UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-4437
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JASON R. SMOOT, a/k/a Rome,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at
Wheeling. John Preston Bailey, District Judge. (5:18-cr-00005-JPB-JPM-1)
Submitted: September 22, 2020 Decided: September 24, 2020
Before NIEMEYER, KEENAN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Frank C. Walker II, FRANK WALKER LAW, Clairton, Pennsylvania, for Appellant.
Stephen L. Vogrin, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jason R. Smoot pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to distribution
of cocaine base within 1,000 feet of a protected location, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 860. On appeal, Smoot’s attorney has filed a brief pursuant to
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are no meritorious grounds
for appeal but questioning whether counsel was ineffective, whether the district court had
jurisdiction over Smoot’s criminal case, 1 and whether the district court erred in accepting
Smoot’s guilty plea. Smoot was advised of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief and
has done so. 2 We affirm.
Because Smoot withdrew his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, we review the
adequacy of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 plea colloquy for plain error. United States v. Sanya,
774 F.3d 812, 815 (4th Cir. 2014). To demonstrate plain error, Smoot “must demonstrate
not only that the district court plainly erred, but also that this error affected his substantial
rights. In the Rule 11 context, this inquiry means that [Smoot] must demonstrate a
reasonable probability that, but for the error, he would not have pleaded guilty.” Id. at 816
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Our review of the Rule 11 colloquy reveals
full compliance with Rule 11, and Smoot’s guilty plea was valid.
1
We reject Smoot’s jurisdictional challenge as patently frivolous.
2
We have considered the issues raised in Smoot’s pro se brief and conclude they
lack merit.
2
Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel generally are not cognizable on direct
appeal. United States v. Maynes, 880 F.3d 110, 113 n.1 (4th Cir. 2018), unless “the
lawyer’s ineffectiveness conclusively appears from the record,” United States v.
Baldovinos, 434 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 2006). To allow for adequate development of the
record, a defendant must bring his ineffective assistance claims, if at all, in a 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 motion. Id. & n.4. Because Smoot fails to meet the relevant standard, we decline
to address his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in this appeal.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in this case and have found
no meritorious grounds for appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment and,
at this juncture, deny counsel’s motion to withdraw. This court requires that counsel
inform Smoot, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States
for further review. If Smoot requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such
a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw
from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on Smoot.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED
3