[Cite as State v. Toy, 2020-Ohio-4619.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF LORAIN )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 19CA011476
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
KEVIN TOY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. 15CR091428
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: September 28, 2020
HENSAL, Judge.
{¶1} Kevin Toy appeals the denial of his motion to suppress and his drug convictions in
the Lorain County Court of Common Pleas. For the following reasons, this Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} Mr. Toy was driving eastbound on the Ohio Turnpike when he was stopped by Ohio
State Highway Patrol Sergeant Neil Laughlin, allegedly for a marked lane violation. According
to Sergeant Laughlin, he smelled the odor of raw marijuana when he reached Mr. Toy’s vehicle
and then observed marijuana inside the vehicle while he was speaking with Mr. Toy and a
passenger. A subsequent search of the vehicle uncovered crack cocaine in the trunk.
{¶3} The Grand Jury indicted Mr. Toy on one count of trafficking in drugs with a major
drug offender specification and one count of possession of drugs. Mr. Toy moved to suppress the
evidence against him, arguing that Sergeant Laughlin did not have reasonable suspicion to stop his
vehicle. Following a hearing, the trial court denied his motion. A jury found him guilty of the
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offenses and the specification, and the trial court sentenced him to 11 years imprisonment. Mr.
Toy has appealed, assigning three errors.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I
THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED MR. TOY’S MOTION TO
SUPPRESS, VIOLATING MR. TOY’S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO BE
FREE FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE. AS A RESULT,
THE EVIDENCE WAS ADMITTED AT TRIAL, DENYING MR. TOY THE
OPPORTUNITY FOR A FAIR TRIAL.
{¶4} Mr. Toy argues that the trial court incorrectly denied his motion to suppress. A
motion to suppress presents a mixed question of law and fact:
When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier of
fact and is therefore in the best position to resolve factual questions and evaluate
the credibility of witnesses. Consequently, an appellate court must accept the trial
court's findings of fact if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.
Accepting these facts as true, the appellate court must then independently
determine, without deference to the conclusion of the trial court, whether the facts
satisfy the applicable legal standard.
(Internal citations omitted.) State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8.
{¶5} Mr. Toy argues that the law enforcement officers who testified at the suppression
hearing were not credible regarding their reason for stopping his vehicle. He notes that neither of
them captured him committing any sort of traffic violation on their dash cameras. He argues that
the officers actually have a history of stopping people along the same stretch of highway for alleged
marked lane violations that are not captured on camera. Mr. Toy also suspects that Sergeant
Laughlin intentionally delayed activating his dash camera to avoid capturing the time period during
which the alleged traffic violations occurred. He also argues that it is not credible that Sergeant
Laughlin is able to make so many drug busts each year compared to the number of traffic citations
he issues.
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{¶6} Mr. Toy did not introduce any evidence at the suppression hearing regarding the
number of other traffic stops Sergeant Laughlin is involved in each year and the circumstances of
those stops. According to Trooper Michael Trader, he was transporting an arrestee to jail when he
passed Mr. Toy’s vehicle, which was travelling below the speed limit. As he passed the vehicle,
he noticed that Mr. Toy and his passenger had closed expressions and appeared to be locked in
place, facing straight ahead, which he thought was unusual. He watched the vehicle exit into a
travel center but radioed ahead to Sergeant Laughlin to report his observations.
{¶7} Sergeant Laughlin testified that he heard Trooper Trader’s report but did not know
how long the vehicle would remain in the travel center. He, therefore, did not have a reason to
activate his dash camera. When the vehicle eventually passed his location, however, he saw it
drive from the center lane over to the righthand lane, crossing the lane markings by about a tire
width before coming back into the center lane. As he prepared to leave the crossover where he
was positioned and enter onto the roadway, he saw the vehicle brake suddenly and then change
into the righthand lane without activating its turn signal. He, therefore, decided to catch up to the
vehicle to initiate a traffic stop. Sergeant Laughlin testified that the dash camera system
automatically saves video beginning from 90 seconds before he activates his overhead lights. In
this case, the video started from the moment that he was pulling onto the roadway, which was after
he observed the traffic violations. There is no evidence in the record regarding the amount of time
it would typically take an officer who is starting from a dead stop to catch up to a vehicle like Mr.
Toy’s.
{¶8} The trial court noted that the report Sergeant Laughlin wrote after the stop stated
that he saw the improper lane change as he pulled onto the highway, suggesting that it would have
been recorded on the video if it had happened. The court thus noted that there was some ambiguity
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or contradiction between Sergeant Laughlin’s report and his testimony as to when the lane change
violation occurred. It assessed the demeanor of Sergeant Laughlin, however, and determined that
he did not act in bad faith and manufacture a reason for pulling Mr. Toy over, even if he was
mistaken when he wrote the report about exactly when the violation occurred, noting that human
beings do not have video recorders in their brains.
{¶9} Sergeant Laughlin explained on cross-examination that, to him, pulling onto the
roadway involves a sequence of activity that includes putting on his seatbelt, watching the other
traffic on the highway to ensure it is safe to pull out of the crossover, as well as actually driving
onto the roadway. He explained that, when he wrote on his report that he saw the improper lane
change while pulling out to catch up to Mr. Toy’s vehicle, it meant that he saw the violation during
the course of activity, not necessarily at the exact moment that he drove onto the roadway. The
trial court was in the best position to observe Sergeant Laughlin’s “demeanor and to ‘use th[o]se
observations to weigh the credibility and resolve the conflicts in the testimony.’” (Alteration sic.)
