United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
No. 18-2219
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
CLAUDIO VALDEZ, a/k/a Claudio Radhames Valdez Nunez, a/k/a
Radhames, a/k/a Carlos Giovanetti Torres, a/k/a Luis Hernandez,
a/k/a Luis Nunes,
Defendant, Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND
[Hon. John J. McConnell, Jr., Chief U.S. District Judge]
Before
Lynch, Kayatta, and Barron,
Circuit Judges.
John T. Ouderkirk, Jr., by appointment of the Court, on brief
for appellant.
Donald C. Lockhart, Assistant United States Attorney, and
Aaron L. Weisman, United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.
September 21, 2020
LYNCH, Circuit Judge. Claudio Valdez entered into a
plea agreement and was sentenced to 240 months' imprisonment
pursuant to that agreement. The district court denied his pro se
motions to withdraw his guilty plea and to appoint new counsel.
We affirm.
I.
On April 11, 2017, Valdez was arrested as a leader and
organizer of a major drug-trafficking organization which had
customers in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. On May
4, 2017, Valdez was charged by indictment with one count of
conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute
one kilogram or more of heroin, and other amounts of fentanyl,
cocaine base, and cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
(b)(1)(A), and 846, and one count of illegal reentry in violation
of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2).
On April 12, 2017, Valdez was appointed counsel. On
January 25, 2018, he filed a motion seeking new court-appointed
counsel, arguing that his attorney had a "conflict of interest"
and was not "represent[ing] [his] best interest and well-being,"
but failed to specify facts evidencing such a conflict. A hearing
on the motion was held before a magistrate judge on February 15,
2018, who denied the motion as "conclusory" and a "purely tactical
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attempt[] [by the defendant] to try to either create appeal issues
or to delay proceedings by the replacement of counsel."1
On May 17, 2018, Valdez signed a plea agreement. The
government agreed not to file a sentencing enhancement pursuant to
21 U.S.C. § 851. Such an enhancement would have exposed the
defendant to a mandatory life sentence. The government also agreed
to recommend that the court impose a term of twenty years'
imprisonment. Valdez specifically "stipulate[d] and agree[d]" to
the facts contained in the plea agreement. Valdez also
acknowledged that he understood the possible statutory penalties
for the charged offenses and the sentence he would receive if the
court accepted the plea agreement. Finally, before signing, Valdez
acknowledged that he "ha[d] read the agreement or ha[d] had it
read to [him], ha[d] discussed it with [his] [attorney],
underst[ood] it, and agree[d] to its provisions."2
A change-of-plea hearing was held on June 7, 2018. At
that hearing, Valdez affirmed that he had "thoroughly reviewed the
plea agreement with [his] attorney and [his attorney had] answered
any questions that [he] ha[d] about that plea agreement," and that
he "underst[ood] as part of that plea agreement . . . that [his]
1 Valdez appealed the denial of that motion, but the appeal
was voluntarily dismissed after he "entered a plea of guilty with
the assistance of counsel."
2 The plea agreement also included an appeal waiver, which
the government does not seek to enforce.
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attorney will recommend 20 years of imprisonment and the Government
will recommend 20 years of imprisonment." In response to a
question from the court regarding whether he had "been treated
recently for any mental illness or addiction to narcotic drugs,"
Valdez stated that he was "taking medication to treat anxiety and
for something else" and that he had not taken the medication since
"[y]esterday." The court then asked him whether his not having
taken the medication was "having any effect on [his] ability to
think clearly today," to which the defendant answered "I'm aware
of what's happening" and "I can think clearly."
The district court asked Valdez whether he had reviewed
the indictment and the consequences of the indictment with his
attorney and whether his attorney had answered any questions with
respect to the indictment, and the defendant answered in the
affirmative. Valdez also confirmed that he was "fully satisfied"
with the representation he had received from his attorney. The
court reviewed with Valdez the maximum penalties it could impose
at sentencing, which included "a mandatory minimum of 10 years but
up to a lifetime of imprisonment" for the drug offense and a
maximum of twenty years' imprisonment for the illegal reentry
offense. Valdez acknowledged that he understood those penalties.
The government recited the elements of the charged
offenses and the facts, including those facts Valdez had stipulated
to in the plea agreement and more specific details about the drug-
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trafficking conspiracy and law enforcement investigation. The
district court then "remind[ed] [Valdez] [that the government
would] have to prove each and every one of those elements beyond
a reasonable doubt for [him] to be found guilty of either or both
charges," and asked Valdez whether he "admit[ted] [to] the facts
as stated by the Government as true." Valdez stated that he did.
He had no questions for the court and had nothing further to
discuss with his attorney at that time. The district court
accepted the guilty plea as knowing and voluntary.
