UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 17-4268
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JIAN-YUN DONG, a/k/a John Dong,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 18-4852
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JIAN-YUN DONG, a/k/a John Dong,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 19-4359
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JIAN-YUN DONG, a/k/a John Dong,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 19-4511
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JIAN-YUN DONG, a/k/a John Dong,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
Charleston. Bruce H. Hendricks, District Judge. (2:11-cr-00511-BHH-1)
Submitted: July 30, 2020 Decided: August 6, 2020
Before MOTZ, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Motion denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
2
Emily Deck Harrill, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL
PUBLIC DEFENDER, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. A. Lance Crick, Acting
United States Attorney, Carrie A. Fisher Sherard, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
3
PER CURIAM:
After a bench trial in 2015, Jian-Yun Dong was convicted of conspiracy to commit
offenses or to defraud the United States, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2018), theft of
government property and aiding and abetting such conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2,
641 (2018), and 22 counts of wire fraud and aiding and abetting such conduct, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 1343 (2018). The district court restrained several direct and substitute
assets prior to trial. The court had found that the directly forfeitable asset, a building that
had not been completed, would most likely be insufficient to fulfill Dong’s monetary
obligation if he was convicted and ordered to pay a money judgment. After Dong’s
conviction, the United States moved for a preliminary order of forfeiture of the building,
and the restraint of several substitute assets. The United States then moved to hold the
forfeiture of the substitute assets in abeyance pending sale of the building. Prior to
sentencing, the court issued a preliminary order of forfeiture against the building while
restraining Dong’s substitute assets with the understanding that those assets would be
forfeited to fulfill the money judgment. Dong was sentenced to 70 months’ imprisonment,
3 years’ supervised release, and restitution of $3,211,599.83. The court incorporated the
preliminary order of forfeiture into the judgment. After Dong appealed, he moved in this
court for the release of substitute assets to cover the cost of retained appellate counsel.
Dong’s retained counsel filed an amended motion. It is this motion that is the subject of
this consolidated appeal. 1 We deny the motion.
1
Dong’s appellate brief raises a number of issues that have nothing to do with the
motion presently before the court. We will not review those issues.
4
In Luis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1083 (2016), the Supreme Court held that a
criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel prohibits the district court from
restraining the defendant’s untainted assets pretrial. Id. at 1093. The Court concluded that
the United States had only a contingent interest in the defendant’s innocent assets. Id.
Later, this court held that a criminal defendant may not use forfeited assets, including
forfeited substitute assets, to pay for appellate counsel. United States v. Marshall, 872 F.3d
213, 220 (4th Cir. 2017).
Here, Dong has been convicted and a money judgment issued. There is no
indication that Dong had any directly forfeitable tainted assets other than the building.
When the district court issued a preliminary order of forfeiture against the building, it
restrained Dong’s substitute assets in well-founded anticipation that the sale of the building
would fall short of meeting Dong’s monetary obligations.
Accordingly, because the United States’ interest in receiving the full amount of the
money judgment is an important interest that supersedes Dong’s interest in the substitute
assets, we deny Dong’s amended motion to release funds. 2
DENIED
2
We previously granted Dong’s motion to submit this motion on the briefs without
oral argument.
5