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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MICHAEL WAY :
:
Appellant : No. 3061 EDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 14, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0006057-2017
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: Filed: August 25, 2020
Michael Way (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed following his convictions of possession of a controlled substance and
possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance (PWID).1
Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his suppression motion. After
careful consideration, we affirm.
The trial court summarized the testimony from the suppression hearing:
While conducting a separate investigation, Office[r] [Timothy]
Bogan [(Officer Bogan)] observed a blue pickup truck in the
Franklin Mills parking lot of Dick[’]s Sporting Goods, at
approximately 1:45 p.m. on April 26, 2017. He observed a white
Cadillac arrive and pull up in front of the blue pickup truck and
honk its horn. The Cadillac drove off slowly and the blue pickup
truck followed the Cadillac[,] lawfully parking in the Wal-Mart
parking lot. Officer Bogan became suspicious of the two vehicles
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1 35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(16), (30).
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at this time and watched the driver of the blue pickup truck get
out of the vehicle and enter the front passenger side of the
Cadillac. After waiting for approximately one minute, Officer
Bogan and Officer [Brian] Sumpter [(Officer Sumpter)], dressed
in plain clothing, stepped out of their unmarked [vehicle],
approached the Cadillac, and announced themselves as police
officers. Four other officers joined Officer Bogan and Officer
Sumpter, bringing the number of officers involved in the
questioning to six. Upon approaching the Cadillac, Officer
Sumpter observed through tinted windows and an open door, a
plastic bag containing crack cocaine packets between
[Appellant]’s legs. Upon observing the narcotics, Officer
Sumpter[] further opened the already opened driver door where
he detained [Appellant], recovering a total of 59 smaller packets
of crack cocaine with the large Ziploc bag.
Officer Bogan has around 30 years of experience as a police
officer and over 20 years of narcotics experience[,] with personal
experience dealing with drug transactions. [Officer Bogan
testified:]
A: Your Honor, as to my years of me also purchasing
narcotics, I would be waiting -- after I would make a phone
call, I would be waiting in the vehicle or on the corner, and
a ca[r] would pull up and blow his horn for me to get into
the vehicle to make a purchase.
Q: So you have witnessed or in the past, you had witnessed
narcotics transactions with all of the similar patterns?
A: I had witnessed them and also performed them myself.
[N.T., 4/17/19, at 11]. Officer Sumpter has around 24 years of
experience in narcotics as well.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/22/20, at 1-2.
Following his arrest, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with
possession of a controlled substance and PWID. On July 10, 2018, Appellant
filed a motion to suppress the drugs recovered from his encounter with the
police. On April 17, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on Appellant’s
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suppression motion. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court denied
the motion, and the case immediately proceeded to a bench trial. The trial
court found Appellant guilty of the aforementioned crimes. On August 14,
2019, the trial court sentenced Appellant to three years of probation.
On October 10, 2018, following the grant of nunc pro tunc relief,
Appellant filed a notice of appeal to this Court. Both the trial court and
Appellant have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.
On appeal, Appellant presents the following issue for review:
1. Police initiated an investigative detention after observing
two people meet in a mall parking lot after arriving in separate
cars. Did the Commonwealth fail to establish reasonable suspicion
to justify the detention?
Appellant’s Brief at 3.
At the outset, we recognize:
[An appellate court’s] standard of review in addressing a challenge
to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining
whether the suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those
facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before
the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the
Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as
remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as
a whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are
supported by the record, [the appellate court] is bound by [those]
findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are
erroneous. Where . . . the appeal of the determination of the
suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the
suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on an
appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression
court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions
of law of the courts below are subject to [ ] plenary review.
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Commonwealth v. Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 526-27 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation
omitted). Our scope of review is limited to the evidentiary record from the
suppression hearing. In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073, 1087 (Pa. 2013).
