FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
OCT 2 2020
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JEFFREY GREEN, No. 19-16682
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:15-cv-02570-DJH
v.
MEMORANDUM*
CITY OF PHOENIX,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Diane J. Humetewa, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted September 18, 2020
San Francisco, California
Before: SCHROEDER, W. FLETCHER, and HUNSAKER, Circuit Judges.
Jeffrey Green is a Sergeant in the Phoenix Police Department. In 2015, he
brought an action against the City of Phoenix alleging that, between 2012 and
2015, the City violated Title VII by retaliating against him for filing EEOC
charges, helping a subordinate file a sexual harassment complaint, and refusing to
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
aid his supervisor in conduct violating Title VII. Green’s alleged damages, which
were limited to pain and suffering, were not supported by any witnesses, evidence,
or documentation other than his own testimony. Throughout the period relevant to
his claims and continuing to the present time, Green has continued to be employed
by the Phoenix Police Department.
The case went to trial and a jury returned a $1.5 million verdict for Green.
The district court then vacated the jury verdict, granting the City’s Rule 50 motion
for judgment as a matter of law, which Green now appeals. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Green claims that the City took adverse action against him in retaliation for
engaging in activities protected by Title VII. To establish retaliation under Title
VII, an employee must show that (1) he or she engaged in protected activity, (2) he
or she experienced an adverse employment action, and (3) “his or her protected
activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse action by the employer.” Univ.
of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 362 (2013); Cornwell v. Electra
Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1034–35 (9th Cir. 2006). It is not sufficient to
show that the protected activities were a motivating factor in the employer’s
decision. Nassar, 570 U.S. at 362–63.
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The district court considered Green’s claims and correctly concluded that, as
to each, Green had failed to satisfy his burden to show a but-for causal connection
between his protected activities and the adverse employment actions he later
experienced.
First, Green did not establish but-for causation between his protected activity
and the fitness-for-duty evaluation he was ordered to undergo in May 2012. As
Green admits, no evidence shows that the Assistant Police Chief who ordered the
work fitness evaluation had any knowledge of Green’s prior protected activities.
Green attempts to impute knowledge onto the Assistant Chief by arguing that both
of Green’s immediate supervisors knew of his protected actions. But Green fails to
prove that his supervisors influenced the decision to order the evaluation. Without
such proof, Green cannot succeed on his “cat’s paw” theory. Acosta v. Brain, 910
F.3d 502, 514–15 (9th Cir. 2018). Regardless of whether temporal proximity alone
can suffice to demonstrate but-for causation, see Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, Green did
not satisfy his burden to prove causation under any but-for standard.
Second, Green failed to establish that his protected activity was a but-for
cause of his second work fitness evaluation in August 2012. Green alleges he was
required to undergo a second work fitness evaluation because he objected to his
supervisor’s disciplinary measures against a subordinate who made inappropriate
3
comments on Facebook: one calling another officer a hypocrite and one
questioning a different officer’s moral standards. Green claims that the
disciplinary measures were actually prompted by a sexual harassment complaint
that the subordinate had filed several months earlier, but Green’s own admissions
that the Facebook comments were inappropriate and disruptive show this claim to
be unreasonable.
Third, Green failed to show that the City’s claimed non-retaliatory reasons
for giving him a poor performance review—and consequently transferring him out
of his division—were mere pretext. Prior to receiving the unsatisfactory
performance review, Green received negative feedback from his supervisors on
multiple occasions. Green points to positive comments that he received alongside
the negative feedback, but mixed feedback is not proof that the poor performance
review was retaliatory or undeserved. The district court found that Green “failed to
present specific and substantial evidence of pretext,” and we agree.
Green also contends that the district court abused its discretion by excluding
three specific pieces of evidence at trial. We disagree. The district court did not
err by excluding as irrelevant testimony about Green’s performance in other units
before and after the period in question. Nor did the district court abuse its
discretion by admitting evidence that Green filed a largely unrelated EEOC hostile
4
work environment complaint in 2009 while declining to admit the report’s contents
as more prejudicial than probative. Finally, the district court reasonably limited the
testimony of a lay witness City employee to matters about which she had personal
knowledge.
AFFIRMED.
5
Jeffrey Green v. City of Phoenix
Combined Opinion