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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
RONALD D. WILLIAMS :
:
Appellant : No. 3620 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Order Entered December 3, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0411681-1996,
CP-51-CR-1202801-1996
BEFORE: BOWES, J., SHOGAN, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 29, 2020
Appellant, Ronald D. Williams, appeals from the December 3, 2018 order
denying his petitions filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”),
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546, at trial court docket numbers CP-51-CR-00411681-
1996 and CP-51-CR-1202801-1996.1 We affirm.
The PCRA court summarized the factual and procedural history of this
case as follows:
On March 28, 1996, [Appellant] killed Fred Williams during
an attempted robbery on the 700 block of W. Master Street in
Philadelphia. [Appellant] fired five shots with a handgun at the
victim. An elderly neighbor testified that she heard the victim beg
for his life while lying on the ground beneath [Appellant], “[D]on’t
do me like that, don’t do me like that...”[.] [Appellant] rifled the
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 The order denying the PCRA petitions listed both trial court docket numbers.
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pockets of the victim. . . . Williams died as a result of the shooting.
When police arrived at the scene, [Appellant] was hunched over
the victim’s body. [Appellant] attempted to flee the scene but
was chased and arrested by police shortly thereafter.
[Appellant] was charged with First Degree Murder and
related offenses. At trial, the following occurred:
The Commonwealth presented the following
uncontradicted evidence of [Appellant’s] guilt: (1)
two witnesses, who lived on the block where the
incident occurred, testified to hearing one gunshot
followed by four more gunshots; (2) these witnesses
saw [Appellant] standing over the victim and going
through his pockets; (3) Officer William Jordan, who
was on patrol in the area, heard several gunshots and
as he drove toward the source of the gunshots, he saw
[Appellant] reach down, yank a watch from the
victim’s arm and then flee; (4) Officer Jordan pursued
[Appellant] in his patrol car, placed him under arrest,
patted him down and found a watch with a broken
band in his possession; (5) [Appellant’s] clothes had
blood on them at the time of his arrest; (6)
[Appellant] waived his Miranda rights and admitted to
the police that he pulled a .38 caliber gun on the
victim in an attempt to rob him; (7) the victim died as
a result of suffering four gunshot wounds; and (8) the
projectile, which was removed from the victim’s body,
was from a .38 caliber or 9 mm handgun.
Commonwealth v. Williams, 775 PHL 1997, 6-7 (Pa. Super. 1998).
On January 23, 1997, [Appellant] was found guilty of murder in
the second degree, robbery, [and] possession of an instrument of
crime[2] following a jury trial before the Honorable Jane Cutler
Greenspan. [Appellant] waived a mental health evaluation and
was immediately sentenced to life incarceration without the
possibility of parole. On April 1, 1998, the Superior Court affirmed
[Appellant’s] judgment of sentence. On April 15, 1998,
[Appellant] filed a petition for allowance of appeal to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, which was denied on August 25,
1998.
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2 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2502, 3701, and 907, respectively.
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On March 7, 2016, [Appellant] filed a pro se PCRA petition
in which he claimed to be serving an illegal sentence and that his
petition met the time filing exception due to the new constitutional
change recognized in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012).
On February 2, 2018, Mark D. Mungello, Esquire was appointed to
represent [Appellant]. On April 3, 2018, [Appellant] filed an
Amended PCRA petition. [Appellant’s] date of birth is June 1,
1975. [Appellant] admits that he was 20 years old at the time of
the offense.
On November 2, 2018, the [c]ourt sent [Appellant] a 907
Notice of Intent to Dismiss. On November 26, 2018, [Appellant]
filed a response to the 907 Notice. On December 3, 2018,
following a thorough review of the record, this [c]ourt dismissed
[Appellant’s] PCRA petition as untimely and for lack of merit. On
December 12, 2018, [Appellant] filed a Notice of Appeal.
PCRA Court Opinion, 3/4/19, at 2-3. The PCRA court did not order the filing
of a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, but it filed an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a).
Before we address the merits of Appellant’s claims, we must determine
whether this appeal is properly before us. The record reveals that on
December 12, 2018, Appellant filed identical notices of appeal from the
dismissal of his PCRA petitions at trial court docket numbers CP-51-CR-
0411681-1996 and CP-51-CR-1202801-1996. Both notices of appeal bore
docket numbers CP-51-CR-0411681-1996 and CP-51-CR-1202801-1996.