The sentencing hearing was held on November 28, 2018.
At the beginning of the hearing, Valdez submitted a letter to the
court, a translation of which stated in relevant part that "I had
no idea, I signed that -- meaning plea agreement -- because my
lawyer told me that my sentence would be 10 to 20 years," that
"[m]y lawyer never explained with certitude so that I could have
a better understanding of the process of coming to or agreeing to
a plea," and that "[h]e never reviewed the evidence with me . . .
before the agreement." Valdez also stated that "I tried to fire
[my lawyer]" and "there's been a breakdown in communication, I do
not trust him, and he does not trust me." Valdez further stated
that "I signed the plea agreement which I did not understand, and
right now I wish to withdraw from that agreement and to abandon
that negotiation" and "I also want to change my lawyer."
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The district court construed the defendant's statement
as making two separate motions: (1) a motion to withdraw the guilty
plea and (2) a motion to appoint new counsel. After hearing from
both the government and defense counsel, the court denied both
motions. With respect to the first, the court stated that it
vividly recall[ed] [the defendant] under oath
admitting that [he] w[as] satisfied with [his]
representation of counsel, that [his attorney]
had fully explained the matter to [him], [and]
that [he] w[as] aware that the plea agreement
that [he] told [the court] [he] knowingly and
voluntarily signed included a mandatory
binding 20-year sentence.
The court concluded that Valdez had "not presented any evidence
. . . that would support a withdrawal of the plea." As to the
second motion, the court noted that a magistrate judge had already
determined that the defendant's previous attempt to replace his
attorney "was a deliberate attempt . . . to stall and disrupt the
orderly administration of this case." The court stated that Valdez
was entitled to a court-appointed attorney who is competent, not
one of his own choosing, and that the defendant had "received that
exceedingly well." It stated that the defendant's attorney was
known "by reputation and observation as one of the finest criminal
defense lawyers in our state if not in our region." The court
concluded that, having observed defense counsel's representation
of the defendant throughout the case, it "ha[d] nothing but the
greatest confidence that he ha[d] well and adequately represented
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[Valdez] as he routinely and regularly d[id] and always does before
this Court." The court accepted the joint sentencing
recommendation in the plea agreement and sentenced Valdez to twenty
years' imprisonment.
Valdez timely appealed.
II.
Represented by new counsel on appeal, Valdez raises
several claims of error with respect to the denial of his motion
to withdraw the guilty plea. Valdez also argues that the district
court abused its discretion in denying the motion for new court-
appointed counsel by "fail[ing] to consider the three guiding
factors" for such requests.
Generally, an appeal from the denial of a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Rodríguez-Morales, 647 F.3d 395, 397
(1st Cir. 2011); United States v. De Alba Pagan, 33 F.3d 125, 127
(1st Cir. 1994). The burden is on the defendant to prove that
there is a "fair and just reason" to withdraw the guilty plea prior
to sentencing. Rodríguez-Morales, 647 F.3d at 398-99 (quoting
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(d)(2)(B)) (assessing several factors in making
that determination); De Alba Pagan, 33 F.3d at 127 (same).
Where a defendant fails to raise a particular Rule 11
error before the district court, however, we review that claim for
plain error. United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55, 58-59 (2002);
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United States v. Laracuent, 778 F.3d 347, 349 (1st Cir. 2015);
United States v. Borrero-Acevedo, 533 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir. 2008).
To demonstrate plain error, the defendant must show "(1) that an
error occurred (2) which was clear or obvious and which not only
(3) affected the defendant's substantial rights, but also (4)
seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation
of judicial proceedings." Laracuent, 778 F.3d at 349 (quoting
United States v. Negrón-Narváez, 403 F.3d 33, 37 (1st Cir. 2005));
see also Borrero-Acevedo, 533 F.3d at 15. To establish that the
defendant's substantial rights were affected, he "must show a
reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have
entered the plea." United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S.
74, 83 (2004); see also Borrero-Acevedo, 533 F.3d at 16.
Our review of the district court's denial of the
defendant's motion to appoint new counsel is for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Karmue, 841 F.3d 24, 31 (1st Cir.
2016). We will reverse a denial for abuse of discretion only after
considering (1) "the adequacy of the [trial] court's inquiry," (2)
"the timeliness of the motion for substitution," and (3) "the
nature of the conflict between the lawyer and client." Id.
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Myers, 294 F.3d
203, 207 (1st Cir. 2002)).
