Mack v. City of Abilene

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT August 16, 2006

Charles R. Fulbruge III
No. 05-10844 Clerk

CHRISTOPHER MACK,

Plaintiff – Appellant,

v.

CITY OF ABILENE; JIMMY SEALS, Officer; OTHER UNKNOWN POLICE
OFFICERS OF THE ABILENE POLICE DEPARTMENT, Individually and
in their Official Capacities; ABILENE POLICE DEPARTMENT; SUE
BELVER, Officer; ROGER BERRY, Officer; D. W. HAVINS,
Officer; STEVE ROGERS, Officer; RODNEY SMITH, Officer,

Defendants – Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas

Before DEMOSS, BENAVIDES, and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

The focus of this case is whether Appellant Christopher Mack’s

Fourth Amendment rights were violated by a series of warrantless

vehicle searches. As set out below, we have determined that one of

the vehicle searches was unconstitutional. Relatedly, we hold that

the police officers who conducted that search are not entitled to

the defense of qualified immunity. Additionally, we hold that the

arrest and apartment search warrant was valid and that Appellant’s

arrest therefore was lawful. Finally, we affirm the dismissal of

Appellant’s state law claims against the City of Abilene but vacate

the dismissal of Appellant’s section 1983 claims against the City
of Abilene.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The named police officers (“Appellees”), who were employed by

the City of Abilene (the “City”), applied for and received a

warrant to arrest Appellant and search his apartment based on

information obtained from a confidential informant. The

confidential informant stated that he had seen Appellant with

marijuana at Appellant’s apartment.

The next day, Appellant left his place of employment, a

restaurant, and walked across a parking lot toward his parked

Suburban. As he approached the vehicle, Appellant remotely

unlocked the doors and started the engine. Immediately thereafter,

he was intercepted by two officers, including Officer Jimmy Seals.

Appellant confirmed his identity. Officer Seals then placed him

under arrest. After searching Appellant and finding no weapons or

contraband, Appellees handcuffed Appellant and placed him in a

police vehicle. Appellees then advised Appellant that the officers

had an arrest and search warrant for him and his apartment. They

then searched the Suburban after placing him in a patrol car. A

search of the vehicle revealed no weapons or contraband.

Appellees subsequently transported Appellant to his apartment

complex in a police vehicle, with one officer driving Appellant’s

vehicle to the complex. Appellees obtained a key and executed a

2
search of the apartment. Again, no contraband was found.

Appellees next searched Appellant’s Suburban a second time.

Appellees found one marijuana seed. Then, Appellees searched

Appellant’s Cadillac, which was parked in the apartment complex

lot. Appellees found nothing illegal. Consequently, Appellant was

released and no charges were filed against him.

Appellant filed suit against Appellees and the City alleging

that Appellees violated his constitutional rights pursuant to 42

U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985 and that the unconstitutional conduct by the

police was the result of the City’s official policy, custom, or

practice. He additionally brought state law claims. Appellees

filed a motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment, claiming

that the warrant was valid, all of the searches were

constitutional, and, even if a search were unconstitutional,

Appellees are immune from liability. The district court granted

Appellees’ motions on all claims. Appellant appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

When ruling upon a qualified immunity issue, the Supreme Court

has instructed that the threshold question to be answered is:

“[T]aken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the

injury, do the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a

constitutional right?” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).

Thus, as a threshold matter, we must decide whether the alleged

3
facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Appellant, show that

Appellant’s constitutional rights were violated. We first briefly

discuss the validity of the warrant. Second, we analyze the

constitutionality of his arrest and the searches of his two

vehicles. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Finding an unconstitutional

search of one of the vehicles, we then examine whether Appellees

are protected by the defense of qualified immunity. Finally, we

address whether Appellant’s constitutional and state law claims

against the City were properly dismissed by the district court.

A. The Warrant Was Valid

Appellant challenges the warrant on the basis of insufficient

probable cause. He claims the magistrate incorrectly determined

that probable cause existed and therefore issued an invalid

warrant. In reviewing the issuance of a warrant, we pay great

deference to a magistrate’s determination of probable cause.

