[Cite as Patterson v. Nationwide Truck Brokers, Inc., 2020-Ohio-4803.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT )
ERIC L. PATTERSON, et al. C.A. No. 29715
Appellants
v.
NATIONWIDE TRUCK BROKERS, INC.,
et al.
Defendants
and
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
SWAGELOK COMPANY WELFARE ENTERED IN THE
BENEFITS PLAN COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
Appellee CASE No. CV-2016-11-4897
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: October 7, 2020
CALLAHAN, Presiding Judge.
{¶1} Appellants, Eric and Laura Patterson (“the Pattersons”) appeal an order of the
Summit County Court of Common Pleas that determined that it lacked jurisdiction to consider
their motion for sanctions. This Court reverses.
I.
{¶2} The Pattersons filed a complaint against an alleged tortfeasor and related parties
after Mr. Patterson was injured in an automobile accident. The complaint also named the
Swagelok Company Welfare Benefit Plan (“the Plan”) as a defendant, noting that the Plan may
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have paid medical bills on Mr. Patterson’s behalf and requiring the Plan to assert its subrogation
rights, if any. The Plan asserted a right to subrogation and reimbursement with respect to medical
bills that it paid. During the course of the litigation, the Plan produced a summary plan description,
but did not produce a plan document. The parties resolved all of the claims at issue and, on July
19, 2017, all claims were dismissed with prejudice pursuant to a joint stipulation of dismissal.
{¶3} On March 7, 2019, the Pattersons filed a motion for sanctions, alleging that in a
second, unrelated case, the Plan produced the relevant plan document and that it contradicted the
summary plan description provided in this case with respect to subrogation rights. The trial court
concluded that because this case had been dismissed and the trial court neither reserved jurisdiction
over the settlement nor incorporated the terms of the settlement into the dismissal, it did not have
jurisdiction to act. The Pattersons filed this appeal.
II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IT DID NOT RETAIN
JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS’ MOTION FOR
SANCTIONS FOLLOWING THE VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL OF ALL
CLAIMS PURSUANT TO CIV.R. 41(A).
{¶4} In the Pattersons’ sole assignment of error, they argue that the trial court erred by
concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider their motion for sanctions. Specifically, they
maintain that their motion for sanctions raised a collateral issue that could be considered by the
trial court notwithstanding the stipulated dismissal with prejudice.
{¶5} As a general rule, a trial court does not have jurisdiction over a case once a final
judgment has been entered, but may act when specific authority is granted it to do so. Palmer v.
Bowers, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 15CA010836, 2017-Ohio-355, ¶ 10. Similarly, a trial court does not
have jurisdiction to enforce a settlement agreement after a dismissal has been entered unless
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jurisdiction to do so was reserved in the dismissal or the terms of the settlement were incorporated
therein. Infinite Security Solutions, L.L.C. v. Karam Properties II, Ltd., 143 Ohio St.3d 346, 2015-
Ohio-1101, syllabus. In various circumstances, however, courts have also concluded that after a
dismissal, a trial court may consider a motion for sanctions because such a motion is collateral to
the proceedings. See, e.g., Sunrise Coop., Inc. v. Joppeck, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 16CA010984,
2017-Ohio-7654, ¶ 21 (concluding that a motion for sanctions can be considered after a dismissal
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction over the case); Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. v. GMS Mgt. Co.,
Inc., 9th Dist. Summit No. 19814, 2000 WL 840495, *2 (June 28, 2000), quoting Baker v.
USS/Kobe Steel Co., 9th Dist. Lorain No. 98CA007151, 2000 WL 14044, *2 (Jan. 5, 2000); (noting
that courts retain jurisdiction after a voluntary dismissal to consider motions for sanctions under
R.C. 2323.51 and Civ.R. 11); Lewis v. Celina Fin. Corp., 101 Ohio App.3d 464, 470 (3d Dist.1995)
(recognizing that a motion for sanctions can be considered after a voluntary dismissal because
“any other result would permit a party to voluntarily dismiss an action to evade an award of
sanctions[.]”). See generally State ex rel. Hummel v. Sadler, 96 Ohio St.3d 84, 2002-Ohio-3605,
¶ 23; State ex rel. Corn v. Russo, 90 Ohio St.3d 551, 556 (2001).
{¶6} The trial court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the Pattersons’
motion for sanctions without considering whether it was a collateral motion that could be
considered after the stipulated dismissal. In this respect, this Court agrees that the trial court erred,
but we decline to consider that question in the first instance. See Allen v. Bennet, 9th Dist. Summit
Nos. 23570, 23573, 23576, 2007-Ohio-5411, ¶ 21. Likewise, this Court makes no determination
regarding the merits of the Pattersons’ motion.
{¶7} The Pattersons’ assignment of error is sustained.
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III.
{¶8} The Pattersons’ assignment of error is sustained, and the judgment of the Summit
County Court of Common Pleas is reversed. This matter is remanded to the trial court for
proceedings consistent with this Court’s resolution of the Pattersons’ assignment of error.
Judgment reversed
and cause remanded.
There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy
of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellee.
LYNNE S. CALLAHAN
FOR THE COURT
SCHAFER, J.
TEODOSIO, J.
CONCUR.
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APPEARANCES:
BENJAMIN P. PFOUTS, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
SHAUN D. BYROADS and DARAN KIEFER, Attorneys at Law, for Appellee.