State v. Robinson, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 18AP0045, 2019-Ohio-3613, ¶ 10, quoting State v.
Andrews, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25114, 2010-Ohio-6126, ¶ 28. It determined that Sergeant
Laughlin did, in fact, observe Mr. Toy commit a traffic violation, even if he was inconsistent about
its exact timing. Upon review of the record, we conclude that the trial court’s finding is supported
by competent, credible evidence. Accordingly, Mr. Toy has not established that the trial court
incorrectly denied his motion to suppress. His first assignment of error is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II
THE VERDICT IN THIS CASE IS AGAINST THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE
EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE REVERSED BECAUSE IT VIOLATES THE
FIFTH, SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO.
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{¶10} Mr. Toy next argues that his convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence.
Whether a conviction is supported by sufficient evidence is a question of law, which we review de
novo. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 386 (1997). In making this determination, we must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution:
An appellate court’s function when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a criminal conviction is to examine the evidence admitted at trial to
determine whether such evidence, if believed, would convince the average mind of
the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The relevant inquiry is whether,
after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.
State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.
{¶11} Mr. Toy argues that the State failed to establish that he knowingly possessed the
drugs that were found in the trunk. He notes that Sergeant Laughlin testified that, while he was
searching Mr. Toy’s vehicle, Mr. Toy asked the passenger that he was travelling with whether
Sergeant Laughlin was close to discovering the drugs, indicating that he did not know where they
were. Mr. Toy also argues that the State did not investigate whose fingerprint was on the trunk of
the vehicle or look for DNA evidence in the trunk. He also argues that there was no evidence that
he intended to sell the drugs or even ever touched them.
{¶12} The jury found Mr. Toy guilty of trafficking in drugs under Ohio Revised Code
Section 2925.03(A)(2) and possession of drugs under Section 2925.11(A). Section 2925.03(A)(2)
provides that no one shall knowingly “[p]repare for shipment, ship, transport, deliver, prepare for
distribution, or distribute a controlled substance * * * when the offender knows or has reasonable
cause to believe that the controlled substance * * * is intended for sale or resale by the offender or
another person.” Section 2925.11(A) provides that no one “shall knowingly obtain, possess, or
use a controlled substance * * *.” “A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the
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person is aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will probably be
of a certain nature.” R.C. 2901.22(B).
{¶13} Sergeant Laughlin testified that, when he interviewed Mr. Toy after arresting him,
Mr. Toy admitted that he was transporting the drugs to Pennsylvania to sell them because he only
makes minimum wage at his regular job. The Sergeant’s testimony was sufficient evidence from
which a rational trier of fact could have found that Mr. Toy knowingly possessed the drugs and
knowingly transported them with the intention of selling them. We, therefore, conclude that Mr.
Toy’s convictions were supported by sufficient evidence. Mr. Toy’s second assignment of error
is overruled.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III
THE CONVICTIONS ARE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE
EVIDENCE IN VIOLATION OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE 14TH
AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND OF THE OHIO
CONSTITUTION.
{¶14} Mr. Toy also argues that his convictions are against the manifest weight of the
evidence. When considering a challenge to the manifest weight of the evidence, this Court is
required to consider the entire record, “weigh the evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider
the credibility of witnesses and determine whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier
of fact clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction
must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” State v. Otten, 33 Ohio App.3d 339, 340 (9th
Dist.1986). Weight of the evidence pertains to the greater amount of credible evidence produced
in a trial to support one side over the other side. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, at 387. An
appellate court should only exercise its power to reverse a judgment as against the manifest weight
of the evidence in exceptional cases. State v. Carson, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26900, 2013-Ohio-
5785, ¶ 32, citing Otten at 340.
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{¶15} Mr. Toy argues that his convictions are against the manifest weight of the evidence
because Sergeant Laughlin’s testimony was not credible. Mr. Toy points to the sergeant’s
purported inconsistency about when the alleged traffic violation occurred. He also notes that there
was no recording of his interview with Sergeant Laughlin, even though the sergeant admitted that
he could have had someone bring him recording equipment before the interview started. Mr. Toy
also notes that the sergeant testified that he makes 80-100 serious drug arrests every year and this
was the largest amount of cocaine that he had ever seen. According to Mr. Toy, it is not credible
that Sergeant Laughlin would have failed to record either the initial traffic violation or his alleged
confession in light of the nature of the stop.
{¶16} Sergeant Laughlin testified that after arresting Mr. Toy, he brought him to a
maintenance building where he could further his investigation without being on the roadside. He
said that the maintenance building does not have recording equipment and that only some
plainclothes investigators carry that type of equipment with them. “In reaching its verdict, the jury
was in the best position to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and it was entitled to believe
all, part, or none of the testimony of each witness.” State v. Shank, 9th Dist. Medina No.
12CA0104-M, 2013-Ohio-5368, ¶ 29. Upon review of the record, we cannot say that the jury lost
its way when it determined that Sergeant Laughlin’s testimony was credible. We conclude that
Mr. Toy’s conviction was not against the weight of the evidence. Mr. Toy’s third assignment of
error is overruled.
III.
{¶17} Mr. Toy’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Lorain County
Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
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There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of
this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
JENNIFER HENSAL
FOR THE COURT
SCHAFER, J.
CONCURS.
CARR, P. J.
CONCURS IN JUDGMENT ONLY.
APPEARANCES:
GIOVANNA V. BREMKE, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
DENNIS P. WILL, Prosecuting Attorney, and BRIAN P. MURPHY, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for Appellee.