Appellant argues that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to detain
him in the Wal-Mart parking lot. Appellant contends the evidence at the
suppression hearing merely established that “Appellant in the white Cadillac
drove up to the blue pickup truck in the parking lot, honk[ed] his horn, and
allow[ed] the individual in the blue pickup truck [to] enter the passenger side
after both vehicles parked.” Appellant’s Brief at 8. Appellant asserts these
facts did not “establish reasonable suspicion that drug activity was afoot.” Id.
There are three categories of interactions between police and citizens:
The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or request for
information) which need not be supported by any level of
suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to respond.
The second, an “investigative detention” must be supported by a
reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period
of detention, but does not involve such coercive conditions as to
constitute the functional equivalent of an arrest. Finally, an arrest
or “custodial detention” must be supported by probable cause.
Commonwealth v. Downey, 39 A.3d 401, 405 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation
omitted).
“To guide the crucial inquiry as to whether or not a seizure has been
effected, the United States Supreme Court has devised an objective test
entailing a determination of whether, in view of all surrounding circumstances,
a reasonable person would have believed that he was free to leave.”
Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757 A.2d 884, 889 (Pa. 2000). In evaluating
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the totality of the circumstances, our focus is whether, “by means of physical
force or show of authority, the citizen-subject’s movement has in some way
been restrained.” Id. at 889. In making this determination, no single factor
dictates “the ultimate conclusion as to whether a seizure has occurred.” Id.
In this case, neither party disputes that the officers conducted an
investigatory detention of Appellant. When evaluating the legality of
investigative detentions, Pennsylvania has adopted the holding of Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), where the United States Supreme Court held that
police may conduct an investigatory detention if they have reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot. In re: D.M., 781 A.2d 1161, 1163
(Pa. 2001). These encounters with police are commonly known as Terry
stops. In order to prove reasonable suspicion, “the police officer must be able
to point to specific and articulable facts and reasonable inferences drawn from
those facts in light of the officer’s experience.” Commonwealth v. Cook,
735 A.2d 673, 677 (Pa. 1999). “The determination of whether an officer had
reasonable suspicion that criminality was afoot so as to justify an investigatory
detention is an objective one, which must be considered in light of the totality
of the circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Walls, 53 A.3d 889, 893 (Pa.
Super. 2012).
In this case, Officer Bogan testified as follows at the suppression
hearing:
On [April 26, 2017], myself, along with other members of my
team, we set up surveillance of the Franklin Mills parking lot for
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another investigation, Your Honor. At approximately 1:45 p.m.[,]
I observed a blue pickup arrive in the Franklin Mills parking lot and
park in a handicap parking spot by -- I believe it is Dick[’]s
Sporting Goods.
At that point, Your Honor, two minutes later, a white Cadillac
arrived and pulled in front of the blue pickup truck. I heard a horn
blown, and the Cadillac slowly drove off and the blue pickup
followed the Cadillac. At that point, it kind of raised my suspicion,
Your Honor.
At that point in time, I watched the vehicles and [they] pulled
over to the Wal-Mart parking lot. At that point, the operator of
the blue pickup was identified as Joe Russo. He exited the front
pickup and entered the front passenger’s side of the Cadillac.
At that point, Your Honor, I waited a minute or so. We
approached the vehicle, identified ourselves as police officers.
Officer Sumpter was on the driver’s side of the vehicle and he
relayed to me that [Appellant] had a plastic bag in between his
legs that contained crack packets.
At that point, Russo was taken out of the vehicle, as well as
[Appellant]; that plastic baggie contained 12 peach colored
packets of crack cocaine and 47 clear packets of crack cocaine.
Also confiscated off of [Appellant] was $467.00 US currency and
then two cell phones.
Your Honor, while we are out there, Mr. Russo stated that he
owed [Appellant] $50 United States currency and there was $50
recovered from the center console. At that point, there [was]
nothing recovered from Mr. Russo and he was released at the
scene. Back inside of headquarters, I conducted a NIK Test G,
which I’m certified to do, and that test was positive for the
presence of cocaine base. The narcotics, money and cell phones
were placed on a property receipt.