Notices of Appeal, 12/12/18. As noted, the PCRA court order dismissing the
PCRA petitions as untimely included both trial court docket numbers. Note 1
supra.
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In Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969 (Pa. 2018), our Supreme
Court explained that “[t]he Official Note to Rule 341 provides a bright-line
mandatory instruction to practitioners to file separate notices of appeal.” Id.
at 976-977. “Where ... one or more orders resolves issues arising on more
than one docket or relating to more than one judgment, separate notices of
appeals must be filed.” Id. at 976 (quoting Pa.R.A.P. 341, note). The failure
to file separate notices of appeal at each docket requires the appellate court
to quash the appeal. Id. at 977. Our Supreme Court held that Walker applies
prospectively to appeals filed after June 1, 2018. Id. at 971.
After our Supreme Court filed its decision in Walker, a panel of our
Court decided Commonwealth v. Creese, 216 A.3d 1142 (Pa. Super. 2019).
In Creese, the Majority concluded that the appellant did not comply with the
requirements set forth in Walker. Specifically, the appellant in Creese filed
four identical notices of appeal, each listing all four trial court docket numbers.
Creese, 216 A.3d at 1144. The Majority quashed the appeals holding, “[This
Court] may not accept a notice of appeal listing multiple docket numbers, even
if those notices are included in the records of each case. Instead, a notice of
appeal may contain only one docket number.” Id.
However, during the pendency of the instant appeals, an en banc panel
of this Court expressly overruled Creese’s mandate that a notice of appeal
may contain only one docket number. Commonwealth v. Johnson, ___
A.3d ___, ___, 2020 PA Super 164, *5 (Pa. Super. filed July 9, 2020) (en
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banc)). Specifically, the en banc Court opined that where an appellant files a
separate notice of appeal at each trial court docket, “[t]he fact that the notices
[of appeal] contained [more than one trial court docket number] is of no
consequence.” Id. Thus, pursuant to Johnson, although Appellant’s
separate notices of appeal bore more than one docket number, the notices of
appeal do not run afoul of Walker or Pa.R.A.P. 341. Accordingly, we continue
with our discussion.
Appellant presents the following issue for our review:
Whether the lower court improperly dismissed [Appellant’s]
P.C.R.A. Petition as being untimely and without merit where that
Petition was filed within the requisite period of time after the
discovery of the expansion of the Constitutional right against cruel
and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment afforded
to him as applied to the states pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment under Miller v. Alabama, and where [Appellant]
suffered chronic traumatic abuse during his childhood and
adolescence which caused his brain to be undeveloped or
immature or lacking in physical maturity, even after he reached
the age of 18 when he committed the crime herein.
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
When reviewing the propriety of an order denying PCRA relief, we
consider the record “in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the
PCRA level.” Commonwealth v. Stultz, 114 A.3d 865, 872 (Pa. Super.
2015) (quoting Commonwealth v. Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(en banc)). This Court is limited to determining whether the evidence of
record supports the conclusions of the PCRA court and whether the ruling is
free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 139 A.3d 178, 185 (Pa.
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2016). The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no
support for them in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Lippert, 85 A.3d
1095, 1100 (Pa. Super. 2014).
A PCRA petition must be filed within one year of the date that the
judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). This time
requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and the court may not
ignore it in order to reach the merits of the petition. Commonwealth v.
Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651 (Pa. Super. 2013). A judgment of sentence
“becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary
review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9545(b)(3).
However, an untimely petition may be received when the petition
alleges, and the petitioner proves, that any of the three limited exceptions to
the time for filing the petition, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and
(iii), is met.3 A petition invoking one of these exceptions must be filed within
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3 The exceptions to the timeliness requirement are:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation of the
claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
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sixty days of the date the claim could first have been presented. 4 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9545(b)(2).
Our review of the record reflects that Appellant initially was sentenced
on January 23, 1997. This Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence
on April 1, 1998. Commonwealth v.Williams, 718 A.2d 350, 775 EDA 1997
(Pa. Super. filed April 1, 1998) (unpublished memorandum). Appellant filed
a petition for allowance of appeal that was denied by our Supreme Court on
August 25, 1998. Williams, 727 A.2d 131, 163 EAL 1998 (Pa. filed August
25, 1998). Appellant did not file an appeal with the United States Supreme
Court.
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(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in
this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii).