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983). The Fourth Amendment

merely requires a showing that “the magistrate had a substantial

basis for . . . [concluding] that a search would uncover evidence

of wrongdoing.” Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 (internal quotation marks

omitted). That said, courts must not “defer to a warrant based on

an affidavit that does not provide the magistrate with a

substantial basis for determining the existence of probable cause.”

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 915 (1984) (internal quotation

marks omitted).

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 The magistrate considered the affidavit of Officer Seals. In

his affidavit, Officer Seals states that an informant reported that

Appellant possessed marijuana at his residence. “An informant’s

‘veracity,’ ‘reliability,’ and ‘basis of knowledge’ are all highly

relevant in determining the value of his report.” Gates, 462 U.S.

at 230. Here, the informant’s report was based on a direct,

personal observation. Officer Seals stated that the informant

“knows what marijuana looks like in it’s [sic] various forms,

including the odor of burning marijuana . . . .” It was with that

knowledge that the informant reported that Appellant possessed

marijuana in his apartment within the prior forty-eight hours.

Thus, Officer Seals established the informant’s basis of knowledge.

Officer Seals also established the veracity and reliability of

the informant by stating that, although he only knew the informant

for less than a month, the informant had supplied Officer Seals

with truthful and correct information about criminal activity.

Additionally, the informant is described as lawfully employed

within the community and having no felony convictions. Officer

Seals, in his affidavit, presented facts tending to evince the

veracity and reliability of the informant. In sum, the magistrate

had a substantial basis for finding probable cause. Therefore, the

warrant should be considered facially valid.

Appellant additionally argues that the warrant was facially

invalid because the affidavit “contains conclusory, vague and

5
ambiguous allegations regarding the credibility of the confidential

informant.” However, the affidavit was specific in its statement

regarding the knowledge obtained from the informant. Appellant has

not pointed to particular claims in the affidavit as false and

therefore does not seem to be making a Franks challenge. See

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). Therefore, Appellant’s

facial attack fails.

We cannot conclude that Appellant’s arrest was

unconstitutional. “The Constitution does not guarantee that only

the guilty will be arrested.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145

(1979). An arrest pursuant to a properly issued warrant is not

unconstitutional, and “a complaint based on such an arrest is

subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim.” Smith v.

Gonzales, 670 F.2d 522, 526 (5th Cir. 1982). Appellees arrested

Appellant pursuant to a valid warrant.1 Accordingly, we reject

1
Assuming, arguendo, that the warrant was not a valid arrest
warrant, the arrest still was constitutional. A warrantless
arrest can be made on the basis of probable cause. Probable
cause exists when the “totality of facts and circumstances within
a police officer’s knowledge at the moment of arrest are
sufficient for a reasonable person to conclude that the suspect
had committed or was committing an offense.” United States v.
Wadley, 59 F.3d 510, 512 (5th Cir. 1995). A court considers the
expertise and experience of the law enforcement officials when
considering what a “reasonable person” would have concluded.
United States v. Garcia, 179 F.3d 265, 268 (5th Cir. 1999).
Appellees had probable cause to effectuate a warrantless
arrest. Appellees had received specific information from a
reliable informant regarding Appellant’s alleged criminal
activity. As stated in the affidavit from the warrant
application, the informant was familiar with the drug allegedly
possessed by Appellant. The informant had seen Appellant

6
Appellant’s contention that his arrest was unconstitutional and

affirm the dismissal of this claim.

B. Fourth Amendment Claims

Appellees searched Appellant’s Suburban twice and also

searched his Cadillac. Each of these searches is evaluated below.

Unless otherwise stated, we review the district court’s findings of

fact for clear error and its ultimate determination of Fourth

Amendment reasonableness de novo. United States v. Sinisterra, 77

F.3d 101, 104 (5th Cir. 1996).