N.T., 4/17/19, at 7-9.
Importantly, Officer Bogan further testified regarding his extensive
experience with narcotics investigations:
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Q. And now, Officer Bogan, how long have you been a police
officer?
A. Going on 30 years.
Q. And during the course of those 30 years, where have you
been assigned?
A. When I graduated the academy, Your Honor, I was assigned
to the 23rd District in ‘89. In ‘97, I transferred to the Narcotic
Strike Force, which is a uniformed branch of the Narcotics Field
Unit.
In May of 98, I was transferred to the Narcotics Field Unit.
In July of 2011 -- I believe it is 2011 -- I was transferred to
Internal Affairs. In July of 2012, I was transferred back into the
Field Unit, and that is where I have been since.
Q. Officer -- I’m sure you don’t have the exact number, but
over the course of your career, can you give us a rough estimate
of how many narcotics investigations you’ve participated in?
A. I will say, well over 500.
Q. And have you received any specialized training with respect
to the packaging sale and the use of narcotics?
A. We did receive a two-week training prior to coming to the
Strike Force on the packaging of narcotics. But when I was in the
23rd -- we made narcotics arrests in the 23rd. So I kind of like
was familiar with the way narcotics are packaged.
Q. Now, you indicated that the vehicle -- I believe you said i[t]
was a blue pickup truck?
A. Yes.
Q. And then the white Cadillac came in after the h[o]nk of the
horn.
A. Yes.
Q. And you indicated that this raised your suspicion. Can you
tell the court why?
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A. Your Honor, as to my years of me also purchasing narcotics,
I would be waiting -- after I would make a phone call, I would be
waiting in the [] vehicle or on the corner, and a ca[r] would pull
up and blow his horn for me to get into the vehicle to make a
purchase.
Q. So you have witnessed or in the past, you had witnessed
narcotics transactions with all of the similar patterns?
A. I had witnessed them and also performed them myself.
Q. Now when you approached the Cadillac, was that vehicle
parked?
A. Yes. Both vehicles were parked. When the Cadillac pulled
up in front of the blue pickup at Dick[’]s Sports, before we drove
off, the pickup followed the Cadillac to [the] Wal-Mart parking lot
and they parked side by side or close to side by side. Russo exited
and entered [Appellant]’s vehicle.
Q. And now were you and your fellow officers on foot or on the
vehicle yourselves?
A. We were in the vehicles.
Q. And you said you pulled up to that location when you got
out of your vehicle?
A. Your Honor, I approached the passenger’s side of the vehicle
with other officers and Officer Sumpter approached the driver’s
side of the vehicle with other officers.
Q. And how far away from the occupants of the vehicle were
you when you approached it?
A. I mean I was walking up on the vehicle. So at that point,
I’m walking up and I’m exiting my vehicle and walk up to the
Cadillac.
Q. So were you able to see clearly inside of the vehicle?
A. I can see inside of the vehicle, yes.
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Q. Were you able to see what Officer Sumpter and Brown were
doing at the same time?
A. I could not see what Officer Sumpter was doing. My focus
on that point was on Russo, and I did see money in the center
console.
Q. And what was it that you believed that you were observing
as you walked up to that vehicle?
A. Based on my experience, I believed that to be a drug
delivery service.
Id. at 9-12.
Thus, the record reflects that during the afternoon on the date in
question, Officer Bogan and five other Narcotics Field Unit officers were
conducting surveillance of a mall parking lot for drug trafficking. Id. at 7.