4 Until recently, a petition invoking an exception was required to be filed within
sixty days of the date the claim could have been presented. However, Act
146 of 2018 amended 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2), and Section 9545(b)(2) now
provides that a PCRA petition invoking a timeliness exception must be filed
within one year of the date the claim could have been presented. See 2018
Pa.Legis.Serv.Act 2018-146 (S.B. 915), effective December 24, 2018, § 2 and
§ 3 (“[T]he amendment ... shall apply to claims arising on Dec. 24, 2017 or
thereafter.”). Appellant’s PCRA petition in this matter was filed prior to this
change.
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As such, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final for PCRA
purposes on November 23, 1998, ninety days after the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court denied allocatur and time expired for Appellant to file an appeal with
the United States Supreme Court. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3); U.S. Sup. Ct. R.
13. Therefore, Appellant had to file the current PCRA petition by November
23, 1999, in order for it to be timely. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1) (a PCRA
petition must be filed within one year of the date that the judgment of
sentence becomes final). Appellant did not file the instant PCRA petition until
March 7, 2016. Thus, Appellant’s instant PCRA petition is patently untimely.
As previously stated, if a petitioner does not file a timely PCRA petition,
his petition may nevertheless be received under any of the three limited
exceptions to the timeliness requirements of the PCRA. 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9545(b)(1). If a petitioner asserts one of these exceptions, he must file his
petition within sixty days of the date that the exception could be asserted. 42
Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2). It is the petitioner’s burden to allege and prove that
one of the exceptions exists. Commonwealth v. Whitehawk, 146 A.3d 266,
269–270 (Pa. Super. 2016).
In the case sub judice, Appellant asserts that “his petition met the time
filing exception due to the expansion of the new constitutional change
recognized in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012),” and that
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718, 732 (2016), made the holding in
Miller retroactive. Appellant’s Brief at 10, 12. While Appellant acknowledges
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that he was twenty years of age at the time of the murder, Appellant “is
arguing that there should be an expansion of the current constitutional right
of those under 18 years of age to include those at or over the age of 18 up to
25 to not be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.” Id. at 12.
Appellant further maintains that it would be “cruel and unusual punishment to
sentence someone with an immature brain to such a harsh sentence.” Id.
Appellant posits that scientific evidence supports this position. Id. at 19-23.
In Miller, the United States Supreme Court held that it is
unconstitutional for state courts to impose an automatic life sentence without
possibility of parole upon a homicide defendant for a murder committed while
the defendant was under eighteen years old. Miller, 567 U.S. at 470. In
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718, 732 (2016), the U.S. Supreme
Court held that its decision in Miller applied retroactively. However, in the
case sub judice, because Appellant was twenty years old at the time he
committed the instant murder, Miller is inapplicable. See Commonwealth
v. Lee, 206 A.3d 1, 9 (Pa. Super. 2019) (en banc) (holding that appellant,
who was over the age of eighteen at the time of offense, could not invoke
Miller to overcome the PCRA time-bar); Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90
A.3d 1, 6 (Pa. Super. 2014) (stating that the holding in Miller is limited to
those offenders who were juveniles at the time they committed their crimes).
Further, this Court previously has refused to render relief on the brain
science argument that Appellant raises in his PCRA Petition. See
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Commonwealth v. Furgess, 149 A.3d 90, 94 (Pa. Super. 2016) (rejecting
the nineteen-year-old appellant’s argument based on neuroscientific theories
of brain development that he is entitled to PCRA relief because he was a
“technical juvenile” at the time he committed his crimes). In Lee, this Court
explained, “As compelling as the ‘rationale’ argument is, we find it untenable
to extend Miller to one who is over the age of 18 at the time of his or her
offense for purposes of satisfying the newly-recognized constitutional right
exception in section 9545(b)(1)(iii).” Lee, 206 A.3d at 10. We further stated,
“[A]ge is the sole factor in determining whether Miller applies to overcome
the PCRA time-bar, and we decline to extend its categorical holding.” Id. at
11. Thus, Appellant has failed to establish an exception to the PCRA time-bar
on the basis of Miller and Montgomery.
Consequently, because the instant PCRA petition was untimely and no
exceptions apply, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to address the claims
presented and grant relief. See Commonwealth v. Fairiror, 809 A.2d 396,
398 (Pa. Super. 2002) (holding that PCRA court lacks jurisdiction to hear
untimely petition).
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/29/20
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