NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 4 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JUAN PABLO PLAZA-MENDOZA, AKA No. 17-71841
David Ramos-Mendoza, 18-72907
Petitioner, Agency No. A206-458-332
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted July 17, 2020**
San Francisco, California
Before: SILER,*** LEE, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
David Ramos Mendoza seeks review of multiple decisions by the Board of
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
Immigration Appeals.1 He filed two separate petitions to challenge (1) the denial of
relief from removal and the disposition of his motion to reopen based on ineffective
assistance of counsel, and (2) denial of his motion for reconsideration. We have
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). We review de novo the BIA’s determinations
of questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact, and we review for
substantial evidence the BIA’s factual findings. See Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947
F.3d 1238, 1241–42 (9th Cir. 2020). We deny both petitions.
1. Denial of relief from removal: Mendoza applied for asylum and
withholding of removal based on his membership in the particular social group of
“Guatemalans who have refused forced recruitment efforts by rural gangs.” For a
proposed group to be cognizable, it must be defined with particularity. See Conde
Quevedo, 947 F.3d at 1242. Particularity requires “characteristics that provide a
clear benchmark for determining who falls within the group.” Matter of M-E-V-G-,
26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 239 (B.I.A. 2014). In other words, a group “must also be
discrete and have definable boundaries—it must not be amorphous, overbroad,
diffuse, or subjective” because “not every ‘immutable characteristic’ is sufficiently
precise to define a particular social group.” Id.
Here, the IJ and BIA reasonably concluded that Mendoza’s proposed group
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According to the petitioner, the name in the caption was given to him by
mistake. We will therefore use the petitioner’s real name.
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lacks particularity. The proposed group leads to unresolved questions about group
membership. For example, people can disagree about what is a sufficient “refusal”
and what constitutes a “forced recruitment effort.” Mendoza also does not point to
evidence showing that members of Guatemalan society would agree on who is a
member of this group. Indeed, we have rejected similar groups as overly broad. See,
e.g., Barrios v. Holder, 581 F.3d 849, 855 (9th Cir. 2009), abrogated on other
grounds by Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1093 (9th Cir. 2013)
(rejecting proposed group of young males in Guatemala who are targeted for gang
recruitment but who refuse because they disagree with the gang’s criminal activities
and citing cases); Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 861–62 (9th Cir. 2009),
abrogated on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas, 707 F.3d at 1093 (finding that the
proposed group — young Honduran men who have been recruited by MS-13 but
refused — was too broad).
The IJ did the requisite case-specific analysis, which was adopted fully by the
BIA, in deciding this question. The IJ reviewed the evidence presented, made
specific factual findings, and found that Mendoza testified credibly. Though both
the IJ and the BIA compared Mendoza’s proposed group to those of other cases, that
does not mean they did not do the appropriate case-specific analysis. These cases
are persuasive authority on why Mendoza’s proposed group is not cognizable, and
Mendoza fails to show why his case should be treated differently. Cf. Barrios, 581
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F.3d at 855 (“Ramos’s argument that young men in Guatemala who resist gang
recruitment constitute a social group is indistinguishable from the argument made in
Ramos-Lopez. Accordingly, we must reject Ramos’s argument for the reasons
explained in that case.”) (footnote omitted).
Even assuming that Mendoza’s particular social group is cognizable,
Mendoza’s claims fail because substantial evidence supports the finding that there
is no nexus between any persecution and his membership in this protected group.
See Ayala v. Holder, 640 F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam). The only
evidence to which Mendoza points — that the gang asked him why he refused to
join the gang and then threatened and hurt when he refused — does not compel the
opposite the conclusion. See Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 250 (explaining
that being “subjected to one of the many different criminal activities that the gang
used to sustain its criminal enterprise” does not “demonstrate that he was more likely
to be persecuted by the gang on account of a protected ground than was any other
member of the society”). Since the BIA and the IJ found no nexus, Mendoza’s case
necessarily fails both the nexus standard for asylum and the nexus standard for
withholding of removal, so remand is not required. See Singh v. Barr, 935 F.3d 822,
827 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam).
In addition, substantial evidence supports the denial of CAT relief. Mendoza
argues that the fact that the police did not make a report and laughed at him when he
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reported his kidnapping shows that any harm that he suffered or will suffer would
be in the context of government acquiescence. But this evidence does not compel
the conclusion that the police acquiesced to the gang’s plans to harm him. This court
has explained that acquiescence requires officials to have an awareness of the
activity and to breach their legal duty to prevent the activity, Garcia-Milian v.
Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1034 (9th Cir. 2014), and the police’s failure to take
Mendoza seriously does not compel the conclusion that the police knew about the
gang’s plans to harm him. Moreover, country-conditions evidence on its own is
insufficient to establish government acquiescence to Mendoza’s alleged harm. See
Singh v. Whitaker, 914 F.3d 654, 663 (9th Cir. 2019).
Finally, despite Mendoza’s assertions, neither the IJ nor the BIA issued a
boilerplate decision for the request for CAT relief. Boilerplate decisions are
decisions that “set out general legal standards yet are devoid of statements that
evidence an individualized review of the petitioner’s contentions and circumstances,
and they neither afford the petitioner the BIA review to which he or she is entitled,
nor do they provide an adequate basis for this court to conduct its review.” Castillo
v. I.N.S., 951 F.2d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 1991). Here, the IJ issued a fifteen-page
opinion that made specific factual findings about the petitioner’s case and that
specifically addressed Mendoza’s circumstances. And the BIA adopted the IJ’s
analysis in full. This is a far cry from the type of opinions that this court has found
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insufficient. See, e.g., Movsisian v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2005)
(explaining that the BIA abused its discretion in denying a motion to reopen when it
denied the motion in a footnote that stated “[t]he respondent’s motion to reopen is
denied” without additional explanation).
2. Ineffective assistance of counsel: The BIA did not err by declining to
consider Mendoza’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim as it pertained to CAT
relief when it reissued its decision. Mendoza’s initial motion to reopen and reissue
the decision was directed at his first attorney’s failure to timely notify him of the
BIA’s original decision. The BIA addressed the substance of the motion as initially
filed and granted the requested relief.
Moreover, Mendoza’s ineffective assistance claim based on his prior
counsel’s handling of his CAT claim also fails. The record does not show that the
gang members harmed Mendoza with government involvement or acquiescence, and
Mendoza fails to show what other evidence should have been added to better develop
this argument. Compare with Lin v. Ashcroft, 377 F.3d 1014, 1022, 1024–25 (9th
Cir. 2004).
As for Mendoza’s ineffective assistance claim based on his prior counsel’s
failure to provide evidence of social distinction, this claim fails because Mendoza
was not prejudiced by any alleged failure. As explained above, the failure to show
particularity in his proposed group and the failure to show any nexus are independent
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bases for why his asylum and withholding of removal claims failed. Thus, any issue
with the social distinction analysis would not have changed the ultimate outcome.
See Kwong v. Holder, 671 F.3d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 2011) (requiring prejudice for an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim); Nehad v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 962, 967 (9th
Cir. 2008) (“Prejudice only results when counsel’s performance is ‘so inadequate
that it may have affected the outcome of the proceedings.’”) (quoting Ortiz v. I.N.S.,
179 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1999)).
Finally, Mendoza’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on the
failure to raise alleged interpretation issues fails because Mendoza does not show
how “a better translation would have made a difference in the outcome of the
hearing.” Kotasz v. I.N.S., 31 F.3d 847, 850 n.2 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Acewicz v.
U.S. I.N.S., 984 F.2d 1056, 1063 (9th Cir. 1993)).
3. Notice of removal: Mendoza argues that his notice to appear did not
vest jurisdiction in the immigration court because it did not include the time and date
of the initial hearing. This argument is foreclosed by binding precedent, however.
See Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 1160–61 (9th Cir. 2019); Aguilar Fermin
v. Barr, 958 F.3d 887, 893–95 (9th Cir. 2020). Karingithi cannot be distinguished
from this case because, similar to the Karingithi petitioner, 913 F.3d at 1159,
Mendoza received actual notice of his hearings.
Mendoza also fails to show that the government violated 8 C.F.R.
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§ 1003.18(b). The 2018 EOIR memorandum that changed the scheduling system on
a moving forward basis does not reveal anything about the government’s abilities to
provide the time and date information when Mendoza received his notice to appear
in June 2014. The same is true with regard to the government’s admission in Pereira
v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2119 (2018) that it previously was able to provide
hearing date information on notices to appear. Thus, Mendoza has not shown it was
in fact practicable for the government to provide this information on his notice to
appear. Kohli v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2007) (explaining that
there is a “well established principle of federal law that administrative agencies are
entitled to a presumption that they ‘act properly and according to law’” and that “[i]n
the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that public officers
properly discharge their duties”) (citations omitted).
PETITIONS DENIED
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