IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
In re the Detention of: No. 80534-7-I
T.S., ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION, WITHDRAWING
Appellant. OPINION, AND SUBSTITUTING
OPINION
Appellant, T.S., has filed a motion for reconsideration of the opinion filed in the
above matter on June 15 2020. Respondent, State of Washington, has filed a response
to appellant’s motion. The court has determined that appellant’s motion for
reconsideration should be denied, the opinion should be withdrawn, and a substitute
opinion be filed. Now, therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED that appellant’s motion for reconsideration is denied. It is further
ORDERED that the opinion filed on June 15, 2020, is withdrawn and a substitute
opinion be filed.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
) No. 80534-7-I
In re the Detention of: )
) DIVISION ONE
T.S., )
) PUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant. )
)
)
ANDRUS, A.C.J. — T.S. challenges the order revoking his less restrictive
treatment under the Involuntary Treatment Act, 1 arguing it exceeds the statutory
maximum commitment period allowable for most restrictive treatment. We affirm.
FACTS
T.S. suffers from schizoaffective disorder. On June 27, 2019, T.S. stipulated
to the entry of an order for involuntary treatment under less restrictive alternative
conditions for 365 days. See RCW 71.05.320(7). The order was set to expire on
June 26, 2020.
On August 21, 2019, a designated crisis responder filed a petition to revoke
the less restrictive order (LRO), alleging T.S. failed to comply with several of the
LRO’s conditions. After hearing testimony from a clinical supervisor and a social
worker, the court found T.S. violated the LRO. It revoked the LRO, remanding T.S.
1
Chapter 71.05 RCW.
Citations and pin cites are based on the Westlaw online version of the cited material.
No. 80534-7-I/2
to inpatient treatment “for a period not to exceed 365 days from June 27, 2019”—in
other words, the remaining 10 months of the LRO.
T.S. appeals.
ANALYSIS
T.S. argues the order revoking the LRO exceeded the statutory maximum
commitment period. T.S. contends while RCW 71.05.320(7) allows a court to enter
an LRO of up to 365 days for any person previously committed for intensive inpatient
treatment in a state hospital, RCW 71.05.320(1)(c) only permits involuntary
commitment in an inpatient setting for up to 180 days. The State contends the
duration of T.S.’s commitment is governed by RCW 71.05.590(4)(d), not by RCW
71.05.320(1)(c). The State has the better argument here.
Statutory construction is a question of law we review de novo, giving effect
to the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute’s language. In re Det. of R.H., 178
Wn. App. 941, 948, 316 P.3d 535 (2014). “‘As civil commitment statutes authorize
a significant deprivation of liberty, they must be strictly construed.’” Id. (quoting In
re Det. of J.R., 80 Wn. App. 947, 956, 912 P.2d 1062 (1996)).
Under RCW 71.05.590(1), an agency or facility designated to monitor or
provide services under an LRO may petition to revoke the LRO. If a petition to
revoke is filed and, as a result, the court orders detention for inpatient treatment,
“the treatment period may be for no longer than the period authorized in the original
court order.” RCW 71.05.590(4)(d).
Here, the original court order—the LRO—required that T.S. remain under
court supervision under less restrictive conditions for 365 days from June 27, 2019.
The challenged order remanded T.S. to most restrictive treatment for the same
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No. 80534-7-I/3
amount of time as the LRO it revoked—“for a period not to exceed 365 days from
June 27, 2019.” It did not exceed the treatment period authorized in the original
court order and, therefore, did not violate RCW 71.05.590(4)(d).
T.S. argues the court should harmonize RCW 71.05.590(4)(d) with the time
limit of RCW 71.05.320 and limit the period of more restrictive treatment to 180 days,
even when based on a revoked LRO. This argument is inconsistent with the plain
language of RCW 71.05.590(4)(d) and would render a portion of that provision
meaningless. We must construe statutes to give effect to all of the language and
cannot construe them in a way that results in unlikely, absurd, or strained
consequences. Mason v. Georgia-Pac. Corp., 166 Wn. App. 859, 870, 271 P.3d
381 (2012). The interpretation T.S. advances violates this rule of statutory
construction.
T.S. also argues commitment orders can never exceed 180 days, and if the
State wants to commit someone for longer than 180 days, it should file a new petition
and bear the burden of proving a statutory basis for involuntary commitment. The
only authority he provides for this proposition is In re Detention of Morgan, 180
Wn.2d 312, 330 P.3d 774 (2014). But that case mentions RCW 71.05.320 only in
passing to distinguish Involuntary Treatment Act commitments from sexually violent
predator commitments under Chapter 71.09 RCW. Id. at 322-23; see also RCW
71.09.010. Furthermore, it does not mention RCW 71.05.590 and the procedure for
revoking LROs. By passing RCW 71.05.590(4), the legislature specifically
authorized an order of commitment exceeding 180 days. T.S. fails to show the
duration of in-patient treatment under these circumstances must be limited to 180
days.
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Because the order revoking T.S.’s less restrictive treatment did not exceed
the treatment period authorized in the original court order, we conclude T.S. has
failed to show error.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
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