Case: 19-60171 Document: 00515553929 Page: 1 Date Filed: 09/04/2020
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
No. 19-60171 September 4, 2020
Summary Calendar
Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
Osmond Tetteh,
Petitioner,
versus
William P. Barr, U. S. Attorney General,
Respondent.
Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
BIA No. A060 617 005
Before Barksdale, Graves and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Osmond Tetteh is a native and citizen of Ghana. In September 2007,
in Ghana, he married a United States citizen who resided in the United
States. The spouse soon returned to the United States, and Tetteh was
admitted to this country in June 2009 as a conditional permanent resident
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should
not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in
5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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No. 19-60171
based on his marriage. Three months later, however, Tetteh’s spouse filed
for divorce; it was finalized in early January 2010.
Tetteh petitions for review of an order by the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA) dismissing his appeal from an order of an Immigration Judge
(IJ). The IJ order denied Tetteh’s application for a waiver of the requirement
to file a joint petition to remove conditions on permanent resident status, as
provided under 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4). He claims: the BIA misapplied the
law when considering whether he showed he entered the marriage in good
faith; and his due-process rights were infringed by the admission of the
divorce transcript.
We review the BIA’s decision except to the extent the IJ’s decision
influenced the BIA. Mikhael v. INS, 115 F.3d 299, 302 (5th Cir. 1997). This
court reviews de novo questions of law, Lopez-Gomez v. Ashcroft, 263 F.3d 442,
444 (5th Cir. 2001), but generally affords substantial deference to the BIA’s
interpretation of immigration statutes unless that interpretation is “arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute”. Orellana-Monson v.
Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 521 (5th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Although we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s
discretionary denial of the requested waiver, we may consider legal issues
connected to this decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii), (a)(2)(D);
Assaad v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 471, 475–76 (5th Cir. 2004); Alvarado
De Rodriguez v. Holder, 585 F.3d 227, 233–34 (5th Cir. 2009).
Tetteh has not shown the BIA misapplied the law. His claim that
evidence of his spouse’s good faith should have been sufficient to establish
his good faith is contrary to the plain language of the relevant regulation. See
8 C.F.R. § 1216.5(e)(2). The record refutes his assertion that the BIA
considered the parties’ positions at the time of the divorce rather than during
the marriage. Additionally, Tetteh’s complaint that he was unable to procure
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No. 19-60171
documentation does not show legal error on the part of the BIA and does not
relieve him of his burden of establishing that he entered the marriage in good
faith. See 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(B).
Tetteh also contends his due-process rights were infringed by the
admission of the divorce transcript. Our court reviews de novo. See Bouchikhi
v. Holder, 676 F.3d 173, 180 (5th Cir. 2012). In order to prevail on a due-
process-violation claim, the alien asserting the claim must show substantial
prejudice. Id. Even assuming the admission of the transcript infringed
Tetteh’s rights, his claim fails because, as the BIA concluded, he has not
shown the requisite prejudice.
DENIED.
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