18-2502
Huang v. Barr
BIA
A087 786 582
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
4 New York, on the 9th day of September, two thousand twenty.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
8 JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
9 WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 ZHE LONG HUANG,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 18-2502
17 NAC
18 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
19 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.
21 _____________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: Erin O’Neil-Baker, Hartford
24 Legal Group, LLC, Hartford, CT.
25
26 FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant
27 Attorney General; Bernard A.
28 Joseph, Senior Litigation Counsel;
29 Anthony O. Pottinger, Trial
30 Attorney, Office of Immigration
31 Litigation, United States
1 Department of Justice, Washington,
2 DC.
3
4 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
5 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
6 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
7 is DENIED.
8 Petitioner Zhe Long Huang, a native and citizen of the
9 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an August 3, 2018
10 decision of the BIA, denying his motion to reopen his removal
11 proceeding. In re Zhe Long Huang, No. A087 786 582 (B.I.A.
12 Aug. 3, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
13 underlying facts and procedural history.
14 The applicable standards of review are well established.
15 See Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168-69 (2d Cir.
16 2008). In his motion to reopen, Huang asserted that
17 conditions for Christians, ethnic Koreans, and dissidents had
18 worsened in China, thereby excusing the untimely filing of
19 his motion and demonstrating his prima facie eligibility for
20 asylum.
21 It is undisputed that Huang’s 2018 motion to reopen was
22 untimely filed more than six years after his removal order
23 became final in 2011. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i)
2
1 (“[T]he motion to reopen shall be filed within 90 days of the
2 date of entry of a final administrative order of removal.”);
3 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (same). However, the time limitation
4 does not apply if reopening is sought to apply for asylum and
5 the motion “is based on changed country conditions arising in
6 the country of nationality or the country to which removal
7 has been ordered, if such evidence is material and was not
8 available and would not have been discovered or presented at
9 the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii);
10 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3). The BIA did not err in finding that
11 Huang failed to demonstrate such conditions.
12 “In determining whether evidence accompanying a motion
13 to reopen demonstrates a material change in country
14 conditions that would justify reopening, [the BIA] compare[s]
15 the evidence of country conditions submitted with the motion
16 to those that existed at the time of the merits hearing
17 below.” In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (B.I.A. 2007).
18 As the BIA found, Huang’s evidence demonstrated that the
19 Chinese government has viewed unfavorably and mistreated
20 unregistered Christian groups to varying degrees depending on
21 the region since before Huang’s 2010 hearing. Huang’s
22 evidence also did not establish changed conditions for ethnic
3
1 Koreans in China but instead discusses the Chinese
2 government’s consistent policy of detaining and returning
3 North Korean refugees. Finally, Huang’s evidence showed that
4 the Chinese government has criminalized unlawful border
5 crossings and monitored and detained dissidents since before
6 his hearing, and he did not establish that the Chinese
7 government perceives or would perceive him to be a dissident.
8 Accordingly, because Huang did not establish a material
9 change in country conditions, the BIA did not abuse its
10 discretion in denying his motion to reopen as untimely. See
11 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C). We do not reach the BIA’s
12 alternative basis for denying Huang’s motion—namely, his
13 failure to establish his prima facie eligibility for relief.
14 See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general
15 rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on
16 issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results
17 they reach.”).
18 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
19 DENIED.
20 FOR THE COURT:
21 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
22 Clerk of Court
4