TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
James Foriest ) Docket No. 2017-06-0413
)
v. ) State File No. 92945-2016
)
United Parcel Service, Inc., et al. )
)
)
Appeal from the Court of Workers’ )
Compensation Claims )
Joshua D. Baker, Judge )
Vacated and Remanded—Filed August 10, 2018
Corrected Version
The employee, a package delivery driver, suffered a knee injury in the course and scope
of his employment. The employer denied the claim based upon its belief the injury was
idiopathic and did not arise primarily out of the employment. Following the trial court’s
denial of benefits after an expedited hearing, the employee obtained additional medical
proof and requested a bifurcation of the trial. The trial court agreed to adjudicate issues
involving compensability, medical care, and temporary disability benefits and reserve
ruling on permanent disability benefits. Following a trial, the court determined the claim
was compensable and ordered the employer to provide temporary disability and medical
benefits. The trial court noted that its decision was “not a final order” and did not
“address all contested issues.” We conclude that the issues tried were not ripe for
adjudication and that this appeal is premature. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court’s
order, dismiss the appeal, and remand the case.
Presiding Judge Marshall L. Davidson, III, delivered the opinion of the Appeals Board in
which Judge Timothy W. Conner joined. Judge David F. Hensley concurred in part and
dissented in part.
David T. Hooper, Brentwood, Tennessee, for the employer-appellant, United Parcel
Service, Inc.
Stephen D. Karr, Nashville, Tennessee, for the employee-appellee, James Foriest
1
Factual and Procedural Background
James Foriest (“Employee”), a fifty-nine-year-old resident of Kingston Springs,
Tennessee, is a package delivery driver employed by United Parcel Service, Inc.
(“Employer”). He has been assigned to drive the same route for over twenty years and
makes up to 150 stops at commercial and residential locations, which requires him to
walk from nine to thirteen miles a day. In 2009, he suffered a work-related right knee
injury and underwent a total knee replacement surgery. He testified the surgery was
successful and that, after returning to work without restrictions, he had no problems or
complications from the surgery.
On October 11, 2016, Employee and his supervisor were working together as part
of Employee’s annual safety evaluation when Employee stopped at a vacant lot to take a
break. After stepping out of his truck and taking a few steps, his right knee “popped” and
he felt pain. Employee testified he was not experiencing any problems with his knee that
day before it popped and had experienced no problems with the knee in the days leading
up to the October 11 incident. He stated that the parking lot where he was walking was
level, that it did not have any debris on it, and that he did not step in a pothole or trip over
anything.
The following day, Employee saw Dr. William Shell, the orthopedic surgeon who
performed his 2009 knee replacement. Dr. Shell believed Employee had dislocated his
patella, and he referred him to his partner, Dr. Allen Anderson. Dr. Anderson agreed
with Dr. Shell and recommended surgical reconstruction of the patellofemoral ligament,
which he performed on January 23, 2017. Dr. Anderson performed a second surgery to
remove a piece of the artificial knee that had broken off. Employee reported complaints
of instability in the knee following the second surgery, and Dr. Shell has recommended a
third procedure.
Employer denied Employee’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits related to
the October 11, 2016 incident, arguing that the injury was idiopathic and, therefore, did
not arise primarily out of the employment. Following an expedited hearing, the trial
court denied benefits, concluding Employee had not met his burden of showing he would
likely prevail at trial in establishing a compensable acute injury. However, the trial court
noted that such a finding did not preclude the possibility that Employee suffered a
gradual injury but that the medical proof was insufficient to render a determination on
that issue. No appeal was filed at that time.
After taking Dr. Shell’s deposition, Employee, instead of filing a second request
for an expedited hearing, filed a motion requesting that the court conduct a bifurcated
trial in which issues concerning compensability and medical and temporary disability
benefits would be addressed, but issues concerning permanent disability benefits would
be reserved. The trial court granted the motion and ordered that a trial be held at which
2
“the Court will adjudicate all issues other than permanent disability benefits and future
medical benefits.” The court also stated in its order that it would “convene a second
hearing to determine permanent disability benefits and medical benefits.”
Following the trial, the court ruled Employee had established a compensable
gradual injury to his knee and was entitled to medical and temporary disability benefits.
The court awarded Employee his past medical expenses, on-going treatment with Dr.
Shell, and temporary disability benefits. The court stated in its order that “[t]he issues of
permanent disability benefits and permanent medical benefits are reserved; therefore, this
is not a final order addressing all contested issues in this claim.”