Officer Bogan observed a white Cadillac drive into a Dick’s Sporting Goods
parking lot and stop in front of a parked blue pickup truck. Id. at 7-8. The
driver of the Cadillac honked his horn at the truck. Id. at 8. Officer Bogan
then saw the truck follow the Cadillac to the Wal-Mart parking lot, where the
vehicles parked next to each other. Id. Officer Bogan observed the driver of
the truck exit his vehicle and enter the Cadillac, sitting in the front passenger
seat. Id. Based on his extensive narcotics investigation experience, including
30 years on the Philadelphia Police Force, 21 of which he spent on the
Narcotics Field Unit, Officer Bogan recognized the behavior of the respective
drivers of the vehicles as a narcotics transaction. Id. at 9-11. Officer Bogan
testified that he made this determination based on his participation in “well
over” 500 narcotics investigations, many of which he acted as a drug buyer,
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and executed the same pattern of behavior. Id. at 10-11. Officer Bogan
explained that in those cases, the narcotics seller would often drive up to the
vehicle of the buyer, honk the car horn, and then lead the buyer to another
location to park and conduct the drug transaction. Id. at 11.
The record reveals that the six officers surveilling the area then
converged on the Cadillac. Id. at 8, 12, 14, 18. When Officer Sumpter
approached the Cadillac, he opened the driver’s side door and saw Appellant
sitting with several packets of crack cocaine in a clear Ziploc Bag between his
legs. Id. at 18.
In support of his argument, Appellant relies on Commonwealth v.
Walton, 63 A.3d 253, 255 (Pa. Super. 2013). In Walton, the trial court
relied on the following facts in making the determination that the police had
reasonable suspicion to stop and detain the appellant:
Officer Bridges testified that he saw a white male and female in
the parking lot kind of walking around, pacing back and forth, and
that [t]hey were on and off their cell phone several times looking
around. Officer Bridges stated that this conduct looked kind of
suspicious to [him]. He explained that based on his experience,
he knew that’s how a lot people will meet with drug dealers or
drug dealers themselves will stand in a parking lot to meet them.
When [a]ppellant’s vehicle pulled up to the couple in the parking
lot and they started talking to each other Officer Bridges stated,
it looked like some type of deal was going to go down.
Id. at 258.
This Court, however, rejected the trial court’s determination that this
testimony indicated that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop and
detain the appellant. Id. We explained that “[t]he record [] reflects
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insufficient evidence to justify an ‘investigative stop.’ Without more, Officer
Bridges’ observations are consistent with innocent activity and nothing more
than a hunch a drug transaction was to transpire.” Id.
We find Walton readily distinguishable from this case. The officer in
Walton did not explain with any specific or articulable facts regarding how he
knew the behavior of the individuals involved in that case was “how a lot of
people . . . meet with drug dealers.” See id. The officer only testified that
his conclusion was “based on his experience[,]” see id., but he did not
articulate what experiences he had that supported this conclusion. In this
case, however, Officer Bogan testified that not only did the behavior of the
drivers of the Cadillac and the blue pickup appear identical to other vehicle-
related drug transactions he has witnessed, but also that Officer Bogan himself
has engaged in similar drug transaction behavior while acting as a drug buyer
in undercover narcotics operations.
Additionally, unlike Walton, the conduct of the drivers of the Cadillac
and blue pickup were not merely consistent with innocent activity. This case
included the added step of the driver of the pickup truck exiting his vehicle
and entering the front passenger seat of the Cadillac (Appellant’s vehicle) so
that their interaction was not visible by anyone outside. Thus, in this case the
drivers of the Cadillac and the pickup truck exhibited behavior that Officer
Bogan specifically knew was, based upon his training and experience,
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suspicious behavior. By contrast, the behavior of the appellant in Walton
provided no indicia of criminal activity. See id. at 258.
Therefore, we conclude that the record supports the trial court’s
determination that Officer Bogan’s testimony pointed to specific and
articulable facts that, in light of the officer’s experience, gave him the
reasonable belief that the drivers of the Cadillac and blue pickup truck were
engaging in a drug transaction. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in
denying Appellant’s suppression motion.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/25/20
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