18-952
Bladimir-Acosta v. Barr
BIA
Laforest, IJ
A 079 797 071
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
4 New York, on the 2nd day of September, two thousand twenty.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
8 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
9 RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 HENRY BLADIMIR-ACOSTA,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 18-952
17 NAC
18 WILLIAM P. BARR,
19 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.
21 _____________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: David Jadidian, Esq., Jackson
24 Heights, NY.
25
26 FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant Attorney
27 General; Linda S. Wernery,
28 Assistant Director; Gerald M.
1 Alexander, Trial Attorney, Office
2 of Immigration Litigation, United
3 States Department of Justice,
4 Washington, DC.
5 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
6 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
7 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
8 is DENIED.
9 Petitioner Henry Bladimir-Acosta, a native and citizen
10 of Ecuador, seeks review of a March 7, 2018 decision of the
11 BIA affirming a June 9, 2017 decision of an Immigration Judge
12 (“IJ”) denying his application for withholding of removal and
13 relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). 1 In re
14 Henry Bladimir-Acosta, No. A 079 797 071 (B.I.A. Mar. 7,
15 2018), aff’g No. A 079 797 071 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Jun.
16 9, 2017). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
17 underlying facts and procedural history.
18 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
19 both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions “for the sake of
20 completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d
21 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006). The applicable standards of review
1Bladimir-Acosta does not challenge the agency’s denial of asylum
as time barred.
2
1 are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei
2 Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018) (reviewing
3 adverse credibility determination for substantial evidence).
4 We deny the petition because the adverse credibility
5 determination is supported by substantial evidence.
6 “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all
7 relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility
8 determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of
9 the applicant . . . , the consistency between the applicant’s
10 . . . written and oral statements . . . , the internal
11 consistency of each such statement, [and] the consistency of
12 such statements with other evidence of record . . . without
13 regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood
14 goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other
15 relevant factor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer
16 . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the
17 totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable
18 fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.”
19 Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008);
20 accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.
3
1 The agency properly considered two omissions in Bladimir-
2 Acosta’s asylum application to find him not credible. First,
3 Bladimir-Acosta failed to include the main basis of his
4 alleged fear — that he fled Ecuador to escape gang members
5 who were targeting him for his religious work rehabilitating
6 other gang members — in his original application for relief.
7 Second, despite including this fear of gangs in a supplemental
8 statement written a year after he filed for asylum, Bladimir-
9 Acosta failed to mention in the statement that gang members
10 attacked him more than once. While the agency may err if it
11 relies too heavily on minor omissions — at least where the
12 omitted information would have supplemented, rather than
13 contradicted, earlier statements — the agency did not err
14 here because Bladimir-Acosta would reasonably have been
15 expected to disclose the primary basis for his claim and both
16 incidents of past harm that caused him to flee Ecuador. See
17 Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585 F.3d 715, 726 (2d Cir. 2009)
18 (holding that the agency may “draw an adverse inference about
19 petitioner’s credibility based, inter alia, on h[is] failure
20 to mention” important details or events in prior statements);
21 see also Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 78 (holding that “the
4
1 probative value of a witness’s prior silence on particular
2 facts depends on whether those facts are ones the witness
3 would reasonably have been expected to disclose”).
4 Having reasonably determined that Bladimir-Acosta’s
5 credibility was in question, the agency also appropriately
6 relied on his failure to rehabilitate his testimony with
7 reliable corroborating evidence. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales,
8 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An applicant’s failure to
9 corroborate his or her testimony may bear on credibility,
10 because the absence of corroboration in general makes an
11 applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has already
12 been called into question.”). While it is true that
13 Bladimir-Acosta submitted evidence that corroborated his
14 religious work, including letters from his church in Ecuador
15 and a fellow pastor, the agency did not err in declining to
16 afford significant weight to these documents since they did
17 not corroborate any details of his alleged past persecution
18 by gang members. See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 333 (2d
19 Cir. 2013) (“We generally defer to the agency’s evaluation of
20 the weight to be afforded an applicant’s documentary
21 evidence.”). The only reference to any past harm was the
5
1 fellow pastor’s statement that a group of people who did not
2 agree with them once attacked them. But the pastor did not
3 provide any details, such as when the attack occurred, if it
4 was an isolated incident, whether the attack was physical, if
5 anyone was injured, and whether the attackers were gang
6 members.
7 Accordingly, given the omissions of the main asylum claim
8 and then of one of the two allegations of past harm, as well
9 as the absence of any detailed corroboration about the alleged
10 harm, the adverse credibility determination is supported by
11 substantial evidence. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 165–66;
12 see also Xian Tuan Ye v. DHS, 446 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 2006)
13 (holding that even a single inconsistency is sufficient to
14 support an adverse credibility determination if it is
15 material and relates to “an example of the very persecution
16 from which” the applicant seeks relief (internal quotation
17 marks omitted)). The adverse credibility determination is
18 dispositive of withholding of removal and CAT relief because
19 both forms of relief were based on the same discredited
20 factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–
21 57 (2d Cir. 2006). Because the adverse credibility
6
1 determination is dispositive, we do not reach the agency’s
2 alternate bases for its denial of relief. See INS
3 v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule
4 courts and agencies are not required to make findings on
5 issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results
6 they reach.”).
7 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
8 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
9 stays VACATED.
10 FOR THE COURT:
11 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
12 Clerk of Court
7