ALD-268 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 20-2020
___________
JOHNNIE MICKELL,
Appellant
v.
LYCOMING COUNTY CENTRAL COLLECTIONS OFFICE
AND ADMINISTRATION
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 4-20-cv-00268)
District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
July 30, 2020
Before: MCKEE, SHWARTZ, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 16, 2020)
_________
OPINION *
_________
PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Johnnie Mickell appeals pro se from the dismissal of his complaint as frivolous
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). 1 Because the appeal presents no substantial
question, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.
Mickell brought this civil rights suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the
Lycoming County Central Collections and Administration (LCCCA) seeking $30 million
in damages for, inter alia, violations of his constitutional rights. 2 Attached to the
complaint were letters from the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas advising
Mickell that he had an unpaid and overdue balance of court ordered-costs and fees
stemming from three criminal cases, and directing him to remit payment to the County of
Lycoming Central Collection Office. The complaint alleged that LCCCA “falsified”
these documents to “mislead public servants to believe” that Mickell owes more than
$30,000 in criminal court costs or fines. The District Court dismissed the complaint after
determining that the claims were barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. This appeal
ensued.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise de novo review
over dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), see Mitchell v. Horn, 318 F.3d 523, 530 (3d
Cir. 2003), and over legal determinations regarding immunity, see Dotzel v. Ashbridge,
438 F.3d 320, 324-25 (3d Cir. 2006). A complaint is frivolous where it relies on an
“indisputably meritless legal theory,” such as where the defendants are “immune from
1
Mickell was granted in forma pauperis (IFP) status pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
2
Mickell also alleged state law claims for, among others, fraud and emotional distress.
2
suit.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). We agree with the District Court
that the complaint does not survive screening under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), albeit for reasons
different from those set forth by the District Court. 3
The District Court concluded that Mickell’s constitutional claims against LCCCA
were barred by the Eleventh Amendment, which protects a state or state agency from suit,
unless Congress has specifically abrogated the state’s immunity or the state has waived
its own immunity. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100
(1984); Laskaris v. Thornburgh, 661 F.2d 23, 25-26 (3d Cir. 1981). The District Court
determined that (1) pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9728(a), Pennsylvania’s Courts of
Common Pleas are authorized to operate collection enforcement units for the collection
of court-ordered fees, and (2) LCCCA, as Lycoming County’s collection enforcement
unit, is acting as an “arm of the state.” See Benn v. First Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d
233, 238-41 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that all components of unified state judicial system
are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity); see Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 69–70 (1989) (holding that States or governmental entities considered “arms
of the State” are not considered “persons” under § 1983). However, the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania authorizes counties, not courts, to operate collection enforcement units.
See 42 Pa. C.S.A.§ 9728(a); see also Chisolm v. McManimon, 275 F.3d 315, 322 (3d Cir.
2001) (noting that Eleventh Amendment immunity protections “do not extend to
counties” unless the state is determined to be the “real party-in-interest”). Nevertheless,
3
Contrary to Mickell’s contention, the District Court was authorized to screen the
complaint prior to service of process. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A.
3
we need not decide if LCCCA is an “arm of the state” because the complaint is otherwise
subject to dismissal as frivolous as it lacks an arguable basis in fact. See Neitzke, 490
U.S. at 325.
The thrust of Mickell’s complaint is that his court costs and fines were vacated,
and therefore LCCCA’s attempts to collect the fees must be the product of fraud.
Specifically, the complaint alleges that a judge vacated Mickell’s fines/costs “as credit
for time served and the information [was] put in [the judge’s] non-archived, and court
reported to a disposal log, as non-permanent for one year, then destroyed, purs[u]ant to
201 Pa. Code. Chapter 40.” It further alleges that the fact that Mickell did not make any
payments on the fines/costs from 1998 (when he was released from prison) to 2020, and
yet no bench warrant has been issued for his arrest, is evidence that he did not owe any
more fines/costs. These factual allegations – that a judge vacated Mickell’s criminal
costs and fees for “time served,” but did not officially record that judgment except in a
“disposal log,” and that all evidence of the judgment was destroyed after one year – are
simply unbelievable. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (“[A] finding of
factual frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the
irrational or the wholly incredible.”). Indeed, we take judicial notice of the Court of
Common Pleas of Lycoming County criminal docket which belies Mickell’s claim that
his costs and fees have been vacated. Cf. id. (noting that “a finding of factual
frivolousness is appropriate when the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the
wholly incredible, whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to
contradict them”). Therefore, the allegations against LCCCA are “clearly baseless” and
4
the complaint was properly dismissed as frivolous pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(b)(i).
Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. Further, because amendment of the complaint would be futile,
dismissal of Mickell’s complaint with prejudice was appropriate. See Connelly v. Steel
Valley Sch. Dist., 706 F.3d 209, 217 (3d Cir. 2013). 4
Based on the foregoing, Mickell’s challenge to the District Court’s order does not
present a substantial question. We will therefore summarily affirm the District Court’s
order. 5
4
Having concluded that Mickell failed to state any federal claims for relief, the District
Court did not abuse its discretion in implicitly declining to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over any remaining claims. See Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Grp., Inc., 584 F.3d
169, 174 (3d Cir. 2009).
5
Mickell’s motion for injunctive relief is denied.
5