UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 20-4049
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JORDAN LEE MOORE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at
Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr., District Judge. (3:17-cr-00181-RJC-DCK-1)
Submitted: July 23, 2020 Decided: July 28, 2020
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and RICHARDSON, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
D. Baker McIntyre III, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray,
Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jordan Lee Moore appeals the district court’s judgment revoking his supervised
release and sentencing Moore to six months’ imprisonment, followed by an additional two-
year term of supervised release. Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but
questioning whether the district court imposed a plainly unreasonable sentence. Although
advised of his right to file a supplemental pro se brief, Moore has not done so. We affirm.
We review the district court’s revocation of supervised release for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Pregent, 190 F.3d 279, 282 (4th Cir. 1999). The district court
need only find a violation of a release condition by a preponderance of the evidence. 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2018). In light of Moore’s admission of the alleged violations of the
terms of his supervised release, we find no abuse of discretion in the revocation of his
supervised release.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of
supervised release.” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). We will
affirm a revocation sentence that “is within the prescribed statutory range and is not plainly
unreasonable.” United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 440 (4th Cir. 2006). “When
reviewing whether a revocation sentence is plainly unreasonable, we must first determine
whether it is unreasonable at all.” United States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir.
2010). A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable where, as here, the district court
adequately explains the sentence after considering the Chapter Seven policy statements and
the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2018) factors. United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202,
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207 (4th Cir. 2017); see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2018). A revocation sentence is substantively
reasonable if the court states a proper basis for concluding that the defendant should receive
the sentence imposed, up to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440. “A court
need not be as detailed or specific when imposing a revocation sentence as it must be when
imposing a post-conviction sentence, but it still must provide a statement of reasons for the
sentence imposed.” Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 (internal quotation marks omitted). Only
if a sentence is either procedurally or substantively unreasonable do we consider whether
the sentence is plainly unreasonable. United States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th
Cir. 2007). We conclude that Moore’s six-month term of imprisonment and his two-year
term of supervised release are within both the statutory maximum and the policy statement
range and are not unreasonable, plainly or otherwise.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and
found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm the revocation judgment. This
court requires that counsel inform Moore, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme
Court of the United States for further review. If Moore requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this
court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy
thereof was served on Moore. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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