NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 9 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
TOMAS MARKUSSEN, No. 19-72231
Petitioner, Agency No. A215-674-748
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted October 7, 2020**
Pasadena, California
Before: KLEINFELD, HURWITZ, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.
Tomas Markussen, a citizen of Norway, petitions for review of a Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision dismissing his appeal of an Immigration
Judge (“IJ”) order denying withholding of removal and protection under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We review the denial of Markussen’s claims
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
for substantial evidence. Yali Wang v. Sessions, 861 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 2017).
Under this standard, factual findings “are conclusive unless any reasonable
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B)). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition.
1. Substantial evidence supports the denial of withholding of removal.
Markussen bore the burden of establishing past persecution or a well-founded fear
of future persecution, Tamang v. Holder, 598 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 2010), “at
the hands of the [Norwegian] government or forces that the [Norwegian]
government was unable or unwilling to control,” Truong v. Holder, 613 F.3d 938,
942 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). The Norwegian government did not participate in
the gang violence perpetrated against Markussen, and the IJ identified several
examples of the Norwegian police successfully combating gang violence. The
record does not compel the conclusion that the Norwegian government is complicit
in or indifferent to gang violence. After Markussen reported the incidents to the
police, they promised to investigate. “[W]e are reluctant to infer government
complicity or indifference from the mere fact that . . . police were unable to locate
[Markussen’s] unknown assailants.” Truong, 613 F.3d at 941.
Markussen’s claim for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(i) also fails because substantial evidence supports the determination
that he failed to show persecution on account of a protected ground. Substantial
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evidence supports the IJ’s determination that Markussen’s “anti-gang” political
opinion was not “a reason” for his persecution. See Barajas-Romero v. Lynch, 846
F.3d 351, 358 (9th Cir. 2017). The record does not compel the conclusion that
Markussen’s altercations with gang members bore a nexus to his opinions, and harm
from criminals motivated by random violence is not persecution on a protected
ground, Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010).
2. Substantial evidence also supports the denial of CAT relief. To qualify
for CAT relief, Markussen must have “establish[ed] that it is more likely than not
that [he] would be tortured if returned to [Norway].” Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600
F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam). This torture must also be “inflicted
by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official.”
8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1). Markussen did not establish past torture, and given the
record evidence of Norway’s efforts to combat gang violence, substantial evidence
supports the IJ’s determination that Norway would not consent to or acquiesce in
Markussen’s torture in the future.
PETITION DENIED.
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