1. Both Searches of the Suburban Were Constitutional

Appellant claims that Appellees unlawfully searched his

Suburban after his arrest and later in his apartment complex

parking lot. Appellant’s argument fails. The searches were

constitutional under the automobile exception to the warrant

possessing the illegal drug within the previous forty-eight
hours. And, the informant gave Appellees a description of the
Appellant and where he lived. Appellees were able to verify that
Appellant lived and worked where the informant had stated and
that Appellant was the man seen by the informant with illegal
drugs. Gates, 462 U.S. at 242 (recognizing that an officer, in
making a warrantless arrest, may rely on an informant’s report if
the report is “reasonably corroborated by other matters within
the officer’s knowledge”). Furthermore, Appellees’ information
would have been sufficient for a magistrate to find probable
cause. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 37 (1968) (stating that
law enforcement officers “must possess facts concerning the
person arrested that would have satisfied a magistrate that
‘probable cause’ was indeed present” when effectuating a
warrantless arrest). Therefore, given the totality of the
circumstances, Appellees had probable cause to make a warrantless
arrest.

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requirement. This exception applies when a vehicle is “readily

capable” of “being used on the highways,” and it “is found

stationary in a place not regularly used for residential purposes

. . . .” California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985). Under the

automobile exception, officers may conduct a search if they have

probable cause to believe that the vehicle contains contraband or

evidence of a crime. United States v. Buchner, 7 F.3d 1149, 1154

(5th Cir. 1993). “Probable cause exists when facts and

circumstances within the knowledge of the arresting officer would

be sufficient to cause an officer of reasonable caution to believe

that an offense has been or is being committed.” United States v.

Carrillo-Morales, 27 F.3d 1054, 1062 (5th Cir. 1994).

Here, Appellees had probable cause to search the Suburban both

times. The district court found that Officer Seals was told by the

informant that Appellant “sometimes hid marijuana in his 1999 Green

Chevrolet Suburban bearing Texas License # ILHS87.” The court also

found that the information received from the informant was

reasonably trustworthy. See United States v. Forrest, 620 F.2d

446, 453 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that “reasonably trustworthy

information” is part of the facts and circumstances at the

officer’s disposal). Thus, Appellees had probable cause to search

the Suburban for contraband at the time of arrest and again at the

8
apartment complex.2

2. Search of the Cadillac Was Unconstitutional

Appellees violated Appellant’s constitutional rights when they

searched his Cadillac. Appellees claim that no search took place

because they merely looked through the vehicle’s windows.

Appellant, however, alleges and presents evidence that Appellees

opened all the Cadillac’s doors and “began looking all through the

car.” Like the district court, we take the Appellant’s allegations

as true in the motion-to-dismiss context. Therefore, we proceed

with our determination assuming the Cadillac was searched.

The Cadillac was not subject to a valid warrantless search

under the automobile exception since Appellees had no probable

cause to believe that marijuana would be found in the Cadillac.

See United States v. Hogan, 25 F.3d 690, 693 (8th Cir. 1994)

(determining that the seizure of a vehicle was invalid for lack of

probable cause because all of the evidence indicated that drugs

2
Appellant also appears to argue that the second search of
the Suburban was unconstitutional because the vehicle was not
parked within the curtilage of his apartment. We need not make a
curtilage determination. The automobile exception applies where
a “car [is] parked in an apartment complex parking lot.” United
States v. Williams, 124 Fed. App’x 885, 887 (5th Cir. Mar. 18,
2005) (unpublished). It applies in a parking lot since a lot is
“generally open to the public.” Id. Similarly, the Seventh
Circuit found it “inconsequential” that the searched car was in a
private apartment parking lot because the concerns of Carney–the
ready mobility of an automobile and the lesser expectation of
privacy associated with them—were still applicable. See United
States v. Gallman, 907 F.2d 639, 641 (7th Cir. 1990). Here, the
same Carney concerns exist. Therefore, the search was carried
out in a valid manner pursuant to the automobile exception.

9
would be found in the defendant’s home or in a different vehicle,

and none of the evidence indicated that drugs would be found in the

particular vehicle that was seized). Here, the informant reported

to Appellees only that Appellant sometimes kept marijuana in his

Suburban, not the Cadillac. Furthermore, upon looking into the

vehicle, Appellees do not claim they saw or smelled something that

might lead to probable cause. Therefore, no search of the Cadillac

was allowed under the automobile exception.

