FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT August 7, 2020
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Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 20-8026
(D.C. Nos. 1:19-CV-00047-SWS &
CHRISTOPHER JOSEPH EADS, 1:17-CR-00172-SWS-1)
(D. Wyo.)
Defendant - Appellant.
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ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
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Before MATHESON, KELLY, and EID, Circuit Judges.
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Petitioner-Appellant Christopher Joseph Eads, an inmate appearing pro se, seeks a
Certificate of Appealability (COA) from the district court’s dismissal of his motion under
28 U.S.C. § 2255. I R. 37. To obtain a COA he must make “a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a district court has
rejected the constitutional claims on the merits . . . [t]he petitioner must demonstrate that
reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims
debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Where a claim has
been denied on procedural grounds, the movant must additionally demonstrate “that
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its
procedural ruling.” Id. Mr. Eads has failed to make either showing and therefore we
deny his request for a COA.
In 2017, Mr. Eads pled guilty to: (1) conspiracy to distribute heroin and
methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) and (b)(1)(C) (Count One); (2)
use and carry of a firearm during and in relation to drug trafficking activity, 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (Count Two); (3) use, carry, and discharge of a firearm during and in
relation to a federal drug trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) and (c)(2)
(Count Four); (4) two counts of carjacking, 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (Counts Five and Six); and
(5) assault on a federal officer by means of a deadly weapon, 18 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(1) and
(b) (Count Seven). He was sentenced to 480 months’ imprisonment and four years’
supervised release. He did not appeal his sentence.
In March 2019, Mr. Eads sought postconviction relief, filing a § 2255 motion
asserting: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel permitted him to plead
guilty to two 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) counts; (2) double jeopardy because he was charged
twice under § 924(c) for the same drug trafficking offense; and (3) a First Step Act
violation. The district court denied the motion determining that: (1) Mr. Eads failed to
establish deficient performance of counsel, and that, even if he had, he had not
established prejudice, i.e. but-for counsel’s claimed deficient performance, he would have
been unlikely to accept the government’s plea agreement; (2) the double jeopardy claim
was without merit, but procedurally barred; and (3) the First Step Act did not apply to
Mr. Eads and was not a basis for relief.
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On appeal, Mr. Eads argues that conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance
(Count 1) is not a drug trafficking offense and cannot be a predicate offense for a
§ 924(c) (Count 2); and that counsel was ineffective for not raising this. The first
proposition is plainly incorrect, see 21 U.S.C. § 846; United States v. Jenkins, 313 F.3d
549, 55758 (10th Cir. 2002). We have reviewed Mr. Eads’s claims and do not find
them reasonably debatable for substantially the same reasons as the district court.
We DENY a COA, DENY the motion to proceed IFP, and DISMISS the appeal.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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