionally, FCM Smith testified:

At this time[, giving Mother additional time to complete services]
is prolonging permanency for the children. Mo[ther] has
continued to struggle with consistency and at this time the
children are not able to achieve permanency based on the
progress that [Mother has] made.

Id. at 118. We must agree.

[27] Mother’s inability or unwillingness to achieve consistency and Mother’s failure

to achieve her referral goals are recurring themes throughout DCS’s case-in-

chief. We acknowledge that Mother demonstrated some progress; however, a

trial court “need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before terminating

the parent-child relationship.” See S.E., 15 N.E.3d at 47. During the Children’s

twenty-month wardship, Mother failed to demonstrate to DCS and a host of

service providers that she could provide the permanency and stability that the

Children require. Under the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the

record supports the trial court’s finding that termination of Mother’s parental

rights is in the Children’s best interests. See Lang v. Starke Cty. Office of Family &

Children, 861 N.E.2d 366, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (finding termination of
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 parental rights was in the best interests of the children where Lang was

uncooperative with DCS and failed to complete services).

Conclusion
[28] Sufficient evidence supports the termination of Mother’s parental rights. We

affirm.

[29] Affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and Pyle, J., concur.

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