The warrantless search of the Cadillac might be constitutional

if the Cadillac was parked within the apartment’s curtilage.

Appellees had a valid warrant to search Appellant’s apartment. The

question before us is whether the Cadillac was a part of the

apartment’s curtilage and therefore subject to search pursuant to

the warrant, assuming the warrant’s scope could validly include the

apartment’s curtilage. “[T]he curtilage is the area to which

extends the intimate activity associated with the sanctity of a

man’s home and the privacies of life.” Oliver v. United States,

466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984) (internal quotation marks omitted). We

conclude that the Cadillac was not within the apartment’s

curtilage.

The circuits are split on the appropriate standard of review

on a curtilage determination.3 In civil cases, however, all courts

3
See United States v. Breza, 308 F.3d 430, 435 (4th Cir.
2002) (holding that the question of “curtilage is ultimately a
legal one, and thus is subject to de novo review, while

10
agree that antecedent facts found by the district court pursuant to

such a determination are reviewed for clear error. Here, we need

not decide the correct review of a district court’s constitutional

determination because the district court declined to decide the

constitutional curtilage question. Instead, the court assumed

without deciding that a constitutional violation occurred and

proceeded to the qualified immunity analysis.4 The court’s factual

findings included that the Cadillac was parked in the apartment

complex parking lot (not a garage or other enclosure), the lot had

multiple spaces, and the Cadillac was parked in an assigned space.

It did not make a finding regarding the proximity of the Cadillac

to the apartment.

antecedent factual findings are reviewed for clear error); United
States v. Diehl, 276 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir. 2002) (same); United
States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 911-913 (9th Cir. 2001) (same);
Bleavins v. Bartels, 422 F.3d 445, 449 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating
that, in the context of a civil case evaluating a curtilage
question, the grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo);
Daughenbaugh v. City of Tiffin, 150 F.3d 594, 597 (6th Cir. 1998)
(same). But see United States v. Benish, 5 F.3d 20, 24 (3d Cir.
1993) (“[T]he question of the extent of curtilage is essentially
factual and therefore we review only for clear error.”) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); United States v. Swepston,
987 F.2d 1510, 1513 (10th Cir. 1993) (same).
4
We note that the district court’s failure to come to a
conclusion as to whether a constitutional violation occurred may
constitute error in and of itself. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S.
226, 232 (1991) (“A necessary concomitant to the determination of
whether the constitutional right asserted by a plaintiff is
clearly established at the time the defendant acted is the
determination of whether the plaintiff has asserted a violation
of a constitutional right at all,” and courts should not “assume,
without deciding, this preliminary issue”).

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 In light of these findings of fact, we hold that this parking

space in the apartment complex parking lot is not part of the

curtilage of Appellant’s apartment. In determining whether the

space was part of the curtilage, this Court looks to the four Dunn

factors to guide our inquiry: “the proximity of the area claimed to

be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an

enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the

area is put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the

area from observation by people passing by.” United States v.

Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987). Based on the district court’s

findings, this Court does not know the proximity of the Cadillac to

the apartment. Applying the remainder of the Dunn factors, the

district court’s findings reveal that the parking space was in an

open parking lot, the lot is a common area used for parking with

multiple spaces, and a vehicle parked in the lot is not shielded

from view by others. Under the Dunn test, this parking lot space

is not within Appellant’s apartment’s curtilage.

This holding comports with the determinations by several other

courts that a parking lot or garage is not curtilage subject to

Fourth Amendment protections under similar factual circumstances.

See United States v. Stanley, 597 F.2d 866, 870 (4th Cir. 1979)

(“We hold that the common area parking lot on which Stanley’s

automobile was parked was not within the curtilage of his mobile

home.”); United States v. Cruz Pagan, 537 F.2d 554, 558 (1st Cir.

12
1976) (holding that entry into a condominium parking garage did not

violate the Fourth Amendment); United States v. Pyne, 2006 U.S.

