Opinion issued September 10, 2020
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-20-00382-CV
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IN RE DOLCEFINO COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, Relator
Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Relator, Dolcefino Communications, LLC, has filed a petition for a writ of
mandamus asserting that the trial court abused its discretion by denying relator’s
petition for pre-suit discovery pursuant to Rule 202 of the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure (the “Rule 202 Petition”). See TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.
We dismiss relator’s petition for writ of mandamus for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.1
“Standing is implicit in the concept of subject matter jurisdiction.” Tex. Ass’n
of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993). Standing is a
constitutional prerequisite to obtaining judicial relief, and courts have no jurisdiction
over and thus must dismiss claims made by parties who lack standing to assert them.
See Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012); see also
Nephrology Leaders & Assocs. v. Am. Renal Assocs. LLC, 573 S.W.3d 912, 914
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.).
To have standing to assert a claim, a party must generally demonstrate that it
possesses an interest in the conflict distinct from that of the general public, such that
it sustained a specific or particular injury. See Linegar v. DLA Piper LLP (US), 495
S.W.3d 276, 279 (Tex. 2016); see also Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829,
843 (Tex. 2000) (“[A]n appealing party may not complain of errors that do not
injuriously affect it or that merely affect the rights of others.”). Just as a plaintiff
must have standing to seek relief in the trial court, a party on appeal must
have standing to challenge an order or judgment of the trial court. Tex. Quarter
1
The underlying case is In re: Friendswood Police Department, Cause No.
19-CV-0814, in the 405th District Court of Galveston County, Texas, the Honorable
Jared Robinson presiding.
2
Horse Ass'n v. Am. Legion Dep't of Tex., 496 S.W.3d 175, 181 (Tex. App.—Austin
2016, no pet.) (citing State v. Naylor, 466 S.W.3d 783, 787 (Tex. 2015)).
The Rule 202 Petition was filed in the trial court by relator “as representative
of Mindy Lee Comstock, Joseph Manley, and Bonnie Manley.” However, the
mandamus record does not include any evidence which establishes that relator had
the authority to act in such representative capacity, and as such, relator lacked
standing to bring the Rule 202 Petition. See Timbertech Inc. v. Wallboards Inc., No.
14-98-00422-CV, 1999 WL 649116, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug.
26, 1999, pet. denied) (not designated for publication) (“Without the authority to sue
in a representative capacity, [appellants] had no standing to sue at all.”).
Further, the petition for writ of mandamus was brought solely by “Relator,
Dolcefino Communications, LLC.” The mandamus record fails to establish that
relator is, itself, an “aggrieved party,” giving it standing to seek relief, either from
the trial court or from this Court. See Torrington Co., 46 S.W.3d at 843; Ghaffari v.
Empire Petroleum Partners LLC, No. 02-17-00164-CV, 2018 WL 1005237, at *3
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 22, 2018, pet. denied) (“A party lacks standing when
it is not personally aggrieved.”) (citing Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171
S.W.3d 845, 848–49 (Tex. 2005)).
3
Because relator lacks standing to obtain the relief sought, we dismiss relator’s
petition for writ of mandamus for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. All pending
motions are dismissed as moot.
PER CURIAM
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Lloyd, and Landau
4