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A. Denial of the Motion to Withdraw the Guilty Plea
Valdez's first claim is that the district court failed
to ensure that he adequately understood the nature of the charged
offenses and erroneously determined that there was a factual basis
for the plea pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(G), (b)(3). Assuming,
arguendo, that Valdez preserved this claim, the record makes clear
that the plea was in full compliance with Rule 11. Our earlier
description of the plea agreement and the change-of-plea hearing
disposes of this claim. See, e.g., United States v. Díaz-
Concepción, 860 F.3d 32, 37, 39 n.4 (1st Cir. 2017); United States
v. Ramos-Mejía, 721 F.3d 12, 14-16 (1st Cir. 2013). The district
court did not abuse its discretion in finding that there was no
fair and just reason for withdrawing the guilty plea given the
weakness of defendant's arguments and the timing of his motion.
See Rodríguez-Morales, 647 F.3d at 398-99 (explaining that "the
force of the reasons offered by the defendant" and "the timing of
the motion" are two of the factors courts consider in determining
whether to permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea prior to
sentencing (quoting United States v. Padilla-Galarza, 351 F.3d
594, 597 (1st Cir. 2003))).
Valdez's second argument is that the district court
failed to inquire adequately into the medication issue to ensure
that his plea was voluntary and intelligent. See United States v.
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Kenney, 756 F.3d 36, 46-47 (1st Cir. 2014); United States v. Parra-
Ibañez, 936 F.2d 588, 595-96 (1st Cir. 1991). This specific claim
was not raised before the district court, and thus we review it
for plain error. See Kenney, 756 F.3d at 45.
After Valdez informed the district court at the change-
of-plea hearing that he had not taken his anxiety medication that
day, the court followed up with questions directed at the
defendant's ability to think clearly despite not having done so.
Valdez answered that he was "aware of what's happening" and
"c[ould] think clearly." The court also observed Valdez's demeanor
and his apt responses to its questions. The court's inquiry was
clearly adequate. See id. at 46-47.
Furthermore, Valdez makes no attempt to show a
reasonable probability that, but for this alleged error, he would
not have entered the plea agreement. Given the strength of the
evidence against him, as well as the substantial benefit conferred
by the plea agreement -- avoiding a mandatory life sentence -- it
is highly doubtful that Valdez would have rejected that agreement.
The defendant's third claim is that the district court
erred in finding that he understood the period of incarceration
which would result from the plea agreement. That argument is only
referenced briefly in the defendant's summary of argument, is not
further developed, and so is waived. GGNSC Admin. Servs., LLC v.
Schrader, 958 F.3d 93, 95 (1st Cir. 2020). Even if the claim were
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not waived, the plea agreement, Valdez's acknowledgment of the
plea agreement, and the discussion at the change-of-plea hearing
demonstrate that Valdez was fully aware of the period of
incarceration he was facing when he pleaded guilty.
B. Denial of the Motion to Appoint New Counsel
Valdez argues that the district court abused its
discretion in denying his motion for new court-appointed counsel.
This claim of error too is meritless. As the district court noted,
five months earlier Valdez had expressed his satisfaction with his
attorney.3 Furthermore, he waited without justification until the
sentencing hearing to file his motion. See, e.g., Karmue, 841
F.3d at 31 (concluding that the fact the motion was made just two
days before sentencing militated against granting it); United
States v. Myers, 294 F.3d 203, 207 (1st Cir. 2002) (same for a
motion filed five days before sentencing without any explanation
for failure to file sooner).
The district court did inquire and hear from both Valdez
and his attorney as to the existence and nature of the alleged
conflict between them. The court appropriately considered the
3 The motion at the sentencing hearing was not merely a
continuation of the defendant's first motion to substitute counsel
filed in January 2018. The appeal of the denial of that motion
was voluntarily dismissed after Valdez entered the plea agreement
with the assistance of counsel. This is not a situation where the
defendant consistently objected to the effectiveness of counsel
over a significant period of time. Cf. United States v. Kar, 851
F.3d 59, 65 (1st Cir. 2017).
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defendant's previous frivolous attempt to obtain new counsel,
defense counsel's own statement that he did not believe there was
a conflict, defense counsel's reputation, and its own observations
of defense counsel's adequate representation of Valdez. See, e.g.,
United States v. Kar, 851 F.3d 59, 65-66 (1st Cir. 2017); Karmue,
841 F.3d at 31; United States v. Hicks, 531 F.3d 49, 51-52, 54-55
(1st Cir. 2008).
Nothing in the record shows an actual conflict or "total
lack of communication" between Valdez and his attorney which
"prevent[ed] an adequate defense." Kar, 851 F.3d at 66 (quoting
United States v. Allen, 789 F.2d 90, 92 (1st Cir. 1986)). Defense
counsel had discussed the plea agreement and its consequences with
Valdez numerous times, which Valdez acknowledged at the change-
of-plea hearing.
The district court did not err in denying both motions.
Affirmed.
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