App. LEXIS 10327, at *3 (4th Cir. Apr. 25, 2006) (unpublished)

(“[W]e conclude . . . that the [apartment complex] parking garage

was not curtilage subject to Fourth Amendment protections.”).

In sum, we hold that Appellees’ search of Appellant’s Cadillac

violated his rights protected by the Fourth Amendment. Next, we

turn to whether Appellees are entitled to qualified immunity for

the unconstitutional search.

C. Qualified Immunity

Appellees claim the defense of qualified immunity to avoid

liability for the unlawful search of the Cadillac. Government

officials acting within their discretionary authority are immune

from civil damages if their conduct does not violate clearly

established statutory or constitutional rights of which a

reasonable person would have known. Mendenhall v. Riser, 213 F.3d

226, 230 (5th Cir. 2000). We review the district court’s granting

of summary judgment on this issue of qualified immunity de novo,

applying the same standards as a district court. Morris v. Dillard

Dep’t Stores, 277 F.3d 743, 747 (5th Cir. 2001). In determining

whether a jury could reasonably find for the nonmoving party, the

evidence and justifiable inferences therefrom are to be viewed in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986).

13
 To determine whether Appellees are entitled to the defense of

qualified immunity, we ask whether the contours of the

constitutional right in question were sufficiently clear that a

reasonable officer would understand that what she is doing violates

that right. See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202. The warrant explicitly

authorized a search of the apartment only and did not mention the

Cadillac. The Cadillac was not part of the apartment’s curtilage

since it is in a public common area and not related to the

premises. Thus, the warrant did not authorize Appellees to search

the Cadillac.

Additionally, Appellees lacked probable cause to search the

Cadillac. Nothing the informant told Appellees implied that

Appellant kept marijuana in the Cadillac. The informant merely

stated that Appellant allegedly kept marijuana in his Suburban.

Obviously, no reasonable officer would mistake a Cadillac for a

Suburban. Cf. Knott v. Sullivan, 418 F.3d 561, 571 (6th Cir. 2005)

(concluding that officers could not rely on a warrant “to search

one vehicle when all of the vehicle-specific descriptors refer to

another vehicle”). Therefore, Appellees lacked probable cause to

search the Cadillac, and, therefore, the search does not fall under

the automobile exception.

Moreover, Appellees cannot claim that the vehicle was searched

in furtherance of officer safety. See Estep v. Dallas County, 310

F.3d 353, 358 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[A] warrantless search of the

14
passenger compartment of a vehicle does not violate the Fourth

Amendment if the search is conducted to protect the officer’s

safety.”). Appellant had not been driving the Cadillac the day of

his arrest and was not in the vicinity of the Cadillac when

Appellees brought Appellant back to his apartment complex. Hence,

Appellees fail to show it was a reasonable search based on officer

safety concerns. Finally, there is no evidence that Appellant

consented to the search of the Cadillac or that Appellees

mistakenly thought Appellant had consented to that search.

Appellees’ search of a car in an open parking lot without a

search warrant, without probable cause, without a concern for

officer safety, and without consent violates clearly established

law. A reasonable officer would not think the Constitution allows

a random search of a vehicle where none of the above justifications

apply. Thus, Appellees are not entitled to the defense of

qualified immunity for the unconstitutional search of the Cadillac.

Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s finding that qualified

immunity was available to Appellees.

D. Claims Against the City Are Sufficiently Alleged

The district court held that Appellant could not succeed on a

claim of municipal liability because he could not show that one or

more of the City’s employees violated his civil rights as a result

of a City policy or custom. See Monell v. New York City Dep’t of

Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690–91 (1978). It then dismissed all

claims of municipal liability based on its finding of no

15
constitutional violation. We have disagreed with that conclusion,

holding that Appellant sufficiently has alleged a constitutional

violation on the part of Appellees, employees of the City, when

they searched Appellant’s Cadillac. Therefore, we examine the

sufficiency of Appellant’s allegations under Monell and its progeny

against the City for the acts of its employees.