Employer has appealed the finding of compensability, asserting that the proof
preponderates against the court’s determination that Employee suffered a compensable
gradual injury. Employer further asserts that Employee’s current condition is related to
his 2009 injury and is controlled by a settlement agreement pertaining to that injury. We
conclude that the issues tried were not ripe for adjudication and that this appeal is
premature.
Standard of Review
The standard we apply in reviewing a trial court’s decision presumes that the
court’s factual findings are correct unless the preponderance of the evidence is otherwise.
See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(c)(7) (2017). When the trial judge has had the
opportunity to observe a witness’s demeanor and to hear in-court testimony, we give
considerable deference to factual findings made by the trial court. Madden v. Holland
Grp. of Tenn., Inc., 277 S.W.3d 896, 898 (Tenn. 2009). However, “[n]o similar
deference need be afforded the trial court’s findings based upon documentary evidence.”
Goodman v. Schwarz Paper Co., No. W2016-02594-SC-R3-WC, 2018 Tenn. LEXIS 8, at
*6 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Jan. 18, 2018). Similarly, the interpretation and
application of statutes and regulations are questions of law that are reviewed de novo with
no presumption of correctness afforded the trial court’s conclusions. See Mansell v.
Bridgestone Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 417 S.W.3d 393, 399 (Tenn. 2013). We are
also mindful of our obligation to construe the workers’ compensation statutes “fairly,
impartially, and in accordance with basic principles of statutory construction” and in a
way that does not favor either the employee or the employer. Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-
116 (2017).
Analysis
Ripeness
The concept of ripeness “focuses on whether the dispute has matured to the point
that it warrants a judicial decision.” Cotton v. HUMACare, Inc., No. 2015-02-0061, 2016
3
TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 42, at *11 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Sept. 14,
2016). “The central concern of the ripeness doctrine is whether the case involves
uncertain or contingent future events that may or may not occur as anticipated or, indeed,
may not occur at all.” Id.
Here, the issue of compensability was not ripe for adjudication at an interlocutory
stage of the case. Ultimately, whether an injured worker is entitled to benefits depends
on a variety of factors including, but not limited to, medical evidence. Such evidence
cannot be complete when the injured worker is still in the midst of pursuing a course of
medical treatment, as Employee is here. As we have observed in a different context,
“[g]iven the twists and turns inherent in litigation, it seems the better practice is to resolve
such issues [when] . . . the parties and the court no longer face uncertainties over future
developments, as opposed to adjudicating disputes . . . in piecemeal fashion as the case
winds its way through the litigation process.” Andrews v. Yates Servs., LLC, No. 2016-
05-0854, 2017 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 35, at *7-8 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp.
App. Bd. May 23, 2017).
As noted in another case involving a bifurcated trial, future developments in the
case can impact the ultimate determination of compensability. Cotton, 2016 TN Wrk.
Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 42, at *11. This is not to suggest that we agree or disagree with
the trial court’s assessment of the incomplete medical proof at this juncture. Rather, we
conclude that, as Employee has not yet completed his medical treatment and, in fact,
apparently needs another procedure on his knee, further developments over the course of
the litigation may well alter the rights and obligations of the parties. As such, a final
determination of the compensability of the claim has not “matured to the point that it
warrants a judicial decision.” Id. Accordingly, the trial court’s order adjudicating the
compensability of the claim is vacated.
Bifurcated Trials
Tennessee courts have cautioned against the use of bifurcated trials as a way of
resolving disputes, including workers’ compensation disputes. Indeed, our Supreme
Court’s Special Workers’ Compensation Appeals Panel has observed that bifurcated trials
“serve little purpose in workers’ compensation cases.” Jones v. Tridon, No. 01S01-9703-
CV-00057, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 528, at *6 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. Panel Oct. 31, 1997).
Other courts have observed that “the interests of justice will warrant a bifurcation of the
issues in only the most exceptional cases and upon a strong showing of necessity.”
Lamar Adver. Co. v. By-Pass Partners, 313 S.W.3d 779, 790 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009)
(citation omitted).
With respect to bifurcated trials in general, we have observed that “resolving
litigation in piecemeal fashion may delay a final resolution of [a] case and rarely serves
the interests of judicial economy.” Rucker v. Flexible Staffing Solutions of Tenn., No.
4
2015-02-0126, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 23, at *15 n.4 (Tenn. Workers’
Comp. App. Bd. May 13, 2016). This case is a good example. The parties prepared for
and participated in an expedited hearing after which the trial court filed an order denying
benefits. Over the ensuing months, the parties obtained more evidence, and a bifurcated
trial was requested and granted. The bifurcated trial was conducted, after which the trial
court filed an order disposing of some issues but not others. The order was appealed, the
parties briefed the issues, and the case is now being sent back to the trial court where
more hearings are likely with the potential of additional appeals and still more litigation.
The end result is that the case will likely remain unresolved longer than it would have
otherwise, and at greater cost and continued uncertainty to the parties.
There are several other considerations that highlight the problematic nature of
bifurcated trials, particularly in the context of the Reform Act of 2013. First, neither the
workers’ compensation statutes nor the regulations contemplate that a bifurcated trial will
occur in a workers’ compensation case. Instead, the current statutes and regulations
provide other mechanisms for a trial court to address interlocutory disputes regarding the
initiation of medical and temporary disability benefits, namely, expedited hearings and
motions. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-6-239(d). A trial court has the authority to order the
initiation of benefits or deny the claim using either of these mechanisms. There is no
indication that the legislature, in passing the Reform Act of 2013, contemplated
bifurcated trials as a means of resolving workers’ compensation cases in light of the
specific framework it put in place in anticipation of interlocutory disputes, such as the
one involved here.
Second, there is nothing in the statutes or regulations to restrict a trial court from
hearing additional evidence or changing its mind on the issues raised and decided in a
bifurcated trial, as such orders do not become final by operation of law. In other words,
nothing prevents a party who lost at a bifurcated trial from seeking additional evidence
and presenting it at a subsequent trial. For example, if as a result of a bifurcated trial an
employer is ordered to authorize surgery and during that procedure the surgeon discovers
a causative condition wholly unrelated to employment, nothing prevents the employer
from securing additional proof from that physician and contesting compensability at a
subsequent trial. As a result, despite the fact that the parties and the trial court agreed to
label the proceeding a “bifurcated compensation hearing” or something similar, it is, in
essence, an interlocutory proceeding and the trial court’s decision can be modified,
reversed, or otherwise changed at any time before the last such hearing or series of
hearings.
Third, even if we were to affirm the trial court’s bifurcated compensation order, it
is unclear where that leaves the parties. Arguably, Employer could not appeal our
decision to the Tennessee Supreme Court because such an appeal does not fall within the
ambit of an appeal as of right as defined in Rule 3(a) of the Tennessee Rules of Appellate
Procedure. Moreover, if the bifurcated compensation order cannot be certified as final, it
5
arguably does not become enforceable pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-
6-239(c)(9). Likewise, if we were to reverse the decision of the trial court and remand
the case, Employee would have the same conundrum since he could not appeal our
decision pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(a) and could not proceed
with the surgery at Employer’s expense.
Fourth, while on the surface it may seem to serve the interests of efficiency and
justice to resolve issues incrementally in separate trials, the result is often anything but
efficient. On the other hand, when litigants use the mechanisms in place and prepare
their cases for a “full evidentiary hearing,” as contemplated by Rule 0800-02-21-.02(7),
an expeditious and efficient resolution provides employees and businesses alike much
needed finality and the ability to move on. This is not to suggest that speed for the sake
of speed should be the goal. Clearly, it is not. Instead, as directed by the legislature,
workers’ compensation disputes should be resolved in a “fair, equitable, expeditious, and
efficient” manner. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-3-1409(b)(2)(A) (2017). Moving a case toward
a resolution one inch at a time through a series of bifurcated trials is inconsistent with
these objectives. 1
In short, as stated by our Supreme Court’s Special Workers’ Compensation
Appeals Panel, bifurcated trials “serve little purpose in workers’ compensation cases.”
Jones, 1997 Tenn. LEXIS 528, at *6. Our experience has borne this out. To date,
bifurcated cases appealed to us have resulted in more litigation, not less. 2 If the idea
behind conducting bifurcated trials in these cases was to streamline the litigation and
thereby chart an efficient course for their ultimate resolution, the end result has been just
the opposite.
Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02
Before concluding, we note that the dissent engages in an extensive discussion of
how and why Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02 could apply to this case. Rule
54.02 states that a trial court may direct the entry of a final judgment on fewer than all
claims “only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and
upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.” The order before us, however,
expressly states that it is not a final order and, therefore, is subject to change by the trial
1
The dissent asserts that, prior to the 2013 Reform Act, it was not unusual for a trial court to bifurcate a
workers’ compensation case. However, the dissent’s supporting list of cases, spanning more than two
decades, suggests just the opposite conclusion, i.e., bifurcated trials were rare. The cases cited
undoubtedly represent an extremely small percentage of cases tried over the same period of time.
2
See, e.g., Cotton v. HUMACare, Inc., No. 2015-02-0061, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 42
(Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. Sept. 14, 2016); Rucker v. Flexible Staffing Solutions of Tenn., No.
2015-02-0126, 2016 TN Wrk. Comp. App. Bd. LEXIS 23 (Tenn. Workers’ Comp. App. Bd. May 13,
2016).
6
court at any time prior to entry of a final order disposing of all issues. Thus, whether and
to what extent Rule 54.02 may apply to bifurcated trials conducted in the Court of
Workers’ Compensation Claims is an issue for another day.
Though we express no opinion on whether Rule 54.02 applies to post-reform
cases, we do wish to address the dissent’s contention that, once a trial court issues a “final
judgment” pursuant to Rule 54.02, “such decision is reviewable by us” and, “[u]pon such
certification of finality by the Appeals Board, an appeal as of right lies to the Supreme
Court.” We respectfully disagree with this analysis. Even assuming that Rule 54.02
gives the Court of Workers’ Compensation Claims the authority to enter a “final
judgment” as to one or more but fewer than all the claims presented in a case, there is
nothing in the Workers’ Compensation Law or the Tennessee Rules of Appellate
Procedure that tolls the thirty-day deadline to appeal such a judgment to the Tennessee
Supreme Court. Indeed, Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a) mandates that a
notice of appeal be filed “within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment appealed
from.” Thus, if the dissent is correct in asserting Rule 54.02 applies, then the time period
to appeal such an order to us would run concurrently with the time period to appeal to the
Tennessee Supreme Court, a result that is untenable. Under such circumstances, a party
would be taking a significant risk by electing to file a notice of appeal with us based on
the assumption that this action would toll the thirty-day deadline to appeal to the Supreme
Court mandated by Rule 4(a).
Moreover, the dissent acknowledges that “the authority in Rule 54.02 for trial
courts to direct the entry of a final judgment seems incompatible with” language in both
Tennessee Code Annotated section 50-6-239(c)(7) (“The decision of the workers’
compensation judge shall become final thirty days after the workers’ compensation judge
enters a compensation order, unless a party in interest seeks an appeal of the decision
from the workers’ compensation appeals board pursuant to this chapter.”) and section 50-
6-217(a)(2)(B) (“For purposes of further appellate review, the workers’ compensation
appeals board must, if appropriate, certify as final the order of the court of workers
compensation claims . . . .”). Indeed, Rule 54.02, if applicable, would seem to allow a
third method for addressing the finality of a trial court’s compensation order, a method
not expressly contemplated in the Workers’ Compensation Law or accompanying
regulations.
In the end, this is the third bifurcated trial to have been appealed to us in a two-
year span, and each one has had its share of problems resulting in the trial court’s order
being set aside. The trial court in the present case correctly acknowledged prior decisions
“hazarding against bifurcation,” as our experience to date has been that the practice
creates more problems than it resolves.
7
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the issue of compensability was not ripe
for a final adjudication. Accordingly, the trial court’s decision is vacated, the appeal is
dismissed, and the case is remanded.
8
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TENNESSEE BUREAU OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD
James Foriest ) Docket No. 2017-06-0413
)
v. ) State File No. 92945-2016
)
United Parcel Service, Inc., et al. )
)
)
Appeal from the Court of Workers’ )
Compensation Claims )
Joshua D. Baker, Judge )
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the Appeals Board’s decision in the
referenced case was sent to the following recipients by the following methods of service
on this the 14th day of August, 2018.
Name Certified First Class Via Fax Via Sent to:
Mail Mail Fax Number Email
Stephen D. Karr X steve@flexerlaw.com
David T. Hooper X dhooper@hooperzinn.com
Joshua D. Baker, Judge X Via Electronic Mail
Kenneth M. Switzer, Chief Judge X Via Electronic Mail
Penny Shrum, Clerk, Court of X Penny.Patterson-Shrum@tn.gov
Workers’ Compensation Claims
Matthew Salyer
Clerk, Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board
220 French Landing Dr., Ste. 1-B
Nashville, TN 37243
Telephone: 615-253-1606
Electronic Mail: WCAppeals.Clerk@tn.gov