Generally, a plaintiff must identify a policy or custom that

gave rise to the plaintiff’s injury before he may prevail. Canton

v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1989). Under section 1983, a policy

and/or custom of inadequate training is an actionable claim in

limited circumstances. Id. A claim of inadequate supervision also

is actionable under section 1983. See Rios v. City of Del Rio, 444

F.3d 417, 427 (5th Cir. 2006).

In his amended complaint, Appellant alleges that it is a

policy and/or custom of the City to inadequately supervise and

train its police officers, including those who were known to have

engaged in police misconduct. Appellant further alleges that, as

a result of those policies and/or customs, Appellees believed their

actions would not be properly monitored by supervisory officers and

that misconduct would not be investigated but would be tolerated.

Appellant thus identifies a custom or policy on the part of the

City that allegedly gave rise to his injuries. See Canton, 489 at

389. He also alleges actionable claims of inadequate training and

supervision under section 1983. Id.; Rios, 444 F.3d at 427.

16
 Appellant meets the liberal pleading standard of FED. R. CIV.

P. 8(a). Rule 8 requires a complaint provide a “short and plain

statement of the claim.” Id. A complaint also must “give the

defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the

grounds upon which it rests.” Leatherman v. Tarrant County

Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168

(1993); Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736, 741 (5th Cir. 2002). These

requirements apply to a section 1983 suit against a municipality

like that brought by Appellant. See Leatherman, 507 U.S. at 168.

Appellant’s complaint provides sufficient notice. Thus, we hold

that Appellant has stated cognizable claims against the City under

section 1983. Accordingly, we vacate the district court’s

dismissal of Appellant’s claims against the City in relation to the

search of the Cadillac.

E. Dismissal of Appellant’s State Law Claims

Appellant argues that his state law claims were improperly

dismissed for lack of notice. Section 101.101(a) of the Texas Tort

Claims Act provides that a “governmental unit is entitled to

receive notice of a claim against it under this chapter not later

than six months after the day that the incident giving rise to the

claim occurred.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.101(a). Here, the

City received a letter from Appellant’s attorney on March 10, 2003.

Whether or not it was sufficient notice, the letter was untimely

for that purpose as it was not received within six months of March

17
8, 2002, the day after the incident. Appellant concedes that he

untimely advised the City of his injuries through formal notice but

argues that the City had actual notice of his injuries. The Texas

Tort Claims Act notice requirements do not apply if the

governmental unit has “actual notice” that the claimant was

injured. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 101.101(c).

For the purpose of bringing state law claims against the City,

Appellant fails to show that the City had actual notice of his

injuries. Appellant contends that the City had actual notice of

his injuries when “Appellant’s supervisor reported him as being

abducted and when Appellant requested an incident report regarding

the search of his home.” The Texas Supreme Court has held that

actual notice to a governmental unit requires knowledge of “(1) a

death, injury, or property damage; (2) the governmental unit’s

alleged fault producing or contributing to the death, injury, or

property damage; and (3) the identity of the parties involved.”

Cathey v. Booth, 900 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. 1995). Appellant has

not alleged that the City had these three pieces of information.

Cf. Dallas-Fort Worth Int’l Airport Bd. v. Ryan, 52 S.W.3d 426, 429

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.) (finding sufficient actual

notice where plaintiff sent a letter notifying defendant of the

injury, the parties involved, and its alleged fault in causing the

injury). Thus, Appellant has failed to demonstrate that he

provided the City with actual notice of his injuries. Accordingly,

we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Appellant’s state law

18
claims against the City.

III. CONCLUSION

We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Appellant’s

challenge to the validity of the warrant; Appellant’s claim that

searches of his Suburban amounted to a constitutional violation;

and Appellant’s state law claims against the City. Because we hold

that the search of the Cadillac was unconstitutional and the police

officers conducting the search are not entitled to qualified

immunity, we VACATE the district court’s summary judgment

dismissing Appellant’s claim in relation to the search of the

Cadillac. We also VACATE the district court’s dismissal of

Appellant’s claims against the City under section 1983 in relation

to the search of the Cadillac. The case is remanded